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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes a minor campaign of the American 
Civil War, but one which illustrates the importance of the 
railroad, as a line of communications, to strategy. In the 
Spring of 1862, the Union Army in the west concentrated at 
Pittsburg Landing, in Tennessee, preparatory to an advance 
south on Corinth, Mississippi. General Ormsby Macknight 
Mitchel, in command of the Third Division of the Army of the 
Ohio, was given the defensive duty of safeguarding the 
Federal left, which included Middle Tennessee, against any 
Confederate threat from Chattanooga. Instead, Mitchel 
advanced to and captured Huntsville, Alabama.
This action provided several opportunities for the 
Union that Mitchel attempted to pursue. His occupation of 
northern Alabama severed the Confederate connection between 
Virginia and Mississippi and forced the South to transport 
men and material via Mobile, rather than by the expeditious 
route through Chattanooga and northern Alabama.
After securing northern Alabama by advancing to 
Stevenson and Tuscumbia, Mitchel tried to convince his 
superiors that with more men he could advance from Tuscumbia 
upon the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, which was the line of 
communications of the Confederate army located at Corinth. 
His advance, whether a turning movement or raid, would have
v 1 1
broken the stalemate at Corinth and led to the Union capture 
of that strategic rail junction.
When Mitchel's superiors did not support his proposal, 
he turned his attention to Chattanooga in hopes of executing 
the same maneuver upon the Western and Atlantic Railroad, 
Chattanooga's only link with the deep south. Although he 
planned to use the same strategy as he had proposed for 
turning Corinth, this move would not have been successful 
because of difficulty feeding and supplying the enlarged 
force that would have been needed to disrupt Confederate 
communications.
Therefore, Mitchel's only success was in holding the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad for almost three months. 
Eventually the Federal armies used that road to tranfer men 
and supplies from the Corinth area to Chattanooga in a move 
to block the same threatening Confederate army that had 
retired from Corinth.
v i i i
INTRODUCTION
In 1846, Henry Wager Halleck defined strategy as "the
art of directing masses [of men] on decisive points .
[spanning] the theater of war, rather than [on] the field of
battle." He explained tactics as "the art of bringing
troops into action, or of moving them in the presence of the
enemy" within the confines of the battlefield. He
considered that logistics "embrace[d] the practical details
of moving and supplying a r m i e s . S i m p l y  described,
proper logistics were essential to translate strategy into
successful operations. Logistics could not alone determine
the outcome of a conflict; however, successful military
operations hinged upon feeding and equipping the men and
2animals of the army, whether stationary or moving.
Unlike previous wars, the American Civil War used the 
railroad to move men within and between theaters of 
operations. The adaptation of the railroad to warfare meant 
new variables in logistical support that required 
modification of strategic thinking. For example, movements 
in earlier wars were conditioned upon the marching rates of 
men and horses, but the railroad promoted greater mobility. 
Instead of marching ten or fifteen miles per day, Civil War 
soldiers often rode twenty or thirty miles per hour, and 
arrived in the proximity of the battlefield more refreshed
1
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than after enduring a long march. While Civil War
armies depended upon horse-drawn wagons for short distance 
hauls of subsistence and supplies, in strategic terms the 
railroads released the armies from the limitation of wagon 
and water transport. Compared to wagons, the union of the 
steam engine and freight car with their increased speed and 
carrying capacity enabled larger armies to be readily 
provisioned and equipped farther from their source than ever
In The Rise of Rail-Power , Edwin A. Pratt noted that 
the Civil War provided the first methodical and extensive 
use of the railroad in waging war. He summarized the 
changes to logistics brought about by the railroad and its 
impact on strategy. As a proving ground, the Civil War 
illustrated the potential of the railroad and revealed its
Martin Van Creveld expanded upon Pratt's theme of the 
importance of the railroad, but provided a more fundamental 
understanding of the relationship of strategy to logistics.
In Supplying War, he reversed the idea that logistical 
planning and support were subordinate and usually subsequent 
to strategic implimentation. Instead, Van Creveld 
maintained that historically, strategy had been formulated 
and initiated within logistical contexts. Contradicting 
Pratt's assertion about the impact the railroad had on
b e f o r e .
, which had been addressed in Europe only
theoretically prior to the 1870 Franco-Prussian
War.4
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logistics, he discovered that even with the advantage of 
railroads, purposely organized as a support function, 
logistics in the Franco-Prussian War failed in so many 
aspects of supply that the Prussian armies ultimately 
reverted to subsisting on requistioned provisions. Because 
men foraged to compensate for the inadequacies of the 
railroad, Van Creveld observed that living off the land was 
only possible as long as the men kept moving. When the 
armies halted for long periods for one reason or another, 
supply difficulties were at once experienced.
Railroads affected the logistics of armies in the 
American Civil War both by their effectiveness and their 
failures, and strategies were adopted to meet the new 
contingencies created by the use of railroads. While 
providing a potential for moving larger armies, with more 
supplies, over greater distances under steam power, the 
railroad also exhibited vulnerabilities. Rail lines were 
exceedingly fragile, and transport could be interrupted 
easily by removal of rails, destruction of bridges, or 
simply occupation of a portion of the line. This made 
armies dependent upon subsisting off the land, requistioning 
from the local inhabitants, or transporting provisions by 
wagon, just as they had before railroads were invented.
Explaining How the North Won the Civil War, Archer 
Jones and Herman Hattaway indicated that Federal armies 
formulated the winning strategy based on a supply line's 
susceptibility to disruption. The logistical relationship
4
was called, in military parlance, the line of 
communications, and it constituted the underlying basis for 
"the interdependence of logistics, strategy, and tactics, 
the three branches of the art of war." Without 
provisions and equipment, armies could not fight, and since 
the defense was a stronger form of warfare than the 
offensive (especially after the soldiers, protected behind 
entrenchments or barricades, fired minie bullets from rifled 
muskets), an alternate form of strategy was needed to 
replace the direct attack. But it had to be one that still 
permitted the destruction of the enemy army as the object of 
operations. The "strategy of exhaustion" became that 
alternate form of defeating an enemy. In contrast with the 
"strategy of annihilation," which destroys the enemy by 
direct and costly combat, the "strategy of exhaustion" 
relied on indirect defeat of the enemy by disrupting his 
line of communications, that precarious relationship of men 
and animals to food and supplies. As Jones and Hattaway 
pointed out, the alternate strategy— that is, the strategy 
of exhaustion— may involve a turning movement in which the 
enemy army nevertheless remains the objective. An army can 
be dislodged from a position not only by engaging its main 
body of troops, a costly encounter, but also by threatening 
or severing its line of communications. To be effective, 
the turning movement had to be directed at something other 
than the enemy's defensive position, with its increased 
maneuverabilty and firepower. The logical objective of such
5
a strategy was aimed at the disruption of the railborne 
logisical system, thereby depriving a dependent army of its 
supplies . ^
My study will analyze the Union army's advance to 
Huntsville, Alabama, in the spring of 1862. Employed as a 
"corps d' observation" for the Army of the Ohio, the Third 
Division, under the leadership of Major General Ormsby 
Macknight Mitchel, descended upon Huntsville, severed the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and occupied that part of 
northern Alabama lying along the Tennessee River. Mitchel's 
campaign illustrates the use of the railroad to transport 
men and supplies during an invasion and occupation of enemy 
territory. Mitchel then applied his understanding of 
strategy to devise a turning movement against the 
Confederate army concentrated at Corinth in conjunction with 
his move to Huntsville. Having moved on Huntsville,
Alabama, and--with only minor skirmishes— occupied that 
town, he then secured complete control of the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad between Stevenson, Alabama, on the east 
and Tuscumbia, Alabama, on the west. He thereby secured an 
undamaged railroad for Union movement either east or west, 
as opportunity might offer; of course, the same movement 
denied the use of this vital railroad to Confederates, who 
were attempting to shift troops from Virginia and eastern 
Tennessee to support the concentration at Corinth, and who 
were now forced to go west by a round-about route through 
Mobile. Having denied General Pierre G. T. Beauregard the
6
use of these troops as he opposed General Halleck's move 
from Shiloh to Corinth, Mitchel then grasped a golden 
opportunity that his control offered him to disrupt 
Beauregard's communications at Corinth. The projected 
turning movement might have ended up being a raid; Mitchel's 
own lines of communications were not that secure because he 
would have had to rely on water communications, and he never 
commanded a sufficient force for a turning movement. Still, 
the concept was there.
Mitchel's idea was to move on Jacinto, Mississippi, a 
small town near the Mobile and Ohio Railroad between Mobile 
and Corinth. This would endanger Confederate
communications. Merely the threat of such a movement would 
presumably force the Confederates to examine hard options: 
retreat west, retreat south and get through Jacinto before 
Mitchel got there, or if Mitchel did get there first, 
Beauregard would be forced to change his strategic defensive 
posture to the tactical offensive, attacking Mitchel in an 
effort to recover his communications to Mobile. None of 
these alternatives was desirable for the Confederate cause.
Mitchel's commander, General Don Carlos Buell, appeared 
even more cautious than Halleck, and neither of these 
officers sought to seize the opportunity that Mitchel's 
skill, initiative, and luck had offered the Union army.
Only after Mitchel destroyed the Decatur bridge on Buell's 
order, and the Confederates retreated from Corinth, did 
Halleck seek to use the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as
7
his line of communications.
Frustrated in the west by his unimaginative superiors, 
Mitchel sought to act upon the same idea once again, this 
time by moving east along the Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad through Bridgeport, Alabama. Apparently Mitchel 
sought to turn the Confederate position at Chattanooga by 
moving on Rome, Georgia, a railhead on a connecting line to 
the vital Western and Atlantic Railroad. Mitchel's 
occupation of Rome would threaten Confederate communications 
from the south to Chattanooga, just as the movement on 
Jacinto was intended to threaten Confederate communications 
to Corinth. This time, however, Mitchel's own 
communications were even less secure because he lacked 
alternative water transportation and because the 
Confederates had cut both the Nashville and Chattanooga 
Railroad and the Nashville and Decatur Railroad, the two 
lines from Nashville to the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. 
As before, he asked for reinforcements for his proposed 
move, but this time his plans were not practical; lacking 
manpower, communications, and wagons he was barely able to 
supply his own division, to say nothing of any
reinforcements he might have received. The proposed move on 
Confederate communications south of Chattanooga turned out 
to be nothing more than a holding action. With only a 
division of 9,000 men, Mitchel might have changed the course 
of the war in the west; at the very least, his campaign 
illustrates the strategic significance of railroads in the
/Civil War.
My thesis is that due to logistical constraints 
Mitchel's attempt to turn the Confederates in Chattanooga 
was premature, and had no chance of success. His probable 
attempt to turn the Confederates in Corinth, however, was 
brilliantly conceived and was never executed only because 
General Halleck was so obsessed with the concept of attack 
on the central position that he was blinded to the indirect 
approach implied in the strategy of the turning movement. 
Whether turning movement or raid, however, the maneuver 
would have posed a serious threat to Beauregard, who would 
have had to act accordingly. At the same time, Mitchel's 
holding action between Decatur and Bridgeport, in which he 
maintained control of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, 
was a major success, for he provided Halleck and Buell with 
viable communications over interior lines between Corinth 
and the approaches to Chattanooga.
The essential sources for this study, without which it 
could not have been undertaken, are The War of the 
Rebellion: A_ Compilation of the Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies, and Ormsby Macknight 
Mitche1, Astronomer and General: A Biographical Narrative . 
The latter source was compiled by Mitchel's son, and 
includes a large number of letters, otherwise unavailable. 
The Official Records, compiled by editors in the War 
Department between 1880 and 1901, is a 128-volume series of 
Civil War documents. Six of these volumes contain extensive
8
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materials on Mitchel's campaign and several others have 
additional useful information. The Official Records will be
g
cited frequently in the chapters to follow.
Unfortunately the extensive monographic literature on 
Mitchel treats his Huntsville campaign and his proposed 
strategy for turning Corinth and perhaps Chattanooga in a 
superficial manner.
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CHAPTER I
THE RELATIONSHIP OF STRATEGY TO THE RAILROAD
Antoine Henri Jomini is often considered the primary 
influence on American strategic thought before and during 
the Civil War. His study of war blended historical analysis 
and theoretical postulates in an attempt to reduce warfare 
to fundamental principles. Renowned for his interpretation 
of Napoleonic warfare, his influence encouraged the study of 
Napoleonic warfare, including Napoleonic strategy.'*’
Jomini's major work was The Art of War; in it he sought to 
explain warfare as a science founded on geometric plans and 
executions. Strategy was systematically described and 
supported in analytical terms.
While alluding to the possible annihilation of the 
army, Jomini emphasized moving upon "decisive strategic 
points" to force the enemy into a position where he must 
retire or surrender. The army's line of operation "must be 
directed upon the center or upon one of the extremities" of 
the enemy. Giving credence to attacking the enemy's 
weakness, a Napoleonic trait, Jomini claimed that if the 
enemy divided his army over an extended front, "the best 
direction of the maneuver-line will be upon his center." 
However, a concentrated enemy required a direction of attack
11
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on his flank or "upon the rear of his line of defense or
front of operations, . . . taking the line of defense in
2reverse." Jomini thus formulated the strategy of 
movement needed to dislodge the enemy by cutting his line of 
supply.
Alternatively, Jomini aimed the march of columns toward
"geographical objective points" and established maxims that,
by encouraging maneuver around the enemy, would supposedly
force him to retreat. The first rule governed the
principles of concentration and of the objective: "by
strategic movements [throw] the mass of an army . . . upon
the decisive points of a theater of war, and . . . the
communications of the enemy . . . without compromising one's
own" line of communications. To place the enemy in an
untenable position, Jomini proposed that the strategic
maneuver ought to be directed on the flank of the enemy,
which could "more easily cut [the opponent] off from his
base and supporting forces" than an attack on his center.
Jomini provided these instructions for the purpose of
denying the enemy provisions from the country or threatening
his line of communications and forcing him to retire or
fight on the offensive. Finally, Jomini pointed out that
"strategic operations to cut an enemy's line of
communications . . . and attack him in rear, . . . are much
3more likely to be successful and effectual."
While strategy invoked "the art of making war upon the 
map," by directing proper movement over the whole "theater
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of operations," the troops executed that strategy by means 
of tactics on the field of battle. Join ini defined logistics 
as the "means and arrangements which work out the plans of 
strategy and tactics," and thus stated a fundamental 
relationship between logistics and the art of war, but he 
relegated logistics to a tertiary position. He illustrated 
this diminished importance by praising the strategic marches 
of Napoleon as "decisive operations, not because of their 
relation to Logistics, but on account of their strategic 
relations . " ^
American military thinkers learned about Napoleon's 
methods of war by studying on the continent and transferring 
the lessons learned there to the United States. Dennis Hart 
Mahan, an instructor at West Point from 1830 to 1870, 
transplanted continental ideas that influenced many future 
Civil War generals. Mahan used Napoleonic campaigns as 
examples to clarify his points. Henry Wager Halleck was one 
of Mahan's students at West Point from 1835 to 1839. He 
also spent time in Europe studying the prevalent form of 
warfare. On his return, he wrote the Elements of Military 
Art and Science j_> almost a literal translation of
Jomini's writings.^ Halleck wrote that the 
fundamental rule in offensive war was to maintain one's 
forces as concentrated as possible, carefully noting that 
"interior lines of operations, have almost invariably led to 
success." Instead of duplicating Jomini's emphasis on
attacking the rear of the enemy and forcing a decision,
14
Halleek gave only cursory mention to the disruption of an
enemy's line of communications. In fact, he de-emphasized
the strategic alternative of attacking communications while
stressing the attack on a central position. He believed
that "it is not enough merely to gain the extremity and rear
of the enemy, for in that case it may be possible for him to
throw himself on our communications and place us in the very 
6dilemma." Halleck thought an attack upon the enemy's 
central position "strikes the enemy at the heart, paralyzes 
all his military energies, and deprives him of his military 
resources."^ Ha Heck's influence spread after West 
Point accepted his book as a text, and it was later 
distributed widely to amateur soldiers during the Civil War.
Besides defining the fundamental aspects of 
war-strategy , tactics, and logistics —  Halleck adroitly
interrelated these basic concepts as "most intimately
8connected." While strategy directed armies upon 
decisive points, usually extending over the theater of war, 
and tactics moved troops within the presence of the enemy, 
the "armies would be of little use without the requisite 
means [i. e., logistics] of locomotion and of 
subsistence." He considered concentration of force as 
a requisite to successful strategy, but due to the intrinsic 
dependency of strategy on logistics, Halleck pardoned an 
exception to this underlying principle. The necessity of 
dividing an army developed from the difficulty of supplying 
a concentrated army with adequate food and forage in a
4
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limited geographical area. Halleck felt that when required 
the army could resort to requisitioning (forced 
contributions demanded from enemy civilians with promise of 
reimbursement) or to foraging for the subsistence of the 
animals (living off the land), rather than depend on river, 
rail, or wagon transport to forward provisions and 
supplies.^ He noted that each method of feeding an 
army contained inherent difficulties in enemy territory.
The insurrectionary state of the local authorities wouid 
impede the requisition process while the lack of navigable 
rivers, good roads, and suitable transport would hinder an 
efficient line of communications.^
Halleck also regarded the capability of the land to
support both an indigenous population and an invading army
as a limiting factor. Living off the land or requisitioning
supplies were temporary measures, and possible only in a
rich country, one unravaged by previous armies, and then
only if invasion occurred during the harvest season. He
indicated that such favorable subsistence was temporarily
limited to an army moving through the countryside, as
. . 12opposed to a stationary army of occupation.
Halleck addressed a political necessity for dispersing 
an army in enemy territory. Military force must aid an 
"insurrection in your favor," which provided a positive 
reason for dividing the army; however, in prescribing the 
necessity to "support [such rebellious] inclination by 
strong detachments," he misjudged the converse situation of
16
having to march through or occupy a hostile area.
The rebellion in the South presented a situation 
corresponding to an army operating in unfriendly country.
The Federal army encountered a hostile citizenry, with 
consequent difficulty in obtaining requisitions without 
opposition. Crops could be destroyed purposely to prevent 
Union consumption. Any belligerent part of the local 
populace could impede or obstruct Lhe Federal armies' 
attempt to solve their supply problem by disrupting the 
armies' line of communications. As a result, the Union army 
depleted its numerical strength by having to string pockets 
of guards along its line of communications to protect it 
from local inhabitants and raiding enemy cavalry.
Well organized logistics permitted extended operations 
in enemy territory, but alone could not defeat an opponent 
in war. In the Civil War, logistical considerations 
influenced strategy and affected the chances of victory. 
Victory depended on feeding and supplying men either moving 
or stationary, or conversely, preventing the enemy from 
receiving its food or supplies. The objective of occupying 
enemy territory received much consideration in strategic 
planning in order to deny the enemy the resources of the 
territory and to gain that resource for supplying one's own 
invading and occupying army.
Before the Civil War, supplies moved on wagons drawn by 
animal power. This combination had not changed since the 
earliest armies had been organized to wage war. During the
17
Civil War, the normal capacity of the six mule U. S. Army
wagon was approximately 2,000 pounds. The transport's
deficiency was not in its hauling capacity, but its ratio of
cargo to range. Its inefficiency resulted from feeding the
draft animals from the cargo's net weight or payload. The
forage consumed subtracted from the total amount of food,
forage, or supplies that could be delivered to the front,
unless supplemental forage could be found en route— but this
had the drawback of taking precious time. Thus, the farther
the distance the wagon traveled to deliver supplies the more
forage requirements were needed to feed the horses or mules
that pulled it. Railroads used to transport supplies,
however, overcame the range limitation of the 
14wagon.
The railroads revolutionized the conduct of war by 
reversing the priorities in strategic movement. Strategy 
was no longer restricted to the slow movement or limited 
capacity of the wagon; railroads eased the adaptation for 
new approaches to strategy. The railroad, unhindered, 
allowed a larger army to concentrate for longer periods of 
time by the implementation and maintenance of supply. It 
not only mitigated the need to disperse the army over large 
areas to subsist off the land; more importantly, it 
permitted the size of an army in the field to be increased. 
The railroad likewise allowed campaigning to be conducted in 
any kind of weather. It was no longer necessary to wait for 
muddy roads to dry out to bear the weight of loaded wagons,
18
thereby losing the advantage of momentum; the railroads kept 
the offensive progressing. An intact and secured railroad 
permitted armies to maneuver detached from river 
communications and to move through countrysides deficient in 
subsistence. However, due to the railroad's vulnerability 
to disruption, an army had to ensure it could find 
alternative means to subsist.
The railroad shortened the time to move supplies and 
equipment between manufacturing and agricultural centers and 
the battlefields; it also facilitated lateral 
transportation, allowing provisions or reinforcements from 
one theater of operations to be rapidly shifted to another. 
These adjustments to strategy, based on the railroad, fit 
perfectly into Jomini's and Halleck's concept of war.
Because of its geographic and logistical consequences, a 
railroad junction of any magnitude, or railroad bridge of 
any size, became a strategic objective.
The use of railroads to shift forces or to resupply 
threatened positions neutralized the geographic concept of 
"interior lines." An army capable of concentration had an 
advantage; before the railroad, normally the army with 
closer, supportive units held the position of interior 
lines. Now the iron rail shrank the extremities of an army 
to the extent of allowing the transfer of men between them 
before an adversary enjoying central position could move his 
troops in a conventional manner by marching to support the 
outnumbered wing. The advantage also applied to strategic
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transfer between theaters. These advantages, gained by the 
use of the railroads in the Civil war, according to Edwin A. 
Pratt, changed warfare in three ways. First, armies using 
railroads increased their strategic fighting capability due 
to increased logistical support. Second, railways provided 
a strategic advantage by moving reinforcements to threatened 
points, permitting rapid concentration. Third, he 
concluded, expeditions undertaken for unprecedented 
distances were made feasible by the speed and capacity of 
the railroad, which influenced the relationship between 
strategy and logistics in warfare.^
Martin Van Creveld emphasized that in past wars 
strategy was first planned and then executed according to 
logistical considerations and constraints. Past military 
leaders intentionally kept strategy closely tied to their 
logistics. Van Creveld's study marked a change in this 
historic priority. Prior to his discovery, historians had 
armies moving about the countryside unconcerned and 
unhindered by supply; however, as was succinctly paraphrased 
by Napoleon, an army moved on its stomach. In more 
elaborate words, Van Creveld noted that before "manoeuvring 
or giving battle, of marching this way and that, of 
penetrating, enveloping, encircling, of annihilating or 
wearing down [an enemy] . . . [the commander] has . . .  to 
make sure of his ability to supply his soldiers with those 
3,000 calories a day without which they will very soon cease 
to be any use as soldiers." Strategy guarantees little
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success without the means to carry it out. The means were 
provisions, equipment, ammunition, and forage for animals. 
Strategy was accountable to logistics to ensure "that roads 
to carry [supplies and men] to the right place at the right 
time are available, and that movement along these roads will 
not be impeded by either a shortage or a superabundance of 
transport." Railroads provided the potential for more 
efficient and rapid logistics, which allowed concentration 
of large armies upon certain points. But, because of 
disruption to or mismanagement of railroads, often those 
armies still subsisted and supplied themselves in the 
traditional manner by requisitioning and living off the 
land . ^
Because the railroad was a physical connection, a
vulnerable link was formed between rear echelon depots and
forward camps and battlefields. A successful break in the
supply line forced the army to revert back to subsisting off
the land in a country sometimes not capable of sustaining
it, or else to depend upon wagon transportation for 
1 7resupply. Without an intact line of communications, 
the army confronted alternatives of either retreating, 
counterattacking, or surrendering, because a large army 
could not subsist off the land for a prolonged period. 
Railroads not only contributed the strategic ability of 
rapidly moving larger armies in warfare, but also embodied a 
counter strategy— the turning movement. In the Civil War 
situation, this meant that because of the South's scanty
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resources invading armies became more dependent on supply
lines and therefore more vulnerable to being turned.
An army can be dislodged from a position by engaging
its main body of troops; alternatively, it could also be
dislodged by threatening or severing its line of
communications. As Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones have
noted, in most cases, turning movements can only be employed
against an army dependent upon a line of communications.
The dependence of supply along railroad routes provided the
opportunity for a counter stroke by a turning movement, a
strategic objective that many Civil War generals maneuvered
18their armies in order to obtain. A disruption of
the line of communications by a strategic turning movement 
allowed the strategic offensive to employ the tactical 
defensive, forcing the defender to extricate himself by 
resorting to an attack to open his line of 
communications.^
All American railroads of the period were similarly
engineered in locomotive power and cargo carrying capacity.
Engines fueled by wood steamed along averaging twenty to
twenty-five miles per hour and pulling between ten to
fifteen cars of various types. Wooden boxcars each carried
approximately 16,000-20,000 pounds of cargo or transported
about forty men each (excluding those carried on 
20top). However, even though the trains were
similar in construction and utility they were not 
operationally compatible. Developed under local auspices
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with constraints in capital and control, small railroad
companies at first were disjointed enterprises, each
experimenting with its own track gauge without forethought
or plans for expansion. Many widths were considered
standard and only after consolidation did lines interconnect
2 1to form railroad networks. As the Union army
moved south, it found no universal gauge, but one company
established a uniform system of roads in Kentucky and
Tennessee. The Louisville and Nashville Railroad replaced
the overland passenger and goods trade between the Ohio and
Cumberland Rivers and competed with the Ohio River trade.
At Nashville, its line joined the Nashville and Chattanooga
Railroad and the Nashville and Decatur Railroad, thus
completing the only trunk line between the North and 
2 2South. The three railroads, all of the same
gauge, were extremely important as lines of communications 
through the border states of Kentucky and Tennessee to the 
deep south.
The Confederacy likewise had access to railroads, but 
one, the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, provided a vital 
east-west military supply line by connecting the seceded 
eastern states with those in the west. The railroad 
operated across Virginia, the northern portions of Alabama 
and Mississippi, and the southeastern part of Tennessee, and 
was originally constructed to enhance the flow of goods in 
peacetime. It became an indispensable logistic and 
strategic communications link at the outbreak of war. Union
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leaders realized the importance of the railroad to the 
Confederacy, for it was a vital means of concentrating the 
enemy's armies by moving troops within a theater or from one 
theater to another. This link, although exposed, 
compensated for the Confederacy's disadvantage in manpower. 
When operating normally it was an equalizer, and the 
Confederate military used it to shift men rapidly from one 
front to another to offset Union forces and gain strategic 
udvanlage.
While Union department commanders and the Union 
leadership discussed the value to the Confederates of the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad, they delayed taking action 
against it. General Ormsby Macknight Mitchel, however, 
planned for over six months beginning in the fall of 1861, 
to sever that road, and eventually he succeeded, in April, 
1862.
In October, 1861, General Mitchel was given command of 
an expedition to invade East Tennessee and cut the Memphis 
and Charleston Railroad around Knoxville, but due to 
departmental conflicts the mission was cancelled and Mitchel 
was reassigned. Then in the spring of 1862, as Confederate 
generals used the Memphis and Charleston to concentrate 
their armies at Corinth, Mississippi, Union forces under 
General Ulysses S. Grant and General Don Carlos Buell 
advanced to meet the enemy, aiming to take control of the 
railroad junction at Corinth, which became Ilalleck's 
strategic and geographic objective. As a subordinate of
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Buell, Mitchel was assigned the duty of using his Third 
Division as a "corps d' observation." He was to protect 
Nashville and central Tennessee from invasion by way of the 
Cumberland Mountains, and to guard Buell's left flank as the 
Army of the Ohio marched southwest in support of Grant's 
forces at Pittsburg Landing.
This sLudy will analyze and interpret Ormsby Mitchel's 
advance as part of the Army of the Ohio in the winter and 
spring of 1862, his invasion of Huntsville, Alabama, on 
April 11th, and his occupation until July of Confederate 
territory north of the Tennessee River, where the Memphis 
and Charleston Railroad paralleled the river's course in 
northern Alabama. The object is to discover whether Mitchel 
understood the effective strategic use of the railroad, and 
whether he understood that by threatening or severing his 
adversary's line of communications he could put that 
adversary in an untenable position and force him to revert 
to the tactical offensive to recover his lines of 
communication. This analysis will also trace Mitchel's 
growing comprehension of the importance of the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad to the Confederacy, and will then 
examine the generalship he displayed in his successful 
attempt to sever the Confederate east-west link, and to 
threaten a turning movement, even a raid, upon the 
Confederate army's line of communications to Corinth. 
Unsupported in that endeavor by higher command, Mitchel then 
launched an expedition upon Chattanooga prior to the
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disengagement of the Union and Confederates armies at 
Corinth. As this study will demonstrate, however, Mitchel 
soon found his division in unfriendly country without a 
completed line of communications. Because of lack of 
transportation for supply, the inability of the country to 
provide abundant support, the enemy interdiction of his own 
line of communications (while at the same time he did not 
command the troops guarding those lines), and the 
unwillingness of his superiors to send reinforcements, 
Mitchel's Chattanooga campaign was too ambitious, premature, 
and impractical. Nevertheless, if Mitchel had been 
supported by reinforcements, his proposed turning movement 
below Corinth could have succeeded in breaking the stalemate 
in northern Mississippi. Even so, Mitchel's success at 
holding the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and adjacent 
territory in northern Alabama gave the armies under Halleck 
and Buell an intact line of communications as they advanced 
east towards Chattanooga after the Confederates withdrew 
from Corinth on May 30th, 1862.
Footnotes to Chapter I
The work of Carl Von Clausewitz, which also 
attempted to define the principles of war as demonstrated by 
the Napoleonic Wars, was translated into English in 1873.
His original work was published in 1832, but because it was 
in German it failed to gain an American audience or to have 
an impact upon American military thinking. Jomini was 
published in French in 1836, and translated into English in 
1862. His work was therefore more easily read and 
interpreted by American strategists. Edward Mead Earle, 
e d . , Makers o f Modern Strategy: Military Thought from 
Machiavelli to Hitler (New York: Atheneum, 1967), p. 95; 
Carl Von Clausewitz, 0_n War , ed. and trans. Michael Howard 
and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1976) , p . xi .
2Baron Antoine Henri De Jomini, The Art of War , 
trans. G. H. Mendel1 and W. P. Craighill (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1962), pp. 78-80, 104-105.
3Ibid . , pp . 63, 78-80, 189.
^Ibid . , PP • 62, 126.
3Stephe n E . Ambrose, Halleck: Lincoln's Chief
of Staff (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1962) , p . 6.
Ha11eck , Elements of Military Art and Science , 
pp. 51, 54.
7 I bi d . , p . 40.
8Ibid . , pp . 38, 90-95.
9Ibid., p. 38.
10Ibid. , pp. 90, 92-95.
1 11 bid., P. 91.
12Ibid., pp. 93-94.
13Ibi d ., p. 41.
14Hattaway and Jones, How
19; see also McCook to Fry, July 10, 1862, U. S., War
Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the 
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 4 
series, 70 Vols. in 128 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1880-1910), Series I, Vol. XVI, pt. 2, p. 117;
26
27
hereafter cited as Official Records. The wagon's tare 
weight was 1950 pounds and it was drawn by four horses or 
six mules. Specifications for Means of Transportation,
Pau 1 i.ns , Stoves and Ranges , and Lamps and Fixtures for Use 
in the United States Army (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1882), p. 7; Moore, "Mobility and Strategy in the 
Civil War," pp. 106-114.
^^Pratt , The Rise o_f_ Rail-power , p . 2 5. See 
also E. G. Campbell, "The United States Military Railroads,
1862 -1865," Military Affairs 3 (Summer 1938):89.
 ^8Van Creveld , Supplying War, p. 1.
19.
^Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won, p .
18Ibid., pp . 715-18.
19Ibid., pp . 708-709.
pp.
^Weber , 
12, 238.
The Northern Railroads in the Civil
^George Rogers Taylor and Irene D. Neu, The
American Railroad Network, 1861-1890 (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 12-14.
2 2R. S. Cotterill, "The Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad, 1861-1865," American Historical Review 29 (July 
1924):700.
CHAPTER II
MITCHEL'S PREEMPTED EXPEDITION: 
THE GERMINATION OF AN IDEA
As a result of the political decision to keep the Union
together, the North had to rely on military force and carry
the war to the Confederate states. The Federal government
could not passively persuade the southern states to rejoin
the Union. If they had not acted forcefully to retain or
coerce those seceding states back into the Union,
Confederate independence would have gone unchallenged and
thus gained.  ^ In pursuit of Union policy, Union
forces followed invasion routes created by the geographical
features of the theaters of war. In the West, Union columns
advanced through the Kentucky and Tennessee "geographical
bottleneck" between the Mississippi River and the Great
Smokey Mountains. This was the middle prong of a concerted
2attack demanded by Lincoln. As the war progressed, 
possession of this avenue became critical to the strategy of 
invasion and victory, for the Confederate government had 
relocated some of its important production centers of iron, 
small arms, gunpowder and other war materials from central 
Tennessee to the deep south. To reach that area and quench 
the embers of secession, the Union armies in the west had to
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channel their efforts through the Nashville-Chattanooga-
Atlanta corridor. As historian Thomas L. Connelly put it,
"A Union army could scarcely reach the lower South without
marching through the State[s]" of Kentucky and 
3Tennessee.
Besides the topography funnelling movement towards the
South through Kentucky, the Union had other reasons for
invading and occupying Tennessee. In the eastern counties
of that state non-cotton growers had fought hard against
secession and needed the support of the Union. To
supplement the spirit of the pro-Union eastern Tennessee
4population, Lincoln favored direct intervention.
Other regions of Tennessee contributed agricultural and 
mineral resources to the Confederacy. In East Tennessee, 
salt, saltpeter, and lead ore deposits were available in the 
Appalachian Valley. Ninety percent of the copper that the 
Confederacy required for percussion caps and artillery 
castings was mined near Cleveland. The lower central part 
of Tennessee was the Confederacy's richest agricultural 
area, based on limestone farmlands; crops and livestock were 
abundant.J
Communication links, consisting of railroads operating 
in a north and south direction and navigable rivers flowing 
east to west, crisscrossed Tennessee (see map 1). At one 
of the South's important rail centers, Chattanooga, two 
vital lines connected, one from Richmond and the other from 
Charleston. Combined, they formed the Memphis and
30
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), l:Map 25.
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Charleston Railroad, which continued west to Memphis. The 
Cumberland River reached central Tennessee at Nashville, 
while the Tennessee River dipped below the border into 
Alabama and then flowed past Chattanooga. Each fed the Ohio 
River near Paducah, but the Muscle Shoals restricted travel 
below Florence on the Tennessee.
Nashville was the communications center of Tennessee.
In addition to river access, the Nashville and Chattanooga 
Railroad and the Nashville and Decatur Railroad split from 
the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and radiated 
southward, connecting the Ohio River to the Tennessee River. 
Nashville was also the "leading war production center in the 
West," manufacturing such war necessities as armaments and 
cartridges. It also served as a Confederate storehouse for 
"tons of equipment. . . . Warehouses bulged with hundreds
of thousands of pounds of foodstuffs collected from the 
fertile Middle Tennessee region."^ To capture or 
prevent the Confederates from using the riches of Tennessee, 
the Federal armies had to move through neutral Kentucky.
But Kentucky maintained neutrality until the end of the 
summer of 1861, and formed a buffer between the two 
antagonists in the West.
In the early months of the Civil War, Kentucky teetered 
on the brink of secession. Kentucky's main concern was 
maintaining the slave system, for tobacco farms produced 
cash crops and required intensive labor. However, the state 
was torn; loyalties lay on both sides, and commercial
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interests tied Kentucky to the South. All of the Union's 
perplexities were manifested in Kentucky as a border state. 
Beyond this, Kentucky had strategic importance for the war 
in the west. While Kentucky attempted to remain neutral, 
internal and external forces were acting to upset its 
neutrality.^
On April 15, 1861, President Lincoln called on
Kentucky to raise four infantry regiments for the Union 
cause. However, so as not to push Kentucky into the 
secessionist's camp, Lincoln did not insist that Kentucky 
fill the quotas placed upon it. Nevertheless, Federal 
officials, taking extreme care not to alarm Kentucky, began 
actively recruiting men across the Ohio River at Camps Clay
gand Joholt. William Nelson, a naval officer, was 
empowered to raise three regiments in southeastern Kentucky, 
where he established camps at Crab Orchard and Dick
9Robinson. On May 28th, the Federal government 
formally organized "all of the state within 100 miles of the 
Ohio River" into the Military Department of 
Kentucky.^  While Kentucky struggled with its 
neutrality, people in Ohio became concerned about their 
mutual border with Kentucky and rallied to the President's 
call for troops. One such man left his civilian profession 
of astronomy to return to military service, where he 
distinguished himself in the invasion of the Southern States 
through Kentucky, the state of his birth.
That man was Ormsby Mitchel, who returned to the army
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on August 9, 1861, almost thirty years after he resigned in
September, 1832. He accepted a commission as a Brigadier 
General of Volunteers and resumed his military career in the 
defense of his adopted home state of Ohio.^
Mitchel was born in 1809 and raised through adolescence 
in Lebanon, Kentucky. Almost sixteen, young Mitchel 
traveled alone to West Point Military Academy and took 
admittance exams in 1825. Accepted for the Class of 1829, 
Mitchel had the privilege of being a classmate of such 
distinguished military figures as Robert E. Lee and Joseph 
E. Johnston. Overshadowed by the military endeavors of his 
classmates, Mitchel still distinguished himself, graduating 
a respectable fifteenth out of forty-six. After receiving 
his commission as a second lieutenant, he was assigned to 
the Second Artillery Regiment, but two months later was 
appointed acting assistant professor of mathematics at West 
Point. He taught for two years before reassignment to Fort 
Marion, St. Augustine, Florida where he tendered his 
resignation. He resigned his commission on the 30th 
September, 1832, and began studying law in Cincinnati. 
Instead of attaining admittance to the Ohio bar, in 1834, he 
taught mathematics, civil engineering, mechanics, French, 
and machinery at Cincinnati College for ten years. In 
addition, from 1836 to 1837, he was chief engineer of the 
Little Miami Railroad, complementing his previous experience 
at operating a railroad in Pennsylvania while in the Army.
In 1841, he was a member of the Board of Visitors to West
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Point. He was founder and director of the Cincinnati
Observatory in 1845, where he became renowned for his
astonomical studies, writings, and publications. In 1847,
Mitchel was appointed Adjutant-General of the Ohio Militia,
and a year later became chief engineer of the Ohio and
1 2Mississippi Railroad.
The innovation of railroad transportation in warfare
demanded comprehension of every facet of railroading for its
successful integration into strategy. Timetables, car
capacities, repairs, bridge construction, wood for fuel, and
spare parts all affected the smooth operation of a railroad.
The movement of supplies and troops to sustain strategy
depended on locomotive maintenance, car upkeep, and track
repair. To function as a line of communications, the
railroad required its own logistical support, which the
1 3commanders had to anticipate.
Mitchel's experience in engineering and managing 
railroads played a very important role in his strategic move 
to Alabama. His cadet studies in mathematics and 
engineering, his teaching of mechanics, civil engineering, 
and mathematics, and his working on railroads provided 
practical knowledge for the establishment and maintenance of 
the Third Division's line of communications. He knew the 
potential of the railroad as a supply line and, conversely, 
he understood the limitations and vulnerabilities of the new 
transportation. With this knowledge and experience, Mitchel 
returned at the age of fifty-two to military duty perfectly
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suited to the new form of strategic mobility.
Volunteering for duty in August, Mitchel immediately 
went to the field as a brigade commander. His first post 
stationed him in the Army of the Potomac under General 
William B. Franklin. But, before Mitchel could see any 
combat on the Peninsula, General Winfield Scott reassigned 
him to Cincinnati, where he assumed command of a newly 
organized camp of rendezvous. The reassignment was in 
response to the alarmed citizenry in Ohio, who witnessed the 
Confederate invasion of Kentucky in September and felt they 
were left defenseless after the removal of General William
S. Rosecrans.
When Mitchel arrived in Cincinnati, on September 2nd, 
it was reported that a large Confederate force under General 
Simon Bolivar Buckner had approached Muldraugh Hill, that 
General Felix K. Zollicoffer had entered Kentucky through 
the Cumberland Gap, and that General John C. Breckinridge 
and General Humphrey Marshall were assembling forces in the 
eastern counties of Kentucky.^  On September 2nd, 
the Confederates entered Kentucky in opposition to Union 
recruiting practices within the state, to put pressure upon 
Kentuckians to join the Confederacy, to capture some of the 
weapons kept by the Home Guard Armories, and to capture 
strategic locations before Union forces could do so.
Mitchel shared the concerns of the people of Ohio when he 
found "that no preparation had been made to defend the city 
[Cincinnati] . . . that neither men nor guns were here, and
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there was no military head."^ He also found
Kentucky in the same defenseless condition, having "no
preparation, no arms, no troops, no artillery, while the
18rebels are prepared with everything."
Mitchel arrived in Cincinnati and diligently prepared
the city's defenses. However, even with the construction of
Fort Dennison, he felt inadequate to meet the enemy because
his authority was limited to the north side of the Ohio
19within the existing Department of the Ohio.
Kentucky, at one time a separate Military Department, had
been transferred to the Department of the Cumberland under
20General Robert Anderson. Therefore, an enemy
advance would come through an area commanded by someone
else. Mitchel expressed his concern that an adequate
defense of Cincinnati could not be made while the approaches
2 1to the city were controlled by another commander.
With the help of Ohio Governor William Dennison, he 
convinced General Winfield Scott to redefine the military 
departments and allow preparation for a proper defense of 
Cincinnati. On 19 September, 1861, the War Department 
issued General Order No. 80, which reorganized the Military 
Department of the Ohio to consist of the states of Ohio,
Indiana, and "so much of Kentucky as lies within 15 miles of
2 2Cincinnati." The department was placed under 
General Mitchel effective September 19th. Mitchel then 
requested approval from the Kentucky legislature for him to 
act in that state within fifteen miles of Cincinnati. The
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legislature not only granted "full authority" to Mitchel,
but replied with "an earnest appeal to send 5,000 troops to
2 3their aid, and drive back Zo11icoffer . "
Besides constructing defenses around Cincinnati,
Mitchel recruited men , obtained funds for his quartermaster,
and, as rendezvous camp commander, organized, trained, and
equipped regiments and sent them forward as necessary to
camps in Kentucky. To meet his quota, he directed all
regiments in Ohio more than half filled to gather at 
24Cincinnati. He also ordered 10,000 men from his
department to be concentrated at Camp Dennison with the
intention of being prepared "to meet any emergency,"
including moving forward to possess and hold strong points 
2 5in Kentucky. Mitchel intended that troops
deployed in a forward position would provide a temporary
defensive cordon extending from Maysville, through Lexington
2 6and Frankfort, to Louisville.
Due to a serious lack of cavalry, the Union forces had
to deploy infantry in a cordon system, as observers, as
guards of major avenues of march, and as reserves. Besides
the four regiments sent to guard the Kentucky Central
Railroad and the Louisville and Lexington Railroad, Mitchel
forwarded, with Anderson's permission, six regiments to Camp
Dick Robinson located at Lexington and one regiment to
Olympian Springs about twenty miles east of Mount Sterling,
"a strategic point of great importance in the contemplated
2 7advance towards Cumberland Gap." Mitchel regarded
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this period of preparation as transitory, and after creating 
a defensive position around Cincinnati and sending troops 
forward in support of units in the fields of Kentucky, 
Mitchel wanted to take the war to the enemy.
As a railroad man, both engineer and manager, Mitchel 
understood the important part rail transportation could 
contribute to offensive as well as defensive operations in 
warfare. Intuitively, Mitchel knew the consequences of 
striking at the line of communications of the enemy even 
with limited means. Mitchel's concern for his own line of 
communications indicated his understanding the effect of a 
severed railroad would have on logistics.
Rebuffed by General Anderson for permission to take and 
hold the Kentucky Central Railroad, over which was conveyed 
reinforcements and equipment from Cincinnati to Lexington 
and Camp Dick Robinson, Mitchel took "possession of the
Kentucky Central Railroad in the name of the
2 8Government." According to orders, he was only
authorized to act fifteen miles into Kentucky, but he
nevertheless ordered the Thirty-fifth Ohio Infantry Regiment
to protect the railroad from Covington to Lexington and to
guard all the bridges on the line, and thereby secure
communications with Camp Dick Robinson. Another regiment
sent by Mitchel guarded the rest of the Kentucky Central
29Railroad at Cynthiana and Paris. He further
ordered a regiment "to occupy a point on the Louisville and
Nashville Railroad" in an effort to "secure .
3 9
communications between Camp Dick Robinson and 
30Louisville. It was only after those precautions
were taken and "with secure lines of communication by rail
with Cincinnati and Louisville . . . [that Mitchel thought]
a powerful force may be moved from the region near Lexington
and Frankfort, and may operate either towards the Cumberland
Gap, or, after shutting up that pass, concentrate a powerful
column and drive the enemy back from Muldraugh's Hill,
31secure Louisville, and threaten Nashville."
Mitchel regarded the control of the railroad as 
fundamental to any strategy, either for concentration of 
troops for a defensive position such as the one between 
Lexington and the Cumberland Gap, or for the transfer of 
support wherever needed. He understood how the railroad 
could aid a defensive position by shuttling reinforcements 
and supplies between the distant extremities of an army. 
Using the railroad, an army forced to operate on exterior 
lines could equalize the enemy's advantage of an interior 
position, providing the enemy did not have similar railroad 
communications. Knowing that the railroad could aid in 
offensive operations through the rapid concentration of 
force, Mitchel felt that a secure railroad link must be 
established and maintained from the base of supplies to 
forward locations before any operations could be successful.
During this transitional period, Mitchel still desired 
to make war on the enemy rather than just to prepare. He 
proposed to General Robert Anderson "to concentrate near
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Nicholasville , to move, when strong enough, against the
force under Zollicoffer, to threaten Knoxville and the
Tennessee railroad, and to secure the Cumberland Gap and
3 2effectually bar it against the enemy." He planned
to use 10,000 newly recruited Ohio troops for the advance,
and he would have been required to live off the land, for
wagon transport would have been inadequate, due to road
conditions, weather, and the limited capacity of the wagons.
His ambitious plan had four objectives (see map 2). The
first and most vital was "to seize [the Tennessee and
Virginia Railroad] and . . . to burn two long bridges at and
near Knoxville," but because of the shortage of required
wagon transportation and the lack of a railroad to the
Cumberland Gap, Mitchel reasoned that the attacking force
could be only somewhat larger than a raiding party and that
the railroad bridges could only be put out of commission
temporarily. A larger force of infantry supported by a
secure line of communications, was required not only to cut
the bridges, but to occupy the area around the bridges and
permanently sever the Confederate railroad. Cavalry could
destroy the bridges, but a sufficient force of infantry
would be required to hold them and prevent the enemy from
either recapturing the bridges or reconstructing them after
the cavalry departed. Mitchel called the seizure of the
Tennessee and Virginia Railroad near Knoxville "a grand
opportunity," because it would sever the Confederacy's main
33east-west supply lines.
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Mitchel's second objective was directed at rallying the 
population of Tennessee and North Carolina, by "10,000 
troops entering Tennessee in the rear of Cumberland Gap." 
This would have a two-fold effect. It would provide relief 
for the inhabitants of East Tennessee as requested by 
Lincoln, and envelop, perhaps even turn, the rear of the 
Cumberland Gap instead of attempting to attack that strong 
position from the front. Mitchel realized that the enemy 
could be dislodged at the Cumberland Gap more easily by 
threatening his line of communications than by a frontal 
assault. Mitchel pointed out that "From London, Kentucky, . 
. . it is but two days' march over fair roads to points 
beyond the Tennessee line in rear of Cumberland Gap, and 
from there only about thirty miles to the [Tennessee and 
Virginia] railroad .
The third objective, to be carried out in unison with
Anderson's troops at Camp Dick Robinson, was aimed at
driving "Zollicoffer out through the Cumberland Gap, or to
3 5capture him with [General John C.] Breckinridge."
Fourth and last, Mitchel hoped that by holding the various 
mountain passes near Cumberland Gap and by concentrating the 
troops in Kentucky, his forces would "assume the offensive
and drive the enemy back towards Nashville, and possibly
3 6strike a decisive blow in Tennessee."
Trying to get his plan adopted, Mitchel quarreled with 
Anderson over confiscation and control of the Kentucky
Central Railroad and over which direction the Union effort
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was to be made in Kentucky. Mitchel realized at that time
there could not be a concerted Union effort in the Kentucky
region "with so many different commanders,— General
Anderson, General Thomas, General Rosecrans, and
myself,--all pulling in different directions. . . . The
want of system and a plan of operations is very
embarrassing; and 1 am now confident that the Department of
the Cumberland and that of the Ohio must be placed under one
3 7military head." Considering the immediate
occupancy of Kentucky "as a matter of the greatest
importance," Mitchel urged the government to send a high
ranking officer for "supreme command of this expedition to
Kentucky and to Tennessee," one who would command the entire
region and control troops in the states of Ohio, Indiana,
3 8Kentucky, and Tennessee. The conflicts between 
department commanders continued to prevent any worthwhile 
direction for the Union forces during the fall of 1861, 
which inhibited any major offensive in the region. This 
inter-departmenta1 conflict would not be resolved until 
Halleck took command of the newly organized Department of 
the Mississippi in March, 1862, which incorporated the 
contending departments and subordinated their generals under 
a unified command.
In preparation for a move towards eastern Tennessee, 
Mitchel had been sending newly organized regiments, 
hurriedly trained and partially equipped, to camps within 
Kentucky. At first, Mitchel had sent forward regiments
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lacking transportation at the request of commanders in the 
field to expedite their reinforcements. However, within 
weeks Mitchel received the required wagons, horses, and 
harness from depots to supply all the regiments advanced 
without transportation. But it was still necessary for him 
to hire and organize a force of civilian teamsters to drive 
the wagons forward, a complication which Mitchel never
39resolved. The teamsters were not under military 
orders, could not be counted as reliable under fire, nor 
punished if they abandoned their wagons.
One of the commanders requesting reinforcements from 
Mitchel, General George H. Thomas, had ideas of his own for 
a pincer movement upon Cumberland Gap through Barboursvi11e . 
From Camp Robinson, Thomas would move his men west and with 
the cooperation of Mitchel, who was to send four regiments 
south up the Big Sandy, "seize the [East Tennessee and 
Virginia] railroad and cut off all communications between 
Virginia and the south through Tennessee."^
While Mitchel contemplated using a force of 10,000 men 
to drive back Zollicoffer, capture the Cumberland Gap, and 
sever the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, Thomas required 
approximately the same number of troops for his plan.
Taking over command of the Department of the Cumberland from 
an ailing Robert Anderson, General William T. Sherman felt 
that the "real struggle in Kentucky is to be between 
[LouisvilleJ and Nashville," and disrupted Mitchel's designs 
for severing the key Confederate railway between Virginia
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and the Mississippi. Therefore, before his plans could 
materialize, Sherman reduced Thomas' force to two 
regiments.^ Sherman's readjustment of the strength 
of the force made Thomas's Gap expedition limited in scope, 
nothing more than a delaying action instead of a strategic 
move with the objective of driving the enemy from the Gap by 
moving upon the Confederate rear.
Another departmental conflict ensued over which 
direction the expedition would take, either towards the Gap 
or south towards Green River. Sherman insisted that an 
expedition in the southerly direction would not suffer from 
the lack of transportation and inadequate lines of 
communications that would hinder any movement in East 
Tennessee. However, Lincoln and General George B. McClellan 
desired to relieve the pressure in eastern Tennessee and "to 
seize and hold a point on the railroad connecting Virginia 
and Tennessee; near the mountain pass called Cumberland 
Gap." Accordingly, Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas ordered 
Sherman to aid Mitchel in carrying out "an outward movement 
. . . to seize the Cumberland Gap and afford protection to
our friends in East Tennessee." With a movement already 
planned to occupy the Port Royal-Hilton Head area, a 
simultaneous advance on the Cumberland Gap was bound to 
succeed. Therefore, Sherman was to stand firm "while all at 
Cincinnati and all at Louisville, with all on the line, 
concentrate rapidly at Lexington," join the force at Camp 
Robinson and then move under Mitchel's command to turn
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Cumberland Gap. Sherman responded that he
required 65,000 men just to remain on the defensive, and
"for offense, would need two hundred thousand"
43men. While Sherman hesitated, Mitchel displayed 
initiative for the offensive, an attribute conducive to 
future operations under the Lincoln administration.
Mitchel had already presented a more sweeping plan 
about coming to the aid of the Union sympathizers in East 
Tennessee, a point noted by the Administration. On October 
10th, 1861, Secretary of War Simon Cameron and Lorenzo
Thomas visited Cincinnati and Mitchel's command. Impressed 
with Mitchel's plan to dislodge the enemy from the Gap, to 
bar "this entrance to Kentucky with a strong fort well 
garrisoned," and to sever the East Tennessee and Virginia 
Railroad, and with the energy Mitchel had spent in 
organizing and reinforcing the camps in Kentucky, Cameron 
and Lorenzo Thomas believed that his "efforts here in the 
past few weeks had effected a revolution in this 
region. As a result, Adjutant General Lorenzo 
Thomas ordered Mitchel that same day to duty in the 
Department of the Cumberland, to proceed to Camp Dick 
Robinson, and to replace George H. Thomas as commander. 
There, Mitchel was to "prepare the troops for an outward 
movement, the object being to take possession of Cumberland 
Ford and Cumberland Gap, and ultimately seize the East 
Tennessee and Virginia Railroad and attack and drive the 
rebels from that region of the country.
Challenged by the assignment and eager to take the war to 
the enemy, Mitchel felt "he was in a position to exert a 
power in behalf of our country which . . . will work a
revolution in the management of affairs.
Mitchel telegraphed Thomas at Camp Dick Robinson and
indicated his desire for preparation of the forthcoming
advance. In so doing, Mitchel transgressed military customs
by "ordering" a fellow officer whom he ranked by only four
days to comply with his wishes, especially one with the same
ambitions of leading an expedition to the Gap. Thomas
assured Mitchel that he was "doing all in [his] power to
prepare the troops," but expressed disappointment at being
"superseded" in the expedition. As Thomas explained,
"Justice to myself requires that I ask to be relieved from
duty with these troops," since the Secretary of War had
replaced me "without . . . any just cause for so
d o i n g . M i t c h e l  also made the mistake of crossing
the boundary between departments in issuing those orders to
Thomas. As ordered, Mitchel was to report to Sherman, head
of the Department of Cumberland, and "be governed by such
further orders as he may give."^® By attempting to
expedite the plans, Mitchel angered Sherman, who on October
11th, authorized George Thomas to "make an advance movement
in the direction of the Cumberland Gap," despite earlier
concerns about the direction of movement and the lack of
49transportation. Sherman later telegraphed Thomas
that "General Mitchel is subject to my orders, and I will,
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if possible, give you the opportunity of completing what you 
have begun. "
Unlike Thomas, Mitchel did not have to begin
preparations for the advance on Cumberland Gap, for he had
"already ordered forward some of the Ohio regiments beyond
Camp Dick Robinson." He organized his "army of 10-12,000
men with all speed," while making up baggage trains, and
sending forward "from one to two hundred horses, harness and
their wagons each day."~^ To ensure that the men
remained healthy and able to march, Mitchel requested Thomas
"to move the three Ohio regiments now in Camp Dick Robinson
to some convenient point beyond [the] Camp, . . . [to]
escape the epidemic now prevailing among [the] men." He
demanded that Thomas "order the regiments at Nicholasvi1le
to remain there until their transportation" arrived. Thomas
indicated that he had sent one regiment forward and would
send others as soon as they had transportation. Thomas had
sought to secure "the road to Barboursville and to protect a
large tract of country abounding in forage." Mitchel
indicated that he would leave Cincinnati for Camp Robinson
when he was "assured that supplies, transportation,
ammunition, and other necessaries" were sent forward. Not
neglecting the administrative detail of the expedition,
Mitchel requested the liberty to appoint a divisional staff
52for the advance towards the Gap.
Before Mitchel began the anticipated expedition, 
however, Sherman dispersed the forces at Camp Robinson.
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Once Sherman had lost the departmental dispute and was 
ordered to support Mitchel, he detained the forces necessary 
to Mitchel's movement. Without the cooperation of Sherman, 
the leaders in Washington postponed the expedition. (It was 
eventually undertaken by General George W. Morgan in 
October, 1862.
On October 26th, Mitchel was reassigned to the 
Department of the Ohio, not as commander, but as subordinate 
to Buell. Dejected at his removal from command and his 
inability to complete the expedition, Mitchel felt that "to 
remain longer inactive [was] to submit to degradation" and 
forwarded his resignation. "I had assumed command by
issuing an order and directing what should be done previous
$
to my taking the field; I had assembled around me a staff 
for the campaign; I had even my baggage wagons and my 
drivers, when, lo! my column is divided and its fragments 
given to other persons, my inferiors in rank. One portion 
advances towards the Gap and meets the enemy, while I am 
compelled to remain here [at Cincinnati]."^
In his new assignment, Mitchel again equipped and 
prepared regiments for other commanders in the field in 
Kentucky. He also continued recruiting for the Union and 
"in thirty days ten thousand have volunteered for three 
years, or the war." Even though Mitchel was removed from an 
active role in Kentucky, he vowed to "make no trouble of any 
kind" and again placed his services at the discretion of the 
government. He was "ready to do and to suffer anything for
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the only object now dear to [him] on earth, the rescue of 
[the] unhappy country from threatened
destruction."^ Mitchel was persuaded by President
Lincoln and Simon Cameron to withdraw his resignation with
the prospect of future command in the western theater as
part of the Army of the Ohio. On November 21st, Mitchel, as
promised, was ordered to Camp Jenkins in Louisville to
continue organizing regiments for the contemplated move 
56south.
Although Mitchel's expedition was at first preempted 
and then cancelled due to disputes over departmental 
authority and confusion as to its commander and its 
objective, he learned many useful lessons and gained 
practical experience that would serve him in the necessary 
invasion of the southern states. He experienced the 
difficulties and problems of organizing and managing the 
required men, animals, and equipment for an expedition. 
However, Mitchel demonstrated that he knew the importance of 
a line of communications by controlling and protecting the 
Kentucky Central Railroad, and he realized that to guard the 
railroad consumed a large number of men who could be used 
either as an attacking force or as an occupying army. The 
value of a railroad to shift men between strategic points 
became apparent to him when regiments were moved between 
Cincinnati and Muldraugh's Hill. Later in northern Alabama, 
Mitchel would again have use of the railroad as a defensive 
multiplier of an inferior force to shuttle troops between
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threatened points over an extended front.
While at Louisville and before he commenced his 
movement south as the "corps d' observation" for the Army of 
the Ohio, Mitchel became appreciative of the strategic 
importance of the railroad bridges crossing the Tennessee 
River, for they linked the heartland of the Confederacy to 
the border states. In connection with his plan to sever the 
bridge at Knoxville, Mitchel learned the advantage the 
railroad gave the Confederates, who had used it in 
September, 1861, to distribute their forces along their 
front. He understood that their lines of communications 
existed because of the railroad network in Kentucky and 
Tennessee and that the only permanent way to deny the 
Confederacy that advantage was to sever the bridges and to 
occupy the surrounding territory.
The Confederates were deployed in front of Buell in a 
defensive arrangement, but one with threatening 
possibilities. Their left extremity was anchored at 
Columbus, Kentucky, on the Mississippi River. The line ran 
east through Kentucky, forming a vulnerable salient at 
Bowling Green on the Big Barren River where the center was 
strongly entrenched. This important railroad junction 
linked the southwest with the trunk line of the Louisville 
and Nashville Railroad, by way of the Memphis Branch. It 
was also the best position from which to cover Nashville, 
the Confederate supply depot. The Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad was also considered a potential invasion route to
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the Ohio River. The eastern end of this defensive line
rested at the foothills of the Cumberland Mountains at Mill
Springs, an entrenched rebel camp, that guarded the
Cumberland Gap. This lengthy position was cut naturally in
the west by the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers; however,
Forts Donelson and Henry, prevented access up the Cumberland
and Tennessee Rivers and protected the village of Dover and
the nearby railroad bridge at Clarksville. The Memphis
Branch operated across that bridge, forming the connection
5 7between Bowling Green, Columbus, and Memphis.
Along this front, the Confederate forces were deployed
by November, 1861, to allow concentration at any point.
Leonidas Polk maintained 12,000 men at Columbus while Lloyd
Tilghman controlled 5,000 men at Fort Henry and Fort
Donelson, and Buckner commanded 8,100 troops at Bowling
Green, which as the center could be easily supported by the
Confederate railroad network. In addition, Zollicoffer had
5 88-12,000 troops defending the Cumberland Gap. The 
Confederate railroad radiated south from Bowling Green and
Nashville, enabling the Confederates to concentrate their
, 1 59entire strength at Munfordsville.
The bridges over the Tennessee gave the Confederates 
the advantage of concentration and mutual support throughout 
the western theater and between the eastern and western 
armies. Mitchel's earlier idea of severing the Tennessee 
and Virginia Railroad at Knoxville would have been a 
temporary measure to hinder the flow of east-west traffic,
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forcing them to send troops by way of Mobile, Alabama. As 
the Union developed its western strategy, a better solution 
appeared that involved the Tennessee River bridges and the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad in northern Alabama. The 
result would be more permanent than Mitchel's expedition to 
the Cumberland Gap, which was limited because it lacked a 
railroad as a line of communications.
Dispatches between the War Department and the
department commanders provided Mitchel with information on
the importance of the bridges. In all probability Buell
conferred with Mitchel, who arrived in Louisville on the
22nd of November, 1861, to command the troops rendezvousing
at Camp Jenkins, one day after Mitchel arrived 
6 0there. Buell undoubtedly sought consultation with
Mitchel, who, because of his date of rank, was second in 
command of the Army of the Ohio, and became one of Buell's 
division commanders.^ In that capacity, Mitchel 
most likely provided advice to Buell about the planned 
advance and shared the information exchanged between 
headquarters.
While the Army of the Ohio was organizing and preparing 
for the winter offensive, the Federal Navy, which had 
uncontested control of the waterways, was planning the 
disruption of the Confederates' lines of communications.
The aim of numerous proposed and actual water expeditions 
was to cut off middle Tennessee by destroying the railroad 
bridges across the Cumberland river and to keep the
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Confederates from reinforcing their defensive positions.
With the water level high in the Tennessee and Cumberland
Rivers, Union gunboats "Lexington and Conestoga could run up
in the backwater to the bridge of the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad, near Tuscumbia, and destroy it." Another plan
called for a transport with five hundred men accompanied by
two gunboats to steam up the river to Tuscumbia, land the
troops, and destroy the bridges near the river. Armed with
"two or three bomb barges," this raid was to float the
charges over the Muscle Shoals obstruction and to "destroy
the long bridges at Decatur and Bridgeport,
6 2Alabama." These plans were similar to Mitchel's
move to sever communications at Knoxville, but less
complicated. However, by using boats, the expeditions were
meant to operate only as raids, with the limited objectives
of cutting the Confederates' lines of communications and
disrupting their ability to concentrate in middle Tennessee
and Kentucky. These plans illustrate how vulnerable the
railroads were to disruption. Buell accepted General C. F.
Smith's proposals for the use of gunboats because the
destruction or even temporary damage of the bridges was so
important that the expeditions were "well worth the risk of
6 3losing more than one or two gunboats."
Initially, the Federal leaders attempted to prevent 
Confederate concentration by destroying the bridge at 
Clarksville, threatening the Bowling Green salient, and 
separating the troops there from those at Columbus. This
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was Halleck's idea of attacking the central position of an
enemy in order to divide his forces while creating a base
from which to make an advance on either of the separated 
64forces. Halleck agreed with the concept of
employing gunboats to "proceed up the [Tennessee] River to
destroy all bridges," but only after reducing Fort Henry.
He allowed boats to transport cavalry and men "to sustain 
the gunboats," but even gunboats supported by a few men 
could only cause temporary disruption of the Confederate 
ability to concentrate.^ When the Federal armies 
went on the strategic offensive, any action would be 
acceptable that could weaken the, enemy and permit the Union 
to gather a superior force against the Confederates. After 
forts Henry and Donelson fell, in early February, 1862, the 
river route was opened into the interior of Tennessee and to 
the rear of Confederate strongholds at both Columbus and 
Bowling Green. And once flanked at Bowling Green, the rebel 
forces retreated to Nashville.
Union leaders then discussed obtaining similar results 
by turning Nashville in a wider move. After a penetration 
of the rear of the Confederate line, the Union generals 
strove for more permanent results than mere raids by boat. 
McClellan suggested to Halleck that he "better devote 
everything towards turning" Columbus and let Buell "take the 
line of Tennessee and operate on Nashville." Moreover, 
McClellan wrote, "The bridges at Tuscumbia and Decatur 
should at all hazards be destroyed at once."^ By
56
destroying the bridges at Tuscumbia, Decatur, and
Bridgeport, he proposed to cut the Confederates' lines of
communications and force them out of Nashville back towards
Chattanooga. Thus, in the winter and spring of 1862,
Federal strategy had developed from merely keeping the
Confederates from reinforcing central Tennessee and
Kentucky, to an attempt to turn the major strongholds of
Bowling Green, Columbus, and Nashville by cutting or at
least threatening their I ines of communications. McClellan
even thought that Memphis "would easily fall if [the] bridge
0 7at Decatur [was ] destroyed." McClellan considered
"the Decatur movement and one on Memphis . . . the next
steps" in his offensive program.^
Now that Grant had taken the forts and was free for
other tasks, Halleck wanted Buell to give up the land
invasion route and join forces with Grant. They would move
up the Tennessee River and cut the bridges at Florence and
Decatur, Alabama. Halleck predicted that Nashville would
then fall by maneuver, precisely as Bowling Green had 
69fallen. Therefore, Halleck ordered Grant and 
Admiral Andrew H. Foote to "push the gunboats up the 
[Tennessee] River to cut the railroad bridges," and to 
transport the troops onboard following riverboats.^
The gunboats "destroyed everything on the Tennessee to 
Florence, in Alabama," but were unable to destroy the 
bridges beyond there because "they could not get past the 
Muscle S h o a l s . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  when Halleck heard
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that the bridge at Decatur was destroyed, he concluded that
"communication between Columbus and Nashville [was] thus
„ ,i 7 2 cut.
But none of the bridges on the Tennessee River above 
the forts were actually destroyed. Although the 
Confederates still maintained the advantage of concentration 
with their intact lines of communications to their rear, 
they nevertheless began a wholesale retreat, giving up the 
Tennessee line. With their extended front penetrated by the 
fall of the two forts, the river route opened up their rear 
communications, which had sustained their forward defensive 
positions in Kentucky. Any advance by the Confederates 
along those same railroads in order to block the Federal 
armies only placed them in a more precarious situation. 
Therefore, instead of being trapped by losing their avenues 
of retreat over railways whose bridges were threatened, the 
Confederates used their railroad network to initate a 
concentration at Corinth, Mississippi. Widely separated 
armies came together, supported by reinforcements from the 
east. Gathered at the junction of the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, they 
quietly rallied to defend that important railroad junction 
by attacking and perhaps destroying Grant's force, which was 
moving south to Pittsburg Landing in an attempt to exploit 
the Federal penetration into the border states. Part of 
Grant's force, in another river borne expedition, tried but 
failed, to prevent the Confederate armies from uniting by
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destroying the Memphis and Charleston Railroad bridge over
73Bear Creek, near Eastport, Mississippi. Thus the 
opposing armies gathered for the bloody Battle of Shiloh, 
April 6-7, 1862.
The Confederates withdrew behind the Tennessee River, 
using the delaying tactic of destroying bridges over 
numerous rivers. Those bridges would have to be rebuilt 
before a Union advance could take place; however, the 
Confederates did not destroy the Tennessee River bridges 
because they hoped to keep their lines along the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad between Virginia and the Mississippi 
River open. The Tennessee bridges became important to the 
advancing Federal armies, but instead of destroying them to 
prevent the Confederates from reinforcing their positions in 
Kentucky or Tennessee, the Army of the Ohio sought rather to 
destroy them in order to sever the east-west communications 
link provided by the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.
Returning from retirement after twenty-nine years, 
during which the nature of military operations had undergone 
notable changes, Mitchel compacted those many years of 
changes into two months of practical learning. With his 
background of railroading, he immediately adapted to the new 
dynamics of the railroad as applied to strategy. While 
updating and refining his military skill in Kentucky,
Mitchel developed an acute awareness of the importance of 
the railroad as a line of communications and specifically 
how vital the east-west rail link was to the Confederacy.
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The lessons learned from his preempted expedition to sever 
the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad remained with him 
throughout the coming winter campaign, for the East 
Tennessee and Virginia Railroad connected at Chattanooga 
with the Western and Atlantic Railroad and formed the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which passed through 
northern Alabama. The opportunity to sever the major supply 
artery of the Confederacy would again present itself;
Mitchel would not again be deterred from his mission by 
departmental conflicts or apprehensive generals.
Photos 1 and 2. Mitchel's objective: the important Howe 
Turn Bridge at Bridgeport, Alabama, over the Tennessee River 
(top view shows bridge from the north bank to the Long 
Island in the middle of the river, the bottom view is from 
the Long Island looking northwest to the north bank).
Photo 3. Again the Howe Turn Bridge at Bridgeport (view 
looking northwest from the south bank to the Long Island in 
the middle of the Tennessee River).
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CHAPTER III
ON TO NASHVILLE: A LIMITED OBJECTIVE
Before the Union Army could penetrate the deep South, 
or even ensure the safety of Kentucky, it had to drive the 
Confederates out of their Columbus-Bowling Green-Mill 
Springs defensive line; Grant's capture of Fort Henry and 
Fort Donelson would be a necessary prerequisite, and Union 
soldiers expected hard fighting before Confederates would 
give up any of Tennessee.
When Union troops of the newly organized Third Division
rendezvoused at Elizabethtown, Kentucky, on December 1,
1861, they arrived in anticipation that battle would not
long be delayed. Elizabethtown was located in northern
Kentucky, about forty miles south of the Ohio River, and it
was here that the Third Division of the Army of the Ohio
joined its unproved commander, Brigadier General Ormsby
Macknight Mitchel.^ Elizabethtown only recently
experienced the "Iron Horse" when the first train of the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad operated through it on
June 15, 1858. However, the town became more than merely a
station stop for the two north-south passenger
2trains. Prior to December, General Sherman had 
cleared the track of rebel raiders only as far as
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Elizabethtown, limiting operation of the Louisville and
Nashville Railroad to forty-two miles between Louisville and
3Elizabethtown. However, the juncture of a spirited 
general and twelve three-year volunteer infantry regiments 
transformed the quaint Kentucky town into an armed camp, 
where officers drilled, trained, and disciplined the men in 
the rigors of w a r /
Just prior to leading the Third Division, Mitchel had
commanded Camp Jenkins at Louisville,^ and since
August of 1861 he had been grooming other general's troops
for battle. But now he molded men from Ohio, Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin into his own fighting
u n i t /  He finally had the opportunity to march at
the head of his troops, bearing the crusading banner for the
Union and to rally his inexperienced men with the battle-cry
"Come, and I will lead you !
Organized December 15, 1861, into the Seventeenth
Brigade, the Fifteenth Kentucky regiment and the Third,
Tenth, and Thirteenth Ohio regiments, assembled at
Elizabethtown after being equipped and given wagon
8transportation. Mitchel's other brigades were
similarly organized with four regiments. The Eighth Brigade
consisted of the Nineteenth and Twenty-fourth Illinois,
Thirty-seventh Indiana, and the Eighteenth Ohio, while the
Ninth Brigade contained the Second, Twenty-first and
Thirty-third Ohio, in addition to the Tenth
9Wisconsin. Thus Mitchel, the champion of Ohio,
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commanded an aggregate of 12,000 troops mostly recruited 
from his adopted state— seven out of twelve regiments. In 
support, three batteries of field artillery (18 pieces), two 
engineer companies, and a regiment of cavalry later joined 
the infantry division during its march south.^
Mitchel knew the importance of having a staff to
relieve him of the burdensome administrative detail of the
division, but he did not use it efficiently. Preparing for
the preempted expedition to Cumberland Gap, he had requested
a staff consisting of a medical director, an adjutant
general, a division quartermaster, and an inspector-general,
each with the rank of colonel. The other positions on his
staff were filled by captains: a commissary officer, a chief
engineer, and several aides.^ Mitchel understood
the importance of transportation in keeping an army fed,
equipped, and moving, so he insisted upon a colonel to fill
1 2the divisional quartermaster position. He did not
lend as much importance to his commissariat, designating 
only a captain to that post. Mitchel did not use a chief of 
staff nor his adjutant; instead, he maintained personal 
charge of the division, oversaw camp inspections (according 
to regulations), wrote telegrams, to his superiors, led 
reconnaissance missions and supervised the reconstruction of 
destroyed bridges.^
The General commanded his regiments through the brigade 
commanders, although his visits to the various camps allowed 
him to develop a personal bond with his men. Joshua Sill
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led the Ninth Brigade from its establishment as an
independent brigade in November, 1861. Sill was a West
Pointer, class of 1853, graduated third and taught at West
Point until 1861. He was granted a colonelcy of the
Thirty-third Ohio in August of the same year, and gained
experience in West Virginia before coming under the command
14of Buell in Kentucky. The senior officer from 
among the regimental commanders, Ebenezer Dumont, assumed 
command of the Seventeenth Brigade. Commissioned a 
brigadier general, United States Volunteers on 3 September,
1861, he took command and replaced the temporary commander, 
William Lytle. Dumont commanded the Seventeenth until March
1862. He fought in the Mexican War, rising to the rank of
lieutenant colonel. Before gaining his war experience he
was a lawyer, legislator, and banker. Lytle resumed command
in March and was promoted to brigadier general, United
States Volunteers, on November 29th, 1862, and only
commanded the Seventeenth Brigade from the 21st of March to
the 19th of August, 1862. Lytle also fought in the Mexican
War and then served as a Democrat in the Ohio state 
1 5legislature. The last of Mitchel's brigade
commanders was the flamboyant John Basil Turchin. Turc'nin
received his military education and experience in Europe.
He was born Ivan Turchininoff in Russia, graduated from the 
St. Petersburg Artillery School, participated in the 
Hungarian campaign in 1849, and fought in the Crimean War. 
His laurels also included attending the academy for general
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staff officers and serving on the staff of the Imperial
Guards in the Crimean War. Turchin finally settled in
Chicago and worked in railroading before being commissioned
colonel of the Ninteenth Illinois Regiment on June 17, 1861.
He commanded the independent Nineteenth Brigade prior to its
formal incorporation into the Third Division on the 2nd of
December. He was promoted to brigadier general, United
16States Volunteers, on July 17th, 1862.
The division had a regiment of artillery assigned to
its organization which included A Battery of the First
Michigan Artillery Regiment, the Fifth Indiana Artillery
Battery, and E Battery of the First Ohio Artillery Regiment.
Also attached were two companies of Michigan Engineers and
the Fourth Ohio Regiment of cavalry.^
From his new headquarters at Louisville, Buell, who
assumed command of the Department of the Ohio on November
9th, 1861, reorganized the sixteen independent brigades into
18five divisions. While Buell prepared his
department, General McClellan confined the operation of the 
Army of the Ohio to Kentucky east of the Cumberland River. 
McClellan felt the war effort in Kentucky "second only to 
that occupied by the army" under his command in front of 
Washington. Discussing strategy with Buell, he indicated 
"the issue [of the war] is the preservation of the Union and 
the restoration of the full authority of the General 
Government over all portions of our territory." McClellan 
correlated the political objective of relieving East
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Tennessee with Buell's strategic movements. He suggested 
Buell "remain on the defensive line from Louisville to 
Nashville," while sending the mass of his force "by rapid 
marches" on Knoxville by way of Cumberland or Walker's Gaps. 
With objectives similar to Mitchel's preempted expedition, 
the maneuver would have a two-fold effect: it would provide
morale to the loyal citizens of East Tennessee, and it would 
occupy the railroad around Knoxville. McClellan realized 
the strategic value of invading East Tennessee; while 
rallying the citizens, it would "at the same time cut off 
the railway communications between East Virginia and the 
Mississippi," that is, sever the East Tennessee and Virginia 
Railroad, which linked Richmond to Chattanooga then 
connected with Memphis on the Mississippi River by the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Even though Buell's 
advance into East Tennessee was to be more permanent in 
nature by holding the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad 
with a larger force, the South would still be able to shift 
men and supplies between theaters by way of Atlanta, then 
via Chattanooga, again utilizing the Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad to Memphis.
Even though McClellan implored Buell to make a "prompt 
movement in force on East Tennessee," Buell conjured up his 
own movement. While putting off McClellan, and indirectly, 
President Lincoln, with excuses of time-consuming 
preparations, Buell detailed a new plan of campaign, that 
satisfied the demands from Washington for a move to East
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Tennessee. He pointed out that geographically Louisville
"affords the best base" from which the North could operate
"upon any part of Tennessee." Making Nashville the intended*
objective, Buell nevertheless indicated that Lebanon,
Kentucky, afforded the shortest route for a column to
liberate East Tennessee. While he placated his superiors,
he thus shifted importance from East Tennessee to Middle
Tennessee on a line running southwest, parallel with the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad, instead of southeast,
towards Knoxville. The Army of the Ohio's line of
communications consisted of the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad and three good pike roads, which converged on
Glasgow, twenty-five miles east of Bowling Green and
afforded good communication for a continued move
19south.
Buell wanted a sufficient force to hold Buckner at 
Bowling Green while sending a column into East Tennessee by 
way of Somerset, the route that McClellan had been urging. 
Then, maintaining pressure on Bowling Green, a column would 
move rapidly past Buckner on the turnpike by way of 
Gallatin. Once beyond Buckner's force, now pinned at 
Bowling Green, Buell would direct additional columns from 
the Lebanon branch of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad 
on both the Somerset and Nashville routes. By turning 
Bowling Green with forty-thousand men, the strategic 
maneuver would threaten the enemy's line of communications 
and force him to attack or withdraw. Buell planned to move
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two flotillas simultaneously up the Tennessee and Cumberland 
Rivers to attack the railroad bridges and to cut 
communications between Bowling Green and Columbus. 
Destruction of the bridges would divide the Confederate 
forces and would sever the Memphis Branch of the Louisville 
and Nashville Railroad.^ Therefore, Buell
anticipated attacking Bowling Green indirectly by a double
turning movement: one by turnpike intersecting the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad at Gallatin, and the other
advancing upon Buckner's rear by the Cumberland River route.
Under orders from Buell, Mitchel and the Third Division
began the march south on the Louisville Pike. Breaking camp
at Elizabethtown on the 16th of December, Mitchel
prematurely wrote "we move again at an early hour for the
2 1banks of the Green River." The Third division
only marched twenty-three and a half miles farther south,
stopping at the intersection of the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad and Bacon Creek. The single spanned, wooden
trestled bridge had been rebuilt after a retreating
Confederate army had destroyed it. Instead of merely a rest
stop, the banks of this creek became the Union army's winter
camp; Green River and the South would have to 
2 2wait. The 1,800-foot Green River railroad bridge
had been destroyed by the Confederates on October 14th, to 
forestall the movement of Federal troops and to guard 
Bowling Green. The resulting delay in front of 
Munfordsville would continue until the defeat of the
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Confederates at the Battle of Mill Springs on the 19th of
January, and the fall of forts Henry and Donelson in the
first two weeks of February. This penetration of the
Confederate left was matched by the turning of the rebel
right; the exposed salient, extending from Nashville to the
Green River, was forced to retire from Bowling Green or be
cut off from its communications through Nashville.
Mitchel constantly drilled the men for the coming war
he was anxious to wage. He oversaw his regimental
commanders pacing their units through marches and formation
changes, while brigadiers attempted to manipulate larger
formations in the fields near Bacon Creek. He daily rode
through the camps of the regiments and around their
perimeter making unexpected personal inspections of the
23troops sometimes even in sleet or snow. This
respite at Bacon Creek enabled General Mitchel to cultivate
a fatherly relationship with his men. Writing in 1865,
author Reverend P. C. Headley, who considered Mitchel a
crusader for the Unionist cause, said that Mitchel basked
"in the admiration and growing confidence" felt toward him
by men, who "loved and trusted him." However, Mitchel was a
strict disciplinarian and the men knew the only way to
endure his strong will was "to faithfully perform every part
of military duty." Thus, the General and "his trained
legions were ready and impatient for the smoke of 
7 4battle."
Despite initial readiness, the enthusiasm of the troops
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lessened as weeks of repetitive preparation turned a new
adventure into the drudgery of camp duty, loneliness, and
military hardship. Disease and sickness infected the Third
Division's camp just as it did in as most camps of the Civil
War. The weather "rains, then snows a little, then freezes
a little then thaws a good deal," helping to inflict camp
fever, small pox, measles, and camp diarrhea on both
25officers and men. As the winter weather continued
damp and cold, laudatory proclamations from the men about
saving the Union sank to camp grumblings. One soldier
remarked, "A life so devoid of incident and thrilling
adventure fell immeasurably short of our ideal of glorious
war." The crusading spirit waned as the troops endured two
months winter quarters at Bacon Creek, and a feeling of
doubt swept the regimental camps as to "whether such
condemned, disagreeable country . . . was really worth
saving at all." The boys soon became "dissatisfied and 
2 6mutinous." The fighting edge of the division was 
blunted by the monotony and sickness of camp life. Before 
Mitchel allowed the martial spirit of his men to be sapped, 
he approached Buell with an appeal to resume the march 
southward. "We must now either be permitted to go into the 
field and meet the foe, or we must degenerate and go 
backwards. It is utterly impossible for me to carry my 
division any further in my drill or discipline. . . . The
men have learned every thing they can learn, and from this 
moment we must commence to decline unless we are sent into
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actual service." Buell delayed granting the
request because the rebels had occupied Bowling Green with a 
very large force, to counter the Army of the Ohio's forward 
movement.
On January 16th, while Mitchel waited at Bacon Creek,
he sent a reconnaissance mission southward to test road
conditions and to report any enemy positions. Mitchel
reported to Buell that "all roads are now equally impassable
for [wagon] trains," and he would have to make a corduroy
2 8road to facilitate transportation. Although dirt
roads were impassable for wagon transport, the railroads
could still sustain the advancing army and allow the
campaign to resume. While not susceptible to mud, the
railroad could be disrupted by a downed bridge or torn up
track, but it still could function as a line of
communications as far as the break in the line.
Buell finally relented, however, and gave the order to
move. He selected Mitchel's division to lead the advance on
Bowling Green instead of General Alexander McDowell McCook's
division, which had preceded Mitchel's move to Munfordsville
and was already camped on the south side of Green River.
When Buell had inquired as to when the Second Division could
move, McCook indicated that "in a week's time he would be
ready." Even though his division was ten miles in the rear,
Mitchel responded to the same question with "tomorrow 
2 9morning." After lengthy consultation with Buell
at Louisville and with some agreement in mind about the
2 7
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coming operations, Mitchel returned to camp on February 9th, 
and relayed Buell's instructions for the advance to begin 
the next morning at six a.m. The night was filled with 
anticipation as the troops broke camp, striking their tents,
packing their knapsacks and getting the horses
„ . , „30caparisoned .
After fifty-six days of inactivity around Bacon Creek,
the Third Division again started south, again using the
Louisville Pike (see map 3). In exhaltation Mitchel warned
his friends to "look out . . . for moves on the theatre of
war that will wake this nation from its long slumber and
31send a thrill of joy throughout the land." The 
Third Division passed McCook's camp and pitched camp a mile 
beyond the Green River because of a delay in constructing a 
pontoon bridge to replace the partially destroyed stone 
structure. Mitchel led the advance of the Army of the 
Ohio into the "Land of Dixie." While the position of honor 
rekindled the troops' spirit, Mitchel received personal 
inspiration from his friend Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of 
the Treasury. "We are looking for great things from the 
Army of Kentucky," Chase wrote. "It is deplorable that you 
were ever recalled from your movements in East Tennessee. 
But that mistake . . . must be made good by future
achievements . "
At 7 a.m., on the 13th of February, the advance guard 
of the Third Division, consisting of Turchin's Brigade, 
Kennett's cavalry and Loomis' artillery, recommenced its
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Map 3. Mitchel's move to Nashville.
Source. Vincent J. Esposito, The West Point Atlas, 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), l:Map 30.
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3 Amarch. The division marched along the Bowling
Green Pike through country containing little or no water
sources, "except in occassional basins, in which the rebels
had thrown dead horses and mules killed for the purpose" of
35denying water to the Union forces. Confederates
had also hindered the Union column by trees cut across the
line of advance, and these were cleared by thirty pioneers,
3 6who were attached to the division
Mitchel decided to rest his division in a field next to
the burned remains of Bell's Tavern's station, which had
been fired by the rebels the night before. At Bell's
Tavern, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad trunk line
joined the Glasgow Railroad, which ran nine miles to the
37southeast to Glasgow, Kentucky. The march of
nineteen miles from Bacon Creek in under seven hours pleased
Mitchel, who felt "everything has moved thus far to my
entire satisfaction," except for the weather, which had
turned from rain to snow on the night of the 13th, and
3 8caused great discomfort to the soldiers. However,
the soldiers were not hungry, even though the bridge over 
the Green River behind him was destroyed and Mitchel had 
railroad communications only as far as Munfordsvi1le. On 
the morning of the 14th, he reverted to the conventional 
means of logistics and sent wagons to the damaged bridge to 
relay supplies between his advanced position and the Green
d • 39River .
As it moved forward, the Army of the Ohio had to repair
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the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, or else the inability 
of the country to support it in winter would cause it to 
collapse from a deficiency of provisions and forage. The 
amount of wagon transportation that Mitchel's quartermaster 
had was enough to transport the division's supplies "five 
day's march from its depot of s u p p l i e s . A s  the Third 
Division captured more of the Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad, and the distance from the head of the column to 
the rear supply depots increased, the limitation of marching 
approximately five days (forty to fifty miles) from the 
source of supplies remained constant. With an intact and 
properly managed railway, the distance that wagon 
transportation could support a column of troops would be 
measured from the railhead and not from the base depot, 
thereby explaining the railroad's contribution to strategic 
maneuver— an extension in range that an army could be 
sustained from its permanent base of operations. Before the 
introduction of the railroad to warfare, when wagons were 
the means of transporting provisions to the battlefield, the 
farthest an army could advance or maneuver to engage the 
enemy was the distance that its wagons could transport the 
required amount of supplies from its resources to the 
battlefield or encampment. Whether its source be an 
established depot with accumulated stores, a river deep 
enough to float continuous shipments of supplies, or a 
country with abundant grain and fodder, an army moved more 
with regard to its future supplies than to the location of
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the enemy. The first alternative meant establishing 
garrisoned depots near or in the enemy country, which made 
them vulnerable to capture; the second normally depended on 
adequate rainfall to swell the rivers, for droughts and 
shoals meant a disruption of supply; the third choice 
required starting an offensive at harvest time or when 
sufficient supplies might be found in storage. In any 
event, the army's operations were limited to agriculturally 
rich areas.
On February 13, 1862, Buell advised McClellan that
Mitchel advanced beyond Dripping Springs, reconnoitering the 
enemy's resistence and intentions, and would soon be within 
fifteen miles or less of Bowling Green. Mitchel did not 
stop short of Dripping Springs, but continued to pursue a 
retreating enemy and fill the void it left behind.41 
Buell used the intelligence gained by Mitchel's advance to 
support his plan of invasion into Tennessee by railroad to 
Nashville, thus countering Halleck's insistance that the 
route was up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, by way of 
forts Henry and Donelson.
Buell had intended Mitchel to advance to Dripping 
Springs, about eight miles further south from Bell's Tavern, 
for the purpose of "discovering the movements of the enemy." 
Reaching Dripping Springs was not "obligatory," and a point 
nearer would be satisfactory; nevertheless, he warned 
against being "greatly exposed in the present stage of the 
operations. . . . [Be] watchful, and be sure what is ahead
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and on your flanks. Make good use of your 
42cavalry." However, Mitchel knew from his scouts 
that the Confederates were retreating from Bowling Green and 
realized that his advance could not be delayed if he 
intended to capture intact the Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad bridge over the Barren River. Mitchel had halted 
his troops early in the evening at Bell's Tavern, twenty-two 
miles from Bowling Green "in order to . . . resume the march
before two o'clock in the morning" and, perhaps, capture the 
rebel supplies, which might be abandoned before they could 
be destroyed.^
Mitchel aroused the troops at midnight to continue the
advance with hopes of surprising the Confederate garrison at
Bowling Green. Turchin's Brigade, again in the lead,
departed at 2 a.m., February 14, while Colonel Harris'
Second Ohio Regiment was ordered to remain at Bell's Tavern
as a reserve to cover Mitchel's left flank in case of attack
44from Glasgow Junction. With snow on the ground,
coldness in the air, and a wind piercing through the
soldiers' overcoats like "needles of ice," the column
proceeded by the Bowling Green Pike, with Mitchel trying to
catch the rebels off guard before they fired the Barren 
45River bridge. To make the twenty-two mile march 
more rapidly, General Mitchel ordered "all wagons and horses 
found on farms and plantations along the road [to be] 
pressed into service to carry the knapsacks and lighten the 
burdens of the advancing column."^ In spite of all
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the celerity of movement, however, the rebels had already
fired the Barren River bridge at one o'clock in the 
47morning.
Even though the railroad bridge had been fired,
Mitchel's scouts found that the turnpike bridge was still
intact. Resorting to a forced march, Mitchel attempted to
capture that bridge, but it too was burned at daylight,
48before he reached it. When the column reached the
north side of the Barren River, it looked upon not only a
destroyed railroad bridge, but also storehouses and the
depot set ablaze. The fortifications surrounding Bowling
Green were evacuated, and the inhabitants were "hastening
49over the hills toward Nashville." Nevertheless,
Mitchel exceeded Buell's cautious expectations by reaching
Oakland on the outskirts of Bowling Green around 4 p.m.
Despite the destruction of both bridges and the Barren
River obstructing his rapid advance, Mitchel wrote with a
note of optimism to Buell that his "engineers and mechanics
will soon enable [them] to cross the river . . .  as the
enemy are driven out. . . .  We will then commence work on
the railroad and telegraph line."'*^ The engineers
improvised a crossing by clearing out timber that obstructed
a ford, then used a flat boat as a ferry.^  Seeking
a more permanent structure, the engineers and men of the
Eighteenth Ohio regiment then constructed a floating 
52bridge. Overcoming an obstacle that might have
taken a week to pass, Mitchel had Turchin's Brigade floated
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across the river to arrive in town at five o'clock in the
53morning of February 15, 1862.
Mitchel did not cross the river with the head of his 
column, but remained to supervise the building of two 
ferries, which enabled his baggage wagons and artillery to 
pass over into Bowling Green. By the afternoon of the 16th, 
Mitchel had five infantry regiments and the cavalry regiment 
ferried across the Barren River. At 0800 February 18th he 
entered the "Gibralter of Kentucky," important because it 
guarded the middle of Kentucky and Tennessee and provided 
railroad connections south to Nashville and Clarksville by 
way of the Memphis Junction of the Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad.
The pressure on the Confederates at the Bowling Green 
salient, created by Grant's victories at Fort Henry and Fort 
Donelson, and by Buell's advance from the northeast, 
persuaded Albert Sidney Johnston to withdraw toward 
Nashville. Because Admiral Foote's gunboats had cut the 
Mobile and Ohio Railroad, a strategic link between General 
Leonidas Polk's force at Columbus and General Johnston's 
force at Bowling Green, these two withdrawing forces were 
separated by the Tennessee River. They were linked only by 
the bridges in northern Alabama, until they were united at 
Corinth Junction where the Memphis and Charleston Railroad 
crossed the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. Mitchel rapidly 
advanced into an area that the Confederates were already 
evacuating, but he prevented them from doing extensive
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destruction, and by maintaining constant pressure in 
conjunction with the threat of Union gunboats and Grant's 
army, he denied the Confederates an opportunity to 
consolidate their position.
Amid burning mansions, storehouses, and train depot,
Mitchel's men confiscated corn, sugar, coffee, pork, salt
beef, and other provisions, enough to supply the Third
Division for a month. By forced marches and initiative, the
Third Division had achieved tactical surprise, forcing the
enemy to abandon one-half million dollars worth of valuable
stores and valuable railroad rolling stock, while destroying
another one million dollars worth of supplies including arms
55and locomotives. But, even with the immense
quantity of captured stores, Mitchel requested Buell to send 
forward forage and subsistence.^  He indicated that 
Bowling Green and Munfordsville lacked enough hay to meet 
requirements, although corn in sufficient supply could be 
obtained from the country . ^
Mitchel wanted these supplies because his line of 
communications depended on a ferry over the Barren River in 
his immediate rear and a pontoon bridge (miles away) over 
the Green River, which his army constructed and crossed just 
five days before. He also requested subsistence in order to 
maintain pressure on the retreating Confederates, not for 
consolidation of Bowling Green. He hoped to establish a 
base of supply for another departure point from which to 
make "a strong and immediate demonstration upon
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5 8Nashville." Because gaps in the railroad hindered
the line of communications for his 10,000 man force, he
wanted an advanced depot from which to draw supplies until
the railroad could be completed. He intended to have his
entire division, with baggage, across the Barren River by
the 18th of February, 1862, and "to throw forward a brigade
on the Russelville road, one on the turnpike and one on the
Nashville road some 10 miles from Bowling Green . . . within
59supporting distance of each other."
Mitchel did not delay in obtaining information about
the enemy. While still on the north bank of the Barren
River, he had ordered a detached company from Colonel John
Kennett's Fourth Ohio Regiment of cavalry to advance upon
the turnpike two and one-half miles beyond Woodburn in the
direction of Nashville. After his scouts detected the enemy
departing Franklin, a town twenty miles south of Bowling
Green on the Tennessee and Kentucky border, withdrawing
6 0towards Nashville, he sent "a reconnaissance on
the road leading to Nashville and extended [his] examination
some twelve miles to the village of Woodburn." He found
remnants of the retreating Confederate army, including the
house where Generals Hardee and General Thomas C. Hindman
stayed the night of the 14th, just four days earlier. The
rebel army of approximately 8-10,000 men had pitched camp
for two miles along the turnpike and hurriedly defended
their position with a double rail fence thrown across the
61road. Realizing he was on the heels of a
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retreating force equal in strength, Mitchel ordered Harris's
regiment forward from Bell's Tavern to reinforce the
division. To fill the void left by the rebels, he sent
forward two infantry regiments, which transported its
baggage upon platform cars captured at Bowling 
6 2Green. Besides relinquishing the column from the
burden of the baggage train, the captured rolling stock also 
maintained the forward flow of provisions and forage 
necessary to permit further progress into the vacuum left by 
the Confederates. Capturing the locomotives and cars at 
Bowling Green gave the Third Division a rapid means of 
moving men and supplies as it advanced. However, Mitchel 
was forced to provide means of covering the gaps in his line 
of communications. Some temporary river crossings required 
ingenious measures, while others needed constant attention 
until they could be made permanent, but in both cases the 
newly reconstructed bridges needed to be guarded to be kept 
intact, a factor that depleted the strength of the advancing 
army .
The newly constructed "floating bridge" was one of 
those crossings. It was a temporary structure that yielded 
to the water pressure of the rising Barren River, and was 
carried downstream. At Mitchel's insistence, the turnpike 
bridge was to be rebuilt "at the earliest possible moment .
. . [for the] ferry boats [were] not to be relied upon for
the passage of an army." Striving to move south, Mitchel 
had neither time nor material for constructing a better
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6 3crossing. The temporary link in Mitchel's line of
communications would have to be replaced permanently to 
withstand such natural disasters and to eliminate any delay 
in forwarding supplies, ammunition and forage. He hoped to 
use "two steamers from the Green River" in order to become 
"quite independent of all ropes and ferries.
With such detail, Mitchel continually demonstrated concern
for his army's line of communications, which determined the
success or failure of the march south through Tennessee and
occupation of northern Alabama.
Mitchel insured proper preparations were made for his
furture line of communications, still located ahead of his
division, as well as for the support of the division's rear.
On the 19th, he ventured six miles south along the Nashville
Pike to oversee his mechanics and engineers repairing a
bridge the rebels had burned.^  In Bowling Green,
meanwhile, repairs of the division's transportation were
also being completed. On the knowledge that the railroad
from Bowling Green to Nashville was still intact, Mitchel
judged that Nashville could be taken as readily as Bowling
Green and in three days he would be addressing his letters
6 6from the capital of Tennessee. His concern was
not the enemy on his flank at Clarksville, for he knew the
enemy had fallen back and concentrated at Nashville, but the
capture and protection of the undamaged railroad in his 
6 7front. He worried that the important and
vulnerable South Tunnel, forty miles south of Bowling Green,
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would be "destroyed by fire in an hour by a single 
6 8hand." The road over which he had advanced was 
damaged, but "by the middle of March, 1862, service of a 
sort had been re-established between Louisville and 
Nashville. . . .  A through train between Louisville and 
Nashville was operated again as early as April 8 ,
1862."69
Confederate hinderances and natural disasters were not
the only impediment to the Third Division's advance. Buell,
hesitant in assisting Grant's siege of forts Henry and
Donelson, grew cautious in executing his own plan for
attacking Nashville. Mitchel hoped to continue his advance
on Nashville every day, but Buell held back and remained
undecided, as he had in Louisville. Mitchel had little
doubt that with an immediate advance Nashville would fall,
especially after Kennett's reconnaissance on the 16th of
February. If he could persuade Buell to permit the Third
Division to advance at once, then Mitchel's prediction of
being in Nashville in three days might become
fact.^  While Mitchel impatiently awaited orders
for the resumption of march, Buell and Thomas A. Scott,
Assistant Secretary of War, arrived in Bowling Green on the
7 120th of February for consultation. Presenting his
case to his superiors, Mitchel countered Buell's cautious 
approach and with the Assistant Secretary of War's 
assistance convinced Buell "it was entirely safe to advance 
on Nashville."^
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Mitchel ordered the men to march on the 22nd of 
February, 1862, with three days' rations in their 
haversacks. On Saturday morning, at 7 a.m. in a drenching 
rain, the troops departed Bowling Green "without wagons, 
tents or camp equipage. The small amount of 
rations carried indicated that Mitchel had an adequate 
supply of provisions at Bowling Green, with the ability to 
move them forward by rail to feed his men. The captured 
trains enabled supplies to be transported from Bowling Green 
to the rapidly advancing column, without being handicapped 
by the slowpaced wagon train.
The main body of troops marched on Nashville by the
road, while General Buell and aides, Scott, General Mitchel
and staff rode the train along with the detached part of the
division. With a repaired locomotive, renamed "General
Mitchel," Mitchel transported a section of artillery and a
thousand riflemen of the Thirteenth Ohio in fifteen railroad
cars, which moved approximately twenty-five miles down the
74Louisville and Nashville Railroad. Accompanied by
a number of cavalrymen, he would scout ahead for signs of 
sabotage along the tracks, in order to keep the train moving 
and prevent a derailment. In mid-afternoon, for example, 
the train halted when it reached a damaged part of the road 
where a rail had been removed. After repairs, the movement 
continued to about thirty-seven miles from Nashville, around 
Fountainhead, Tennessee and five miles north of the crucial 
South Tunnel, where Mitchel found that floodwaters had
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washed out the road and destroyed a bridge, carrying the 
track off the piers and abutments. Blocked by this and two 
more downed bridges, the Union advance was halted and 
"compelled either to return or rebuild the bridges and 
repair the road." Mitchel chose the latter and on Sunday, 
February 23, set about to repair the bridges. Putting the 
thousand rail-borne men to work under his personal 
supervision, by the evening Mitchel was able to send two 
locomotives over all but one of the bridges. The last 
bridge, with its foundation destroyed, required the deposit 
of two carloads of stone into the river bed, forming a 
foundation on which to build a pier for crib-work.^
Although Mitchel was delayed overnight by the bridgework, he 
had a stroke of luck when he found the South Tunnel intact. 
To keep supply lines open, this key point had to be 
protected from Confederate mischief to ensure the Louisville 
and Nashville Railroad would remain open to Nashville.
Meanwhile, the rest of the division marched along the 
Nashville pike and reached twenty miles south of Bowling 
Green, near Franklin, on Saturday night. The troops walked 
in the rain and met the same natural obstructions to their 
route that the men riding the train had experienced. The 
heavy rains washed away several bridges and flooded the dirt 
roads around the a rea.^ After the first day's 
march, the column found shelter "in tobacco houses, barns 
and straw piles." On Sunday, the men limped with 
blistered feet only fifteen miles further along the pike and
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reached the still open South Tunnel. On the 24th of
February, the troops awoke at daylight and continued towards
7 8Nashville, thirty-two miles away. Mitchel left
the train and on horseback met the head of his marching
column on its way south. Together, following behind the
Fourth Ohio Cavalry Regiment and Loomis' artillery battery,
they arrived in the evening on the north bank of the
Cumberland River, which flowed around the north side of
Nashville and emptied into the Ohio River, 200 miles further 
79west. They found the suspension bridge across the
river destroyed, requiring it to be rebuilt before providing
means for a continuous flow of supplies to the advancing
Union army campaigning in enemy territory.
Before Mitchel and his troops crossed the Cumberland,
the mayor surrendered the city to one of General Buell's
division commanders, William Nelson, who had come up the
Cumberland River by boat. As General Mitchel entered
Nashville, riding at the head of his staff, he first
encountered confusion among the population at the prospect
of another military occupation of their town, and then met
81General Grant and his staff from Fort Donelson.
With the joint acceptance of the surrender of the city, 
Mitchel joined in the capture of Buell's military objective, 
eliminating the Confederate hold over the neutral state of 
Kentucky and divided Tennessee. In a letter home, Mitchel 
summarized the campaign of the past two weeks. "Here we 
are," he wrote, "the campaign ended, Bowling Green and
9 3
Nashville ours, and nobody hurt." He had penned 
upon his stationary a feeling of relief, but disappointingly 
noted how incomplete the endeavor really was. While Buell's 
objective had been reached, Mitchel still desired to disrupt 
the enemy's only direct inter-theater railroad, the Memphis 
and Charleston, but he had to bide his time and endure more 
delays.
The enemy had been able to retreat unscathed from 
Nashville, and as before at Green River and Barren River, 
had been allowed to destroy another strategically important 
railroad bridge over the Cumberland River. This complicated 
the logistical problems of supplying an army over a 
disjointed line of communications. Instead of a direct link 
to the supply depot at Louisville, Mitchel had intended to 
rely on wagons, ferries, and make-shift bridges to connect 
the intact sections of the railroad, but at Nashville, the 
Louisville and Nashville crossed the Cumberland River, which 
was navigable up to that point. The river could therefore 
be used as an alternate form of communications for the time 
being. With normal spring run-off to insure adequate depth, 
boats could transport supplies up the Cumberland River from 
the Ohio River. It was not necessary, after all, that the 
Louisville and Nashville Railroad be entirely repaired 
before communications could be restored and Mitchel's 
division resupplied for their advance south.
Mitchel was lucky. He advanced into an area that was 
evacuted so rapidly the Union army had little opportunity to
8 2
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encounter the enemy. Although he had proven himself adept 
at maneuver, he was still an untried battlefield commander. 
Because of Buell's caution in filling the vacuum left by the 
retreating Confederates, Mitchel would get no opportunity to 
prove himself in combat until or unless he had the 
opportunity to operate on his own, without Buell's frequent 
supervision.
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CHAPTER IV
CAPTURE OF HUNTSVILLE:
SEVERING THE MEMPHIS AND CHARLESTON RAILROAD
In addition to the supplies that could be received from
the Cumberland River route, the Union troops confiscated "at
least a half million pounds of bacon, . . . bread, flour,
beans, etc.," the rebels were unable to remove from
Nashville. Mitchel’s troops, previously ordered to march
without tents, discovered "a full supply of new tents of the
best pattern in store ready for . . . use."'*'
Nashville became an advance depot, with two avenues of
supply, and enabled Mitchel to turn his attention to
continuing his advance. In preparation, he positioned his
troops at Camp Andrew Jackson, five miles south towards
Murfreesborough , and maintained advance guards and cavalry
2outposts facing the direction of the enemy.
Mitchel was about to get the freedom of action that he 
needed to display his talents. Halleck was pressuring Buell 
to send troops to Grant as he approached Pittsburg Landing. 
Although a part of Buell's army, Mitchel's division was 
never engaged on the bloody field at Shiloh; nevertheless, 
its presence would be felt on both sides, as Union and 
Confederate commanders evaluated their situations.
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During the march to Nashville the division suffered few
casualties, but Buell still suggested that Mitchel be
"cautious and watchful." Buell was not prepared for a
forward movement and he did not wish Mitchel to commence
3one. Once again Buell was indecisive in the
implementation of his own plan, and did not display any
aggressiveness in the pursuit of a retreating enemy.
Mitchel wrote that the enemy was similarly confused, not
knowing where to retreat nor at what point to make a stand,
but he chastised General Buell for waiting for the army of
fifty thousand effective troops to concentrate at Nashville
instead of making a strategic pursuit of a retreating 
4enemy.
Therefore, Mitchel stretched his authority and sent a 
"reconnaissance in force" to the village of Lavergne. 
Dumont's Seventeenth Brigade departed down the 
Murfreesborough Pike to flush out a body of Confederate 
cavalry,  ^ "a gang of freebooters commanded by a real 
Dick Turpin of a fellow known as Captain Morgan," who had 
been instrumental in burning the bridge across Bacon 
Creek. The brigade returned empty handed after 
missing its elusive enemy.^
But Buell's caution was warranted after all, for on the 
9th of March Morgan's cavalry struck four miles inside of 
Mitchel's advanced line, only one mile from the Third 
Division's main camp. Near the Washington Institute Insane 
Asylum, Morgan's raiders intercepted one of Mitchel's wagon
trains and captured wagons, twenty teamsters, and eighty to
ninety horses, which were later recaptured after a tactical 
8pursuit. Morgan's cavalry forestalled the federal
advance. Acting as a screen, they hid the movements of
Confederate infantry, covering their retreat from Nashville
to Corinth. Using "hit and run" tactics, the enemy cavalry
placed the Army of the Ohio on the tactical defensive.
Reacting to Morgan's presence, Buell's hesitation and
desire to concentrate at Nashville delayed the offensive
almost a month from the 24th of February to the 18th of
March. With a force of 71,000 "effectives," in the Army of
the Ohio, Buell positioned five regiments at Cumberland
Ford; five regiments operated in the valley of the Big
Sandy; one regiment was at Somerset; and four infantry
regiments and one cavalry regiment secured the line from
Louisville to Nashville. The remaining units, organized
into six divisions or about 55,000 men, were concentrated at 
9Nashville.
Contemplating the next strategic objective, Buell 
indicated to Halleck on March 13th that the enemy was 
concentrating along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at 
the "great bend of the Tennessee." Confederates also 
occupied Huntsville, Corinth, and several intermediate 
points, but Decatur appeared to be the main point.^
On the 14th of March, Buell proposed to use his concentrated 
force at Nashville "to strike at the points occupied by the 
enemy on the Memphis and Charleston road." It would be
accomplished in two phases, first an "advance in two columns
one through Murfreesborough, Shelbyville, and Fayetteville,
the other through Columbia." The second phase intended to
divide the enemy's line along the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad between Decatur and Corinth. Buell suggested that
"Florence is the most desirable, if we can secure the
bridge," and also hinted that "the line east of Decatur must
. . . be looked to."^ Answering Buell, Halleck
responded that the "enemy's present line of defense
extendfed] from Decatur to Island No. 10. We must attack it
in the center; say at Corinth or Jackson. . . .  I think all
your available force not required to defend Nashville should
be sent up the Tennessee. This seems to be the best line of
operations, as it leads directly to the enemy's center, and
1 2is easily supplied."
Buell understated the difference between himself and 
Halleck on the question of strategic mobility in the Western 
theater. Turning down Halleck's proposal to use the rivers 
as lines of movement and supply, Buell emphasized the land 
route following the established railroad lines as his army's 
line of march and line of communications. "We should use 
the river to get supplies, but I am decidedly of opinion 
that my force should strike [Savannah] by marching. It can 
move in less time, in better condition, and with more 
security to our operations than by the river. It will have 
also the advantage of driving out the scattered force of the 
enemy this side of the river, and operate powerfully on the
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minds of the people." He emphasized the point that the
union of the two armies must "he safe, and yet not too far
from the enemy;" he hoped to "effect it by surprise . . .
at Florence, getting in between Decatur and Corinth," in
order to draw an enemy attack. "Whenever that may be," he
told Halleck, "[we] will be fully sure to meet the principal
1 3force of the enemy. . . ." Buell formed his
strategy in terms of interior lines similar to Halleck's 
strategy, seeking to get between the enemy and gain central 
position. But he stressed use of the railroad for his 
communications.
The two plans originated from Halleck's and Buell's 
respective lines of communications. Both focused their line 
of operations towards the enemy's receding front along 
parallel directions. Halleck's line of communications 
rested solely on the Tennessee River, while Buell's depended 
on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and the Cumberland 
River. Based on the existing departmental organization, 
their divergent objectives ensured that cooperation between 
Halleck and Buell would be difficult, if not impossible. 
Until March 11, 1862, when departments reorganized, the two
generals commanded separate departments. Buell commanded 
the Department of the Ohio, which consisted of Ohio, 
Michigan, Indiana, Tennessee, and that part of Kentucky east 
of the Cumberland River, while Halleck commanded the 
Department of the Missouri, which contained the states of 
Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Arkansas,
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and that portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River.
The current operations following the retreating Confederates
towards Corinth bordered on the two departments, which
raised debate between the two commanders as to whose plan to
implement. The matter was settled on March 13th, 1862, when
Halleck took command of the newly organized Department of
1 4the Mississippi, which joined the two departments.
Halleck immediately began making the decisions for the
juncture of the two former armies in time for the
forthcoming battles at Shiloh and Corinth.
On the 16th of March, Halleck closed the debate over
the strategic objective of the joint forces of the
Department of the Mississippi by ordering Buell to "move
[his] forces by land to the Tennessee River as rapidly as
possible . . . Grant's army is concentrating at Savannah.
You must direct your march on that point, so that the enemy
cannot get between u s . ^  On the 17th, Halleck
brushed aside Buell's concern about Beauregard's movement
from Corinth "to some other point" on the Tennessee River
and urged Buell on to Savannah. "Push forward your troops
as rapidly as possible," Halleck wrote, "so that we can cut
16their railroad communication [at Corinth].
Halleck was concerned that the Confederates would close on 
the two armies, attempting to divide and conquer each 
separate part before they were joined, just as Buell had 
feared. To prevent that situation, he adamantly ordered 
Buell to move. "Savannah is now the strategic point. Don't
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fail to carry out my instructions. I know that I am
r i g h t . B u e l l  accordingly sent his divisions in
motion to the southwest from Nashville in support of C. F.
Smith's expeditionary force at Savannah. His advanced
division arrived at Columbia on the 18th. On the same day
Buell sent Mitchel's division marching southeast to
18Murfreesborough.
With Morgan no longer an interference in front of
Murfreesborough, Buell ordered the Third Division to
advance; once again, an opportunity arose for Mitchel to
move rapidly forward (see map 4 ) . This time they in arched in
conjunction with the remainder of Buell's army, but not to
the southwest, as Halleck intended for all forces not
19required for the defense of Nashville. At this
juncture, as the Third Division departed the outskirts of 
Nashville for Murfreesborough, and while Buell accompanied 
three divisions to join Grant's army at Savannah, Mitchel's 
command became semi-independent and no longer susceptible to 
Buell's cautious time-table. The Third Division commenced 
its southerly march along the Murfreesborough Pike on the 
18th of March.^
The Third Division's first night of march ended at
Lavergne, where the earlier attempt to capture Morgan had
2 1taken place. On the 19th of March, while Buell 
still prepared forces at Columbia for Savannah, Mitchel, 
hindered once again by the bridges burned by retreating 
Confederates, circumvented these obstructions by marching on
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the Liberty Pike, which joined the Murfreesborough-Nashville
Pike just south of Lavergne. The next morning, after
turning south at an intersection of the Liberty-Lebanon
Pikes, the division took three hours to rumble along the
pike road, which illustrated the immense length of a
2 2division of 10,000 men and eighteen cannon. The
march ended in the afternoon as Mitchel's columns entered
Murfreesborough, "a beautiful town on the banks of Stones
2 3River, surrounded by a noble forest." Here the
Nashville Pike, Lebanon Pike, Shelbyville Pike, and the
Franklin road intersected, which provided a crossroad for
wagon and horse. However, it was the crossing of the
Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad over the west fork of
Stones River that made Murfreesborough a point of strategic
importance. The low ground between the heights on each bank
was normally spanned by three different bridges, one
railroad and two pike, a total length of 1 2 0 0 feet, which
2 Arequired considerable trestle work. The Third 
Division easily entered the town, due to its circuitous 
route around the destroyed bridges, but found that the 
retreating enemy had removed or destroyed all stocks of food 
and equipment.
However quickly the men marched forward, they met with 
destruction and delays. Cautious delays at Nashville had 
allowed the enemy time to fall back unopposed behind manmade 
structures that were now destroyed, so that only natural 
obstacles still interposed between the armies. Mitchel
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addressed this reoccurrance of overcaution with severe 
criticism of his commander. Normally, hindsight provides to 
those weak in spirit the needed courage for criticism, but 
Mitchel was strong in his conviction that delay only favored 
the enemy. His reconnaisance and intelligence confirmed his 
suspicions that the rebels were streaming southward through 
Tullahoma and Stevenson, endeavoring to concentrate at 
Corinth and hoping to strike the Union force advancing on 
Savannah.
Chafing at the situation at Murfreesborough, Mitchel 
wrote that "on reaching Nashville the rebels were on the 
march to [Murfreesborough], and were in great disorder. An 
advance then by our own troops would have scattered them 
like chaff, and we would have captured all their stores; but 
General Buell determined to wait the coming up of fifty-two 
thousand men." That required twenty-two days and rendered 
the advance to Murfreesborough less successful than it would 
otherwise have been, since the rebels were able to retire 
with all their supplies and left both the turnpike and 
railroad bridges in wreckage. The Third Division was 
compelled to halt and rebuild these bridges before it could 
move into Alabama.^
Mitchel realized his advance could not be continued, 
not because of obstructions in his path nor because a strong 
enemy awaited south of Murfreesborough, but because his line 
of communication was not intact. The destroyed railroad 
bridge over the Stones River and the one being rebuilt at
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Nashville severed the Third Division's link with its supply
depots at Louisville and Nashville. Mitchel was a soldier,
optimistic about the forthcoming opportunities, but still
realistic concerning the prerequisite of establishing and of
maintaining the continuity of one's line of communication.
He did not want to take the time to forage away from his
line of communications, especially in an area already
stripped by the retreating Confederates. It therefore
became necessary that "these formidable bridges must be
rebuilt . . .  as without the railroad we could not feed the
2 6army for lack of [wagon] transportation."
Therefore, on March 21, 1862, forced to halt and repair the
bridges behind him, Mitchel immediately set his two engineer
companies to work that proceeded at a fevered pace; in ten
days, the three bridges were erected and rail traffic
27crossed Stones River.
On the 20th of March, Buell assigned Brigadier General
Dumont from Mitchel's division to command the troops posted
to Nashville and on the lines of communication of the army.
His orders were to see "that the lines of communication of
the army are kept open; . . . that trains are provided with
suitable escorts, . . . that the bridges and roads are
2 8properly guarded and kept in good order."
After being ordered to Savannah, Buell explained to 
Halleck what defensive arrangements were made to protect 
middle Tennessee. There were three routes from which an 
enemy could have advanced upon Nashville: first, by the
direct route across from Knoxville; second, by the
Chattanooga Railroad; and third, by the Decatur Railroad.
Each route provided advantages to the enemy that Buell felt
"prudent to take precautions against"; however, they were
detrimental to the planned combined move on Savannah. The
protection of Tennessee would have to occupy troops from the
Army of the Ohio and thus divert men from Halleck's aim of
concentrating all troops at Savannah. Buell's defensive
strategy included Mitchel's division as a "corps d'
observation," placed southeast from Nashville. Buell
forwarded Mitchel's division to Fayetteville, supported by a
brigade at Murfreesborough if necessary to "keep open its
communications, and at the same time observe Nashville and
the approach from Knoxville." Another brigade was kept at
Franklin, where it could be conveniently diverted to support
Murfreesborough, Fayetteville, or to cover the route through
Columbia. Another division was situated in front of
Columbia, either to act with Mitchel's division or to move
toward Savannah, following Buell's army. Buell figured that
with the necessary bridge and depot guards, about 25,000 men
were required to protect middle Tennessee, which left four
divisions or about 35,000 men to join forces at 
29Savannah.
Supplied by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 
Nashville would be used as a depot for the armies defending 
middle Tennessee. Recruits and stragglers would be 
organized, drilled, and supplied, then moved as needed to
the front units. Likewise, rations, forage, medical and
camp equipment, supplies and ammunition, would move through 
30Nashville. Since the city provided a terminal for
both Mitchel's line of communications (the Nashville and
Chattanooga Railroad) and Buell's line of communications
(the Nashville and Decatur Railroad) Dumont's judgement
would have great impact on the conduct of future operations,
for he could prioritize the amount and direction of supplies
moving forward through Nashville.
Mitchel's record reconstruction of the bridges over
Stones River did not eliminate the obstruction to his line
of communications at the bridges near Nashville, which were
being rebuilt by Dumont's men and were not under Mitchel's
command or leadership. The railroad supply line required
continuity for successful operation and those "small bridges
. . . on which the work [had] been progressing some six
weeks, [were] unfinished, and [the] entire division [was]
31held back." Mitchel tried to remedy his lack of
command over his line of communications, by requesting of
Buell that the entire railroad to Chattanooga be placed
32under his command. Mitchel felt that command of his
supply line, in this case control of troops rebuilding the
bridges of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad and troops
guarding the line, would alleviate future supply 
33problems.
If the integrity and security of his rear lines was 
established and the lines brought under his control, Mitchel
predicted a quick and unrestricted advance to the Tennessee
River. It was his link with Nashville that Mitchel was
primarily concerned about, not his front. "I care little or
nothing for the destruction of the railroad bridges. I can
rebuild them and move my army faster than others usually
march. The moment the Nashville bridges are finished my way
is clear to Shelbyville, and thence I will soon open it to
Fayetteville; and once there, I will laugh at railway
communication, as I can advance upon Decatur even without a
halt and supply my army with my regimental teams." Planning
to forage on the country, at least for the time being,
Mitchel only complained of "one trouble, and that is my
dependence on others, who are too slow. The entire war has
been moved too slowly." In full knowledge of the risks
involved in moving without secure rail communication, he was
willing to take the chance of having to subsist off the land
if that gave him the opportunity to occupy the Memphis and
Charleston line. He believed that "with a clear field and
plenty of room in which to operate, and no one to depend
on," he could be in Decatur, or possibly 
34Chattanooga.
The request for control of the railroad went 
unanswered; however, in utter frustration, Mitchel gave vent 
to his feelings. "Buell is the slowest person I ever had 
the misfortune to be associated with, and tries my patience 
in the severest manner almost daily. I wish I had the 
management of this war for just thirty days! Here now I
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shall be compelled Lo wait! wait!! wait!!!"
An advance to Decatur or Chattanooga untangled by
communications was a bold risk, and while his accusations
bordered on insubordination, Mitchel based them on previous
experience and on current information gained while waiting
at Murfreesborough. General Mitchel dispatched a
reconnaissance expedition consisting of the Twenty-fourth
Illinois Regiment, Fourth Cavalry Regiment, part of the
Thirty-seventh Indiana Regiment, plus two six-pounders of
Simonson's battery to search for the enemy and report their
3 6strength and disposition. On the 24th of March, the
expedition departed Murfreesborough, the day before Buell
finally crossed the Duck River on his way to Savannah. It
went by Shelbyville, Tullahoma, Manchester, and McMinnville
to search for the whereabouts of Morgan's cavalry and to
determine whether it was a threat to the Third Division's
37flank or a threat to its communications. The
reconnaissance bore fruit, for the enemy cavalry were
engaged on the evening of the 27th; however, it was
discovered that the enemy cavalry was just a screen and the
only enemy between the Third Division at Murfreesborough and
3 8the Tennessee River. The column returned to 
Murfreesborough on the 28th of March bearing the vital 
information to Mitchel.
Armed with this revealing information, General Mitchel 
knew his front lacked any sufficient enemy to pose a threat 
or to prevent an advance, but his progress was still
3 5
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hampered by the incomplete line of communications. Not
having the railroad to supply food and forage, it became
necessary for Mitchel to relay regimental and divisional
wagons to and from Nashville. On the 31st of March, he sent
ninty wagons guarded by 400 men to Nashville to assist with
the repair of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad and to
39return with provisions.
Buell did not doubt Mitchel's capabilities as a
general; he just did not grasp the opportunities which lay
before Mitchel. This shortsightedness explained Buell's
over-caution. Halleck, in agreement with the basic plan
Buell proposed for the defense of central Kentucky and
Tennessee, likewise doubted the "expediency" of Mitchel's
movement. He even criticized Buell's decision to allow
Mitchel to act as a "corps d' observation," for the column
"on the diverging line to Stevenson . . .  if made very
strong . . . divides your forces too much. It seems to me
better to threaten Decatur by way of Pulaski. Your columns
would then be near enough together to co-operate. . . .  If
[the enemy stands at CorinthJ, your eastern column would be
too distant to render us any assistance."^ Halleck
predicted there would be no counter threat upon Nashville
from Decatur or Stevenson and therefore no need for
diverting any of Buell's troops who were meant for Grant's 
„ 41support.
Halleck similarly failed to anticipate any 
opportunities that lay before Mitchel. After Mitchel
1 1 9
departed Murfreesborough, separated from the main army, he 
would confront the enemy as a semi-independent commander 
with 9,000 men. Buell gave General Mitchel one last set of 
instructions before Mitchel endeavored to sever the Memphis 
and Charleston Railroad. Buell telegraphed the Union 
dispositions, Mitchel's responsibilities, his area of 
command, and finally his part in the campaign commencing in 
southwest Tennessee.
In the March 27th telegram, a concerned Buell stressed 
Mitchel's deployment as a "corps d' observation." This was 
the last order to General Mitchel before his movement south 
and it underscored the fact that the Third Division would be 
"semi-independent." He would not receive another 
telegram from his superiors until the first of May.
Buell's defensive positions placed the Third Division 
at Fayetteville, midway between the two railroads radiating 
south from Nashville. The Nashville and Chattanooga 
Railroad ran southeast from Nashville through the Cumberland 
Plateau and joined the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at 
Stevenson. A distance of 116 miles separated Stevenson from 
Nashville. Fayetteville was connected to the Nashville and 
Chattanooga Railroad at Decherd by the Winchester and 
Alabama Railroad. The Nashville and Decatur Railroad ran 
west of Fayetteville and connected Nashville to Decatur in a 
southwest line. It ran 120 miles and likewise intersected 
the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at Decatur. The base of 
this railroad triangle was the Memphis and Charleston
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Railroad linking Stevenson to Decatur by eighty miles of
track. The entire circuit consisted of uniform five foot
track gauge. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad paralleled
the Tennessee River and crossed it at only two points along
its entire length. These strategically important points
were at Bridgeport, Tennessee, ten miles east of Stevenson,
and Decatur, Alabama, eighty miles to the west of
Bridgeport. The two bridges were both constructed with very
large spans across the Tennessee River and if destroyed
would have crippled the Memphis and Charleston Railroad
supply link for several months while awaiting
reconstruction. Destroying the two bridges would also
protect an invading Union force north of the Tennessee
43River. Mitchel's position at Fayetteville was 
thirty miles north of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad 
and approximately equidistant between the Nashville and 
Chattanooga and Nashville and Decatur Railroads. From that 
central point he could command either route north to 
Nashville.
In justifying Mitchel's line of deployment in central 
Tennessee, Buell informed Halleck that "Fayetteville is on 
as good a line for Decatur as Columbia is; and at the same 
time guards the route to Nashville from the east." Buell's 
guidance to Mitchel added that "This force can be 
concentrated either for an advance or for defense, if 
necessary. It can by marches of from 25 to 35 miles over 
good turnpikes concentrate at Shelbyville or at Columbia or
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Pulaski; or, still farther in advance, at Huntsville or
Decatur. These points are of more or less importance in
consequence of the routes they command, and some of them are
on streams--Duck River and Elk River--which in high water
would have some strength as defensive lines, though in the
dry seasons they are fordable at many points. Fayetteville
is also important, as affording by the branch railroad from
Decherd a good depot for operations against any position
south of it on your line." Buell informed Mitchel that it
was only necessary to suggest these general features of the
strategic situation in central Tennessee and left the final
arrangements to his subordinate, whose confidence emanated
from Mitchel's military understanding of how well "to take
advantage of them or guard against them, according to 
t, 44circumstances.
In Buell's mind, Fayetteville was the pivotal strategic 
point in central Tennessee. Therefore, he supported 
Mitchel's deployment with Duffield's brigade and a battery 
of artillery and squadron of cavalry situated at 
Murfreesborough and with a detachment posted at Lebanon, 
while Negley's brigade, a battery of artillery, and a 
squadron of cavalry covered Franklin. Columbia would be 
protected by a division detached from Buell's force placed 
at or in front of that city. These units were "to act. to 
the left in conjunction with [Mitchel], or to the right, 
according to circumstances.
Mitchel did not expect to get command of his line of
communications, and when finally acknowledging Mitchel's 
request, Buell vaguely indicated that "excepting your own 
division, the troops [those guarding the railroads] are not 
strictly under your command, but they will become so, unless 
otherwise . . . any advance of the enemy toward Nashville
renders their concentration or united action necessary, and 
they will be so instructed." Therefore, only under threat 
of attack towards Nashville would Buell relinquish control 
of the troops guarding Mitchel's line of communications. 
Rightly so, for Buell was ultimately responsible for the 
defense of Nashville and therefore commanded the reserve, 
but— compounded by inaccurate information and communication 
delays due to his distance from Mitchel's line —  Buell's 
decision contributed to missed opportunities in northern 
Alabama.^
After deferring to General Mitchel's judgment for 
moving the Third Division forward, Buell specifically 
ordered him to move one of his brigades, with a battery and 
the principal part of his cavalry, immediately to 
Shelbyville, from which point Mitchel was to complete his 
railroad transportation. Once the Murfreesborough bridges 
were capable of sustaining communications, Mitchel was to 
forward "the principal part of [his] division to 
[Shelbyville], and throw a brigade and strong force of 
cavalry forward to Fayetteville."^
Under specific orders to march, but with only general 
instructions for deployment and action, Mitchel departed
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Murfreesborough on the 3rd of April. Getting a late start,
the Third Division marched south fifteen miles and
bivouacked around Fosterville among "handsome . . . houses
and large . . . plantations. On the 4th, the
division resumed the march at 7 a.m. with the Third Ohio in
the lead, and reached Shelbyville at noon. The division
left the rail route and marched by way of the
Murfreesborough and Shelbyville Pike, which paralleled the
Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad to Fosterville, where the
two diverged, the pike continuing due south and the railroad
veering southeast to Wartrace through Bellbuckle. At
Wartrace the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad branched
west eight miles to Shelbyville. This railroad link was to
suffice as Mitchel's supply line until he reached 
49Fayetteville.
At Shelbyville, the men spent their time in camp one 
mile from town on the Duck River, while Mitchel had to 
endure a delay of four more days waiting for the bridges 
near Nashville to be completed, making his railroad 
communications intact. ^
Mitchel did not want lose momentum because of someone 
else's delay, and thus ordered a "lightning" raid to be made 
to the Tennessee River on the 7th. Three hundred cavalry 
and one gun were to dash towards the bridge at Bridgeport, 
"surprise the bridge guard, drive it away, burn the bridge, 
and retire." The raid was intended to sever the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad and deny the east-west link to the
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rebels. By using cavalry, which depended less on supply
lines and was not slowed down by wagons or infantry, the
expedition had a chance of surprise, but it meant that the
expedition was limited in scope and that territory could not
be occupied and held against a large enemy force. The
cavalry raid, nevertheless, could have profound strategic
results if successful. While not creating a permanent
situation, it would temporarily delay any further enemy
movements by rail from the east towards Corinth, protect the
Union concentration at Savannah, and disrupt the Confederate
concentration at Corinth. Conversely, the use of the
cavalry could adversely affect Mitchel's major objective of
capturing Huntsville by alerting the enemy of his intentions
and by keeping the horsemen occupied and unable to provide
reconnaissance or act as a covering force. While the raid
was a risky decision when deep in enemy territory, it had
great potential for severing the enemy's line of
communications, a situation Mitchel confronted in keeping
his own line of communications intact and in feeding his
division while at Huntsville.^  The results were not
in line with Mitchel's expectations. Even though the
cavalry captured and destroyed a train on the Nashville and
Chattanooga Railroad and netted fifteen prisoners, the raid
proved unsuccessful because the bridge was heavily defended
by infantry. Still intact, the bridge and the enemy supply
and troop link remained, a condition Mitchel feared when he
52attacked Huntsville.
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Mitchel knew that he had tipped his hand; he must move
his division forward promptly after this initial attempt at
severing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at Bridgeport
53failed. With a small force under his command and
the Confederates' ability to use the railroads and move
rapidly against him, Mitchel nevertheless risked undertaking
the venture to Huntsville because Confederates were
necessarily preoccupied with the main Union force at
Pittsburg Landing. Situated at Shelbyville, and ordered by
Buell to move to Fayetteville, Mitchel analyzed his
position, orders, and options for capturing Huntsville and
severing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. His movement
by rail either to Stevenson or to Decatur, with the
Confederate communication link still intact meant the Third
Division could be cut off from Nashville by enemy forces
moving on the opposite rail line. However, surprise was on
the side of Mitchel because the enemy expected the Third
Division to take a month to six weeks to rebuild the
destroyed bridges at Murfreesborough, whereas Mitchel
rebuilt them in ten days and completely upset the enemy's
54delaying tactics. With his line of communications 
finally completed from Nashville to Shelbyville, Mitchel 
could make Shelbyville his supply depot. From that point he 
could haul supplies the final fifty-seven miles by road to 
Huntsville, which required the use of both regimental and 
division wagons.^ Mitchel weighed the strategic 
possibilities against the risks of failure and concluded
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that severing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad was well 
worth the gamble. He had not come all this way to be halted 
by superiors, repulsed by the enemy, or turned away because 
of a lack of nerve.
This strategic objective, cutting the east-west 
railroad link of the Confederacy, which Mitchel had long 
thought of as his contribution to the war effort, now became 
a distinct possibility. He was within striking distance of 
the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and had the potential to
attack Chattanooga and capture that vital rail
„ 56center.
For this strategy to succeed it needed a tactician's 
viewpoint, as well as planning and implementation. During 
the preparation for the departure from Shelbyville to 
Fayetteville, Turchin presented Mitchel with an 
independently conceived plan to seize Huntsville and follow 
up the occupation by attacking the enemy concentration at 
Corinth. Intrigued by the idea, on the eve of the final 
march Mitchel charged the Russian with arranging the details 
of the plan.
Turchin proposed to send his brigade and Kennett's 
cavalry first from Shelbyville, followed the next day by 
another brigade. Returned from the Bridgeport raid, the 
cavalry would act as a covering force "on a wide front on 
all roads leading . . . from Fayetteville and Huntsville."
As a screening force, the cavalry would gain information 
first about the strengths and deployments of the enemy in
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and around Fayetteville, then around Huntsville. Since the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad was still operating and 
capable of transporting troops through Huntsville, it was 
necessary to determine if troops were concentrated there 
waiting to be transferred. From the gathered intelligence, 
a decision could then be made about movement upon both 
places. If the information turned out to be favorable, then 
the brigades could rapidly move on Fayetteville and finally 
upon Huntsville. In the final phase, the cavalry would be 
detached and employed east and west of Huntsville to cut 
railroad and telegraph wires and "to seize the post-office 
and telegraph office, railroad yard, round-house, and 
buildings where Confederate property might be stored." Once 
Turchin captured Huntsville, he planned to have part of his 
brigade transported by train toward Decatur, while Mitchel 
with a part of the other brigade would execute the same plan 
east toward Bridgeport, and "in two or three days [they] 
could be in possession of the whole railroad on [the north] 
side of the [Tennessee] river." Mitchel questioned the 
possibility of finding the enemy in strength at Huntsville. 
According to his recollection, Turchin answered, that "if by 
attacking the town we found the enemy too strong for us, we 
would fall back and be re-inforced by the brigade following 
us, and then act according to circumstances. We might lose 
some men, it is seldom that a military expedition of that 
kind is not attended with losses. Yet the enterprise was of 
such magnitude that we might well afford to risk some lives
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for the sake of achieving an important result.
On April 8th, Mitchel approved Turchin's plan and 
ordered him to move the Eighth Brigade toward Fayetteville
on the next day, while the cavalry screened the advance as
5 Sproposed. The advance started at 6 a .m ., but
moved slowly moving because the Fayetteville Pike was
"sloppy, and in many places overflowed," due to a drenching 
59rain. Sill's brigade departed Shelbyville on the
10th, following Turchin's brigade, while Lytle's brigade
0remained in Shelbyville as a reserve force.
After sixteen miles, the march was halted five to six
miles from Fayetteville, to be continued at 6 a.m. the next
morning. By noon it had reached Fayetteville with Mitchel
riding at the head cf his staff into the public square. The
men crossed the Elk River bridge and camped on the south
bank. Cavalry outposts were ordered "to the front on all
the roads leading from the direction of Huntsville, [again]
with orders not to pass anybody out toward that
town."^ Kennett's cavalry performed its duty as a
covering screen and captured many people routinely traveling
north on business. These detentions netted important
information on which Mitchel based his decision to continue 
62south.
Some of that information concerned the outcome at 
Shiloh, for results there would directly affect the 
practicality of the move to Huntsville. At first, 
information gathered from civilian prisoners indicated that
1 2 9
Grant's army was defeated by Beauregard, and that 5,000
rebels were at Huntsville "aware of [the Third Division's]
6 3approach and prepared to receive [them]." With
only 4,000 "effective" men in the initial advance against a
force of 5,000, further movement would be suicidal. Mitchel
believed the information regarding the number of enemy
troops at Huntsville was correct, but rejected the notion
that the enemy knew of his approach because his cavalry had
arrested "every person through whom news of [their] approach
could be conveyed."^ And on the 10th of April,
Mitchel received a dispatch which dispelled the enemy rumors
of a Union defeat at Corinth.^ His movement on
Huntsville immediately became more feasible.
However, Mitchel's division formed only a part of the
original force that had started south in December. It was
depleted by illness, absentees, death, and the "necessity
for leaving several regiments at Shelbyville and several
others at Fayetteville, the latter of which places was
6 (5thoroughly and venomously disloyal." Mitchel was
concerned about his tenuous line of communications, now
tethered by road through enemy territory secured neither
from rebel raiders nor nature. He depleted his small force
to guard against the former, but was unable to protect his
line of communications against nature's effect upon road
6 7conditions and bridge structures.
With indefatigable courage and unswerving perseverance, 
Mitchel nevertheless elected to move at once upon
130
Huntsville. One hour after getting word of the results of
the Battle of Shiloh, Turchin's brigade, the 4th Ohio
Cavalry, and Simonson's battery departed Fayetteville.
Mitchel again used the shuttle system of moving forward one
brigade at a time, keeping a brigade at Fayetteville in
reserve. After marching twenty miles in ten hours, and
"wading over one of the branches of the Flint River, waist
deep, [Turchin's brigade] stopped to bivouac . . . in a
6 8grove of timber about 10 miles from Huntsville."
General Mitchel knew the utmost importance of proper
execution of a military plan. His intelligence and personal
drive had formed the Third Division into an efficient
marching force capable of overcoming natural and manmade
hinderances on the road. It had made remarkable time when
allowed to move south. The march had started in December
from Elizabethtown and now camped undetected just ten miles
from glory. But on the night before the final phase,
Mitchel felt obliged to place the success of the mission
ahead of his personal ambition. Considering his own lack of
combat experience, Mitchel conferred command of the
immediate advance on Huntsville upon a battle hardened
veteran. He gave Turchin the task of leading the expedition
69into Huntsville. If there was to be a battle and
there were odds that there might be, with 5,000 rebels in 
transit at Huntsville, Mitchel wanted his command in 
reliable, experienced hands. Without specific orders 
authorizing the move, the success or failure would rest
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squarely upon Ormsby Mitchel. Turchin would command only 
the cavalry and two cannons in order to expedite the fall 
upon Huntsville, followed immediately by Mitchel with the 
remainder of the brigade's infantry.
After only four or five hours rest, the men were roused 
without the sound of trumpet or drum. They were tired after 
marching forty miles in forty hours. The spent force moved 
out along the Meridianville Pike from its bivouac and passed 
unnoticed through sleepy Meridianvil1e seven miles from 
Huntsville. At Meridianville , according to plan, three 
details of cavalry equipped with picks and crowbars and the 
horse artillery split from Mitchel and the infantry to dash 
upon their respective assignments. Mitchel hoped to catch 
all of the rolling stock still remaining in the train yard 
by tearing up the track on either side of town and sealing 
off the town.^
The mission was accomplished without any major 
problems. The western cavalry detachment cut the railroad 
and telegraph wires, although the eastern detail was unable 
to rip up the track before two engines moved toward 
Stevenson. Driving off the enemy cavalry, the center column 
of the Fourth Cavalry Regiment entered the town at 7 a.m. 
and took possession of the "railroad yard and all the 
railroad rolling stock, offices and buildings, with 
supplies. They also captured the telegraph office, post 
office, and the railroad depot," making prisoners of several 
hundred Confederate troops who [were] caught passing through
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the city." The anticipated 5,000 rebels had already passed 
Huntsville and luckily, the Third Division attacked between 
enemy troop movements heading west. The Third Division had 
marched fifty-seven miles in forty-eight hours and by their 
rapid movements gained complete surprise and severed the 
coveted Memphis and Charleston Railroad. The townspeople 
were awakened by the sound of cannon echoing from east of 
town and before breakfast they were in the hands of Union 
soldiers.^
Two hundred military prisoners, fifteen locomotives,
and eighty "passenger, box, and platform cars," along with
the undestroyed machine shops and tool apparatus in the rail
yard were captured without casualties tc the Third Division.
Led by General Ormsby Macknight Mitchel, the Third Division
of the Army of the Ohio, "succeeded in cutting the great
artery of railway intercommunications between the southern 
72States."
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CHAPTER V
SECURING HUNTSVILLE:
A POSSIBLE TURNING MOVEMENT
The Battle of Shiloh was over. The bloody affair left 
the Union in possession of the field. While Confederates 
retreated south toward Corinth, the Union army— under the 
field command of Halleck since April llth--slowly pursued. 
The march on Corinth took a month, for Beauregard did not 
evacuate until May 30.
Mitchel was interested in a move on Huntsville for its 
own sake, because cutting the Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad could have far-reaching effects in all theatres of 
war. But the events in northern Mississippi were never far 
from Mithcel's mind, end it was obvious to him that his 
movements after the fall of Huntsville might have an 
extremely beneficial effect on Union fortunes before Corinth 
if he was allowed to develop his plans.
Apparently Mitchel was thinking in terms of a turning 
movement, or at least a raid, to break the stalemate at 
Corinth. Mitchel realized that any movement, on Beauregard's 
communications did not necessarily depend solely on troops 
under Halleck's immediate control. He could supply the 
manpower over the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to
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Tuscumbia. If more troops were needed to accomplish the 
turning movement, they could be sent from Pittsburg Landing 
on the Tennessee River. If additional troops were not 
forthcoming, however, Mitchel's operation could be a raid 
conducted by infantry, breaking the Mobile and Ohio 
Railroad. This probably would have forced Eeauregard to 
retreat, for he lacked field transportation and had to keep 
his army concentrated thus relying on that railroad for 
supplies.
In strategic terms, the capture of Huntsville on April 
11 by the Third Division meant a disruption of Confederate 
commerce, logistics, and strategic mobility. Specifically, 
it hindered the transfer of men and supplies between 
theaters of operation. For rail communications between 
Virginia and Mississippi, the Confederacy was now forced to 
resort to the indirect route from the east through Atlanta, 
south by way of Mobile, then north along the Mobile and Ohio 
Railroad to Corinth. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad, 
which had demonstrated its usefulness when it brought 
together troops from throughout the Confederacy at Corinth, 
had been severed at Huntsville. Instead of destroying that 
railroad to render it useless, however, Mitchel captured the 
road intact and found that by keeping it intact, he could 
turn it to Federal advantage. There were plenty of cars and 
locomotives, and the shops and depots were in good 
condition. It made sense to use the road now for the 
benefit of the Union. The railroad continued to operate as
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it had before, but under new management.
On April 11, 1862, Mitchel's Third Division, minus two 
regiments protecting its line of communications to 
Nashville, entered Huntsville undetected, having achieved 
tactical surprise. But it would not take long fcr news of 
the occupation of the town and the loss cf the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad to reach Confederate ears. Therefore, 
the Third Division immediately began the duties of an 
occupation army, and attempted tc secure its flanks (see map 
5). According to a prearranged plan, Mitchel promptly 
dispatched Turchin's Brigade by railroad tc Decatur on the 
evening of April 11th. At 6 p. m ., the 24th Illinois, a 
part of the 19th Illinois, and a working party fcr repairing 
the railroad track, boarded railroad cars and with a "gun 
fixed on a flat car, placed in front of the locomotive,"
departed Huntsville for Decatur, roughly twenty-five miles
2away. The force advanced slowly westward cut of 
Huntsville, following on the heels of Confederate Brigadier 
General Benjamin H. Helm's cavalry, v'hich tried to destroy 
track and bridges over intervening culverts in order to
3hinder Turchin s movement. Ccming to the near side 
cf the Decatur Bridge over the Tennessee River on the 
morning of the 12th, Turchin's men surprised the rebel 
guards, who quickly fired bales of cottcn that had been used 
as makeshift fortifications. Turchin's men easily 
extinguished the fire and salvaged the bridge work, but the 
citizens cf Decatur raised the drawbridge in hopes of
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preventing the Federate from crossing. After Union troops 
prodded the citizens to lower the bridge by threatening that
"if you do not close the bridge at once your town will be
n 4shelled to pieces, the citizens acquiesced.
Turchin's move to Decatur was successful in securing the
division's right flank by capturing the Tennessee River
bridge. Any counter move by the Confederates would have to
come over the bridge and through Turchin's brigade. Besides
securing the north side of the Tennessee, the capture of the
bridge also gave possibilities for the division to link up
with the main Union army at Corinth. Meanwhile, as part of
Turchin's Brigade had moved on Decatur to the west, a
regiment of Sill's Ninth Brigade advanced towards
Bridgeport, to the east.
On the morning of April 12th, 1862, Sill and 1,000 men
boarded a train and headed tc the east in an effort to 
capture the bridge at Bridgeport, and thus secure Mitchel's 
left flank. Mitchel accompanied the expedition to a point 
beyond Stevenson, where the Memphis and Charleston Railroad 
crossed Widow Creek. Finding the Confederate force guarding 
the Howe Bridge at Bridgeport too large for an immediate 
attack, Sill's force fell back to Stevenson. However , to 
keep the enemy from using the Nashville and Chattanooga 
Railroad and slipping in behind his position at Huntsville, 
Mitchel ordered that the Widow Creek [Widden] bridge 
approximately four miles from Bridgeport, be burned. The 
destroyed bridge temporarily prevented the Confederate force
at Bridgeport from advancing to Stevenson Junction and 
denied them the use c f the Nashville and Chattanooga 
Railroad. Mitchel left Sill and his meager force to defend 
the left flank. Though not as spectacular as destroying the 
Tennessee River bridge at Bridgeport, as Buell and Mitchel 
had intended, destruction of the Widow Creek bridge 
nevertheless accomplished the same results, for it refused 
access to the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to the 
Confederates, and secured the Third Division's left 
flank.'*
On the 13th of April, 1862, Mitchel reported he had 
three regiments of infantry and ore squadron of cavalry at 
Decatur, v/ith its bridge over the Tennessee River intact. 
Halleck reported to Stanton on the 16th of April that 
Mitchel had captured both Huntsville and Decatur, and had 
moved cn Tuscumbia. But Halleck did not comprehend 
the possibilities created by Mitchel ' s possess i. on of a land 
avenue via Decatur or Tuscumbia for offensive operations 
across the Tennessee River into the rear of the enemy at 
Corinth. Almost to the point of obsession, Halleck 
concentrated on Corinth as the objective for his own 
combined army, based on his belief that the primary 
strategic point existed "where several lines of 
communications either intersect or meet." Halleck planned 
to attack "the centre of [a line] . . . occupied by the
enemy, which he had indicated was at Corinth Junction in the 
middle of the Confederate line, extending from Decatur to
Memphis."
To guard against a threat to his left flank at Corinth, 
Halleck had instructed Grant on April 12th to send t v. o 
regiments by steamer "to Florence and destroy a portion of
gthe bridge there and return" to Savannah. Cutting
the bridge connection would have blocked one Confederate 
route of retreat from Corinth and would also have blocked a. 
suitable line of advance that might have been used in a 
gamble to turn Halleck's force at Shiloh. But, by capturing 
the Decatur bridge and Tuscumbia, Mitchel eliminated any 
such possibility and provided an opportunity for Halleck to 
fall upon the Confederate position at Corinth. Mitchel 
captured the bridge for another reason besides just securing 
his position in northern Alabama.
Realizing the advantage to Union communications that 
the Memphis and Charleston Railroad provided, Mitchel 
defended his left flank at Stevenson by blocking the enemy 
with a destroyed bridge, and pushed his other flank to 
Tuscumbia to link with the force fighting at Shiloh. With 
his position secured behir.c the defensive barrier formed by 
the Tennessee River, Mitchel sent a reconnaissance in force 
towards Tuscumbia, expecting "to capture Tuscumbia and 
Florence . . . [and] open communications with the main body
of the army under [Buell's] command."^ With a 
distance of only forty-two miles separating Savannah and 
Florence, part of the main army could have moved by an 
overland route cn good roads or could have been transported
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on the river and reinforced Mitchel's troops at Tuscumbia. 
Beauregard's central position at Corinth, presented a flank 
position to Mitchel as he created a gap in the Confederate 
front and the Confederate army's right retreated towards 
Corinth. The constricted rebel front be:came more 
concentrated, and hence more powerful, but it also became a 
vulnerable position susceptible to a turning movement. By 
concentrating at Corinth, the enemy withdrew his front, gave 
up the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and became more 
logistically dependent on the Mobile and Olio Railroad. 
Mitchel did not plan to attack the position at Corinth, but 
to inflict a turning movement, upon the Confederate line of 
communications, the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, below Corinth. 
While the main Federal army occupied the attention of the 
Confederates in front of Corinth, Mitchel with additional 
troops from Halleck, could have threatened or severed the 
enemy's line of communications. Even without 
reinforcements, Mitchel could threaten a serious raid that 
would have damaged Beauregard's communications.
However, Halleck feared the enemy, situated at Corinth 
between Halleck's army and Mitchel's column at Tuscumbia, 
would utilize his interior lines to hold one army at bay and 
strike at the other, a classic Napoleon gambit. A turning 
movement was inconsistent with Halleck's belief in operating 
on the enemy's central position. Halleck thought in 
strategic terms of attacking the enemy's center to sever 
"the enemy's means of resistance, and . . . [enable] the
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assailant to strike, with the mass of his force, upon the 
dissevered and partially paralyzed members cf the hostile 
body."^ In the Trans-Mississippi campaign, he 
indicated that "to operate on exterior lines against an 
enemy occupying a central position will fail, as it always 
has failed, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. It is 
condemned by every military authority, . . . unless each of
the exterior columns is superior to the e n e m y T h e  
two Union columns v«/ere separated by the bend of the 
Tennessee River, but with superior river transport the river 
provided a convenient link. Hal.leek could have used his 
river transportation to transfer men from Pittsburg landing 
to Tuscumbia, as had been planned and taken place on 
numerous occasions to sever the Tennessee Ri.ver bridges.
Joined at Florence, a combined movement by the Union 
armies could have been accomplished unhindered by the 
Confederates. From a "bridge head" at Tuscumbia, cperatiers 
could have been directed upon the rear of the enemy at 
Corinth. Supported by rail from Nashville via Decatur, and 
by water via the Tennessee River to Tuscumbia, a turning 
movement, aimed at the enemy's line of communications (the 
Mobi.le and Ohio Railroad) would have forced Confederate 
capitulation, retreat, or placed them in a situation of 
having to attack to protect their co mi muni, cations. Balleck's 
objective, the capture cf Corinth, would have been 
successfully completed, and forced an attack by the 
Confederates to keep from being encircled and to prevent
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t.heir line of communications from being cut off.
Ordered to communicate directly to Secretary of War
1 2Edwin M . Stanton in Washington, Mi t che1 sent him a
plan for such a movement. If his command consisted of more
than 7,000 men, he would advance promptly upon Tuscumbia
with more than a reconnaissance force and attack "the tear
of the enemy [at] Jacinto, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad,"
1 3forty miles from Tuscumbia. Including the detached
regiments at Fayetteville and Shelbyville guarding his line
of communications, the Third Division only had 8,782
effectives. Mitchel misjudged his superiors' reaction to
driving the enemy from Decatur and Tuscumbia. He had felt
"those places . . . would be promptly occupied by a large
force from the main army. . . ." He complained to both
Stanton and Buell that the occupation of the two towns gave
the Union "the opportunity of striking a fatal blow at the
14Mobile and Ohio Railroad in the enemy's rear."
After the Federal army and navy had failed for months 
either to destroy or capture the Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad bridges over the Tennessee, Mitchel captured and 
held one of the two remaining bridges with the connecting 
rail line. He thought that the Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad could provide a solution to the stalemate facing 
the: Federal armies after Shiloh, but both Ha 11 eck and Buell 
only thought about direct attacks against the enemy- 
positions i.ri their front. When the Confederates retreated 
from the battlefield to entrenched positions around Corinth,
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Union armies cautiously and sluggishly moving towards 
Corinth applied unsuccessful flanking movements within the 
confined area near the bend of the Tennessee River.
With Memphis and Charleston Railroad operational in his 
rear, Mitchel proposed to use the road as his line of 
communications from Decatur to Tuscumbia to support the 
movement. With the bridge intact at Decatur, his line of 
communications radiated northward via the Nashville and 
Decatur and the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroads. Gaps 
in these could be repaired and provisions supplemented by 
transport up the Tennessee River to Tuscumbia. The 
Tennessee River could have supplied a large force sent in 
support to impliment Mitchel's turning movement. The waters 
normally were deep enough to allow river traffic up to 
Tuscumbia, where Buell had transported 100,000 rations for 
Mitchel's division on the 22nd of April. When the move east 
was planned later in May, Eastport had been designated an 
advance depot, so there was adequate water transport and the 
river was high enough to permit supplying a large army near 
Tuscumbia for Mitchel's turning movement. His hopes of 
"opening . . . [overland] communications directly with
General Buell," were delayed, however, when Turchin found 
that the Confederates had destroyed the bridge at 
Florence.^ However, this only eliminated the most 
expedient means of moving reinforcements across the 
Tennessee River from Columbia and Savannah to Tuscumbia. 
There were still operational ferries and river transports
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available until the bridge could be repaired. Troops could 
also be transported from Nashville by the Nashville and 
Chattanooga Railroad and the Nashville ard Decatur Railroad 
and cross at Decatur.
Apprehensive about the enterprise to take Tuscumbia,
Buell bid cautionary words of advice to Mitchel. Buell
explained that with the Florence bridge destroyed, Mitchel's
only avenue of retreat if attacked was to fall back toward
Decatur, where the bridge was still intact, and employ the
Memphis and Charleston Railroad to move further east. Even
with the possibility of Mitchel's extended force being cut
off, Buell deferred judgement, permitting Mitchel to hold
16the position at Tuscumbia as an outpost. According
to regulations, outpost duty was designed to provide advance
warning of the approach of an enemy. However, it "should
not only secure an army against surprise, but also be so
arranged as to enable the outposts t.o avoid an engagement
and not be enveloped by an enemy."*/ Mitchel did not
capture Huntsville, Decatur, and Tuscumbia in order to
devote his energy to sit on the defense. He wanted to take
the war to the enemy, with "the only object . . . [to]
rescue [the] unhappy country from threatened
18destruction." Halleck agreed to allow Mitchel to
hold Tuscumbia as an outpost, but stipulated that Mitchel
maintain his main force north of the Tennessee
d • 19River.
No doubt the instruction to have the Third Division
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remain on the north bank was a precautionary measure against
any enemy counter move that might have cut the division off
from its escape route. As an outpost position, Tuscumbia
could give invaluable advance warning to both Hal leek, and
Mitchel. Such an outpost could indicate the route of a
retreating enemy from Corinth, warn of a rebel turning
movement upon Halleck's force, or inform Halleck of an enemy
movement on Nashville from south of the river. Mitchel
similarly used the outpost to warn of enemy threats against
his vulnerable position south of the river and to detect any
attempt to retake control of the strategic bridge at
Decatur. However, by delegating only a defensive role for
the Third Division, Buell confused the situation for
Mitchel, eliminated the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as a
line for offensive operations, and removed the railroad's
20advantage for defensive concentration.
In the second week in April, 1862, Mitchel provided the 
opening for an indirect attack upon the enemy at Corinth by 
moving troops to Tuscumbia, only forty miles from Jacinto. 
But Mitchel received contradictory orders, first from Buell 
to destroy the bri.dge at Decatur, and then from Buell and 
Halleck to hold the position at Tuscumbia. The Decatur and 
Florence bridges had been treated in previous communiques as 
primary strategic objectives for disrupting the enemy's line 
of communications or for preventing an enemy retreat from 
Tennessee. Mitchel did disrupt the Confederate trunk line 
rail route, not temporarily by destroying one or more
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bridges, as the Federal navy had failed to do, but 
permanently by occupation of the land between Tuscumbia and 
Stevenson. Mitchel acknowledged Buell's order to burn the 
Decatur bridge on the 20th of April, but argued that he 
should maintain his position from Tuscumbia to Decatur in 
order to use the bridge in future offensive operations or to 
keep a line of communications open with the main army. "I 
have seized and hold the railroad from Decatur to Tuscumbia 
in the hope of opening communication with the main body 
under your command . . . but with so small a force no amount
of vigilance or activity is sufficient to protect so long a 
line." However, "if the enemy retreat from Corinth I deem 
it a matter of the utmost moment that I should hold my 
present position, which commands this whole section of the
. M 21country.
Buell's order for the destruction of the bridge was
contrary to Halleck's wishes. Answering an inquiry as to
why Mitchel was ordered to destroy the bridge, Halleck told
Lincoln that he knew of no such order, "on the contrary,
[Mitchel] has saved some [bridges] which were fired by the
2 2enemy." Mitchel expessed to Chase his concern and
confusion about the burning of the bridges. "I now hold
[the] Memphis and Charleston Railroad from Tuscumbia to
Stevenson," he wrote, "but am now ordered to burn the
bridges. I do not comprehend the order, but must obey it as
early as I can." Mitchel felt that the "entire line ought
23to be occupied," instead of abandoned.
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Still at Shiloh, Buell inquired of Mitchel about the
status of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, for he
looked to it as his line of operations for a possible move
on Chattanooga. Buell discounted an advance by the Federal
forces along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, insisting
that Mitchel destroy "the Decatur bridge as soon as [he]
2 Ashould leave it." However, Mitchel realized the 
strategic importance of the Decatur bridge. It provided one 
of two crossings of the Tennessee River, and was part of the 
only Union-controlled continuous railroad link between the 
west and as far as Bridgeport on the east. Any move by 
Halleck's army east towards Chattanooga could only be 
mounted along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which 
served as a direct line of operations. The success or 
failure of a Union advance through northern Alabama hinged 
upon the maintenance and control of the Decatur Bridge. The 
Tennessee River could not act as a line of communication 
that far east because of the Muscle Shoals obstruction to 
river traffic. The advantage of concentration along the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad and those railroads linked 
to it, belonged to the Union army, but it depended on the 
condition of the two bridges over the Tennessee River to 
provide a continuous line of communications. Damage to the 
Howe Bridge at Bridgeport meant the Union concentration 
aimed at splitting the Confederacy must stop short of 
Chattanooga. The Federal line of communications still 
existed in a disjointed fashion via the Nashville and
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Chattanooga Railroad, the Nashville and Decatur Railroad, 
and the limited access up the Tennessee River.
However, the destruction of the Decatur Bridge meant 
that the Union armies could not move east expeditiously. It 
also meant that the main army could be cut off from central 
Tennessee and be isolated south of the river. The advantage 
of interior lines that Mitchel gained for the Union armies 
by capturing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad would also 
be negated. The river, which was eight hundred feet wide at 
this point, impeded any north-south movement without the 
intact railroad bridge at Decatur.
Mitchel analyzed his predicament and knew all of the 
advantages of keeping the bridge intact and under Union 
control, but he also understood the devastating impact the 
bridge would have on Union fortunes if it reverted intact to 
the Confederates. Intact, the Decatur Bridge opened Middle 
Tennessee and Kentucky to reoccupation by the South, with 
the potential of following the rail line almost unopposed, 
except for Mitchel's forces, all the way to Nashville, 
Louisville, and the Ohio River. Mitchel could not allow the 
intact bridge to change hands. If his superiors did not 
want the advantage of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, 
he was prepared to destroy it if he had to withdraw.
Not only was his position secured in northern Alabama, 
but Mitchel had trains running regularly along the section 
of track between Bellefonte and Jonesborough. After 
capturing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, complete with
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the means to operate it, Mitchel gained the advantage of 
concentration over his front of operations. Controlling a 
line of 120 miles would have been impossible without the 
railroad, for with it the Third Division possessed the 
capability to shift its meager force between Tuscumbia, 
Decatur, Huntsville, and Bridgeport. With sixteen engines 
and a proportional number of cars, Mitchel enjoyed the means 
of operating on internal lines even over such an extended 
position as northern Alabama. Mitchel admitted that without 
the railroad, it would have been impossible to hold the 
region for one d a y . ^  ^ It would have been difficult to 
extend throughout northern Alabama so quickly, and later to 
secure the area; by the same token, Mitchel could not have 
successfully resisted a determined Confederate attack on 
either of his flanks if the intact Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad had not given him interior lines. Because of the 
railroad, Mitchel had the capability for defensive 
concentration and therefore the ability to reinforce a 
threatened flank.
To bolster his forward position, Mitchel ordered two
regiments, one at Shelbyville and the other at Fayetteville,
to reinforce the bridge guard at Decatur and to provide
2 6)support to Turchin at Tuscumbia. Upon receiving
Mitchel's request for additional troops, Buell gave 
conditional permission to "call together all the force that 
can possibly be spared from the roads and the neighborhood 
of Nashville," but only if he had to fall back on
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Shelbyville. The two cavalry regiments between Columbia and
Savannah and the two infantry regiments at Columbia were not
to be removed, while the force near Murfreesborough was to
be reduced only after the enemy had committed itself to
2 7attacking Mitchel's defenses in middle Tennessee.
Buell would not be able to send reinforcements from Corinth 
because of the lack of transportation and because the route 
over which the men would travel would expose them to 
interception. Since Buell felt that sending Mitchel troops 
from Halleck's position in front of Corinth would weaken 
Halleck, he promised Mitchel three other regiments from Ohio 
and one from Louisville, which were to replace the older 
regiments for needed rest.^
The men promised Mitchel came too late, as the 
Confederates applied pressure on Turchin's Brigade at 
Tuscumbia and forced Mitchel to withdraw his outpost back 
towards Decatur. Mitchel did not receive any reinforcements 
for his proposed turning maneuver, or even for holding his 
own position south of the river. He was compelled to defend 
his position by retiring behind the Tennessee River barrier, 
and that required him to destroy the Decatur bridge. The 
advantage Mitchel had realized by capturing the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad intact went unused by his superiors, 
resulting in a loss of interior lines of communications 
between the main army central Tennessee. Mitchel therefore 
destroyed the Decatur bridge, constricted his lines, and 
turned his attention from the west and to the east. Perhaps
t
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Chattanooga would offer Mitchel the same opportunity to 
disrupt enemy communications that Corinth had provided.
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CHAPTER VI
MITCHEL'S LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS
By not receiving any supporting encouragement to hold 
his position south of the Tennessee River, nor to enter a 
joint operation from the main army at Corinth for a turning 
movement, Mitchel had no option but to destroy the Decatur 
bridge. After securing his right flank by eliminating the 
bridge, Mitchel attempted an unsupported advance towards 
Chattanooga through his position at Stevenson. Mitchel 
found that his difficulties in the offensive eastward were 
derived from the neglect of his superiors, the threatening 
moves of the enemy, and the difficulty in maintaining an 
adequate supply of provisions and forage for his division. 
Nevertheless, Mitchel's unsuccessful operation illustrates 
the problem of an army that relies on rail communications 
when those lines are disrupted, and must revert to wagon and 
water transport. The contrast between traditional military 
communications and rail communications underscores the 
limitations of wagon and water in supporting a large, 
concentrated force.
The lesson may be applied to Mitchel, for his logistics 
did not adequately translate his well conceived strategy 
into a viable turning movement on Chattanooga. The notion
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of disrupting the Western and Atlantic Railroad was sound, 
but could not be implemented successfully without more 
complete rail communications. Mitchel displayed ingenuity 
in supplying the forces at hand with limited means, but he 
could not have supported the additional manpower needed to 
interrupt Confederate communications south of Chattanooga.
After occupying northern Alabama, the Third Division 
experienced a supply problem which resulted from a number of 
factors. While actual starvation never confronted the 
division because of Mitchel's successful efforts to maintain 
its line of communications, the logistical question 
complicated the occupation and limited future operations. 
Until a greater emphasis was placed on Mitchel's operations 
by his superiors, his role became religated to a holding 
action due to his small force and inadequate communications.
The Third Division's route of march from Nashville to 
Huntsville was through the richest agricultural area of the 
Confederacy, but as it moved south the land was increasingly 
oriented toward cotton production. ^  The natural 
invasion corridor had provided some of the best pasture and 
grain fields in Tennessee. While past harvests had 
indicated the potential of the fertile fields of Tennessee 
and had prompted Union army occupation to deny that source 
to the Confederacy, the immediate concern to Mitchel was in 
getting food for his troops and animals.
At Nashville, the division obtained its last sufficient 
supply of provisions from captured stores, the Louisville
and Nashville Railroad, and the Cumberland River. That 
occurred at the end of February 1862, but when the division 
departed for Murfreesborough on the 18th of March without 
establishing its communications across the Cumberland River 
at Nashville, the Third Division hauled supplies forward by 
wagon from Nashville for ten days, while delayed at 
Murfreesborough reconstructing the Stones River bridges.
Beginning on April third, the final route of 
seventy-eight miles from Murfreesborough to Huntsville 
passed over rugged terrain and crossed numerous creeks and 
rivers. The terrain consisted of flat ground to rolling 
hills, interspersed with broken and rocky country. For 
twenty-five miles the route from Shelbyville to Fayetteville 
became curvy and rugged, with rapidly rising terrain as it 
cut through narrow pasture lands isolated by heavy woods and 
meadows. The last twenty-eight miles, from Fayetteville to 
Huntsville, showed more intensive cultivation on either side 
of the road for one or two miles as the terrain flattened. 
Closer to Huntsville, farm lands continued west to Decatur, 
while to the east, beginning with a small hill north of 
town, a ridge line ran north-south to the Tennessee
d • 2River .
For his plan to succeed, Mitchel had to force march his 
men to ensure tactical surprise. Therefore, the Third 
Division moved on Huntsville from Fayetteville without the 
usual cumbersome supply train. To speed the pace of the 
march, the men fed from their haversacks and confiscated
t
162
163
provisions along their route of inarch. Marching through 
middle Tennessee in early spring, however, prior to the 
harvest season, the Third Division found the region lacking 
abundant food or fodder. The 1861 harvest was already 
consumed by the populace and by the Confederates during 
their occupation, and when the enemy army retreated its 
troops attempted to destroy their accumulated stores just as 
they had done at Bowling Green, Nashville, and 
Murfreesborough.
Mitchel needed those stocks of provisions and forage to
keep his army moving and to maintain its ability to fight,
or he had to ensure that his line of communications could
make up the difference. In order to keep the soldier
healthy, the 1862 U. S. Army ration provided the required
33,000 calories per day. Meat and bread supplied 
almost all of the nutrition, as three-quarter pounds of pork 
or one and one-quarter pounds of salted or fresh beef gave 
the soldier approximately 1,200 calories while twenty-two 
ounces of fresh baked bread or sixteen ounces of "hard tack" 
supplied another 1,600 calories. Beans, rice, coffee, 
sugar, vinegar, molasses, and salt rounded out the soldier's 
ration and together with the meat and bread totalled 3,200
4calories. Marching rations were even more bland.
In addition to a normal ration of meat, coffee, sugar, and 
salt, it included ten pieces of "hard tack." While weighing 
two and one-quarter pounds, compared to a normal ration of 
three and one-eighth pounds, the marching ration still
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provided the daily caloric requirement.
Horses and mules required a daily forage ration of hay 
and grain. Horses were authorized fourteen pounds of hay 
and twelve pounds of oats, corn, or barley and mules 
normally received fourteen pounds of hay and nine pounds of 
assorted g r a i n s . A s  previously mentioned, a U. S.
Army wagon carried Various commodities weighing an average 
of 2,000 pounds over most common dirt roads.
To supply that essential 3,000 calories, Mitchel's 
original line of communication followed his route of march 
from Murfreesborough to Huntsville. He also employed part 
of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad from Nashville to 
Wartrace over the bridges he reconstructed at 
Murfreesborough in March, 1862. From Wartrace a rail line 
connected to Shelbyville, which Mitchel intended using as a 
depot, sending accumulated supplies from there by the pike 
road through Fayetteville to Huntsville.  ^ In order 
to keep his line of communications intact, Mitchel left a 
regiment at Fayetteville and one at Shelbyville to protect 
the turnpike bridges over the Duck and Elk Rivers.
Mitchel's earlier prediction that he could "laugh at 
railroad communication . . . and supply my army with my
regimental teams," became more difficult to fulfill than he 
expected due to rainy weather and the rough terrain. The 
fifty-seven mile journey from Shelbyville to Huntsville 
required one hundred and ten wagons per day to feed the 
Third Division. There were seventy-five to eighty wagons in
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the division train, and by using the regimental wagons this 
method of transporting supplies appeared practicable in good 
weather. However, if he used most of the wagons to haul 
provisions, then wagons for hauling forage around Huntsville 
or for other contingencies, such as transport for regimental 
baggage, cooking gear, ammunition, or medical supplies, or 
for the expeditions to Tuscumbia, Decatur, and Stevenson, 
would be unavailable or in limited number.^
As noted, the rugged terrain with steep inclines 
between Shelbyville and Fayetteville strained the draft 
animals and limited the weight of the cargo. Rain also 
hindered wagon transportation as it muddied or washed out 
the roads, which in turn burdened the movement and 
necessitated a lighter load for the animals to pull.
Mitchel feared "the heavy rains now falling will render the 
streams between [Huntsville] and Fayetteville impassable," 
and a fortnight after the occupation of Huntsville, Mitchel 
found "it impossible to feed [the] division from Shelbyville
gwithout the aid of all [the] regimental trains."
As the Third Division's line of communications faced
disruption due to natural causes, Mitchel rerouted the wagon
trains from Fayetteville via Madison Cross Roads to Athens
and arranged the transfer of their cargo to railroad cars
9for the rest of the trip to Huntsville.
Mitchel had attained his objective of severing the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad, not by destroying the 
Bridgeport bridge as he had planned, but by capturing intact
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the entire length of the road from Tuscumbia to Stevenson.
He had been successful in reaching his goal with such a 
limited force because his division did not have to fight its 
way forward and simply moved into the void left by the 
evacuation of Confederate forces for concentration at 
Corinth. In assuming a position from which to disrupt or 
threaten the Confederate line of communications (the Mobile 
and Ohio Railroad) he had provided an attainable solution to 
the stalemate at Corinth. But, without any prospects of 
receiving reinforcements from the combined armies around 
Corinth, the Third Division's advance reverted to a 
defensive deployment.
Unable to destroy the Howe Bridge at Bridgeport, Sill, 
on the left flank, had prevented the Confederates from 
gaining access to the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad and 
threatening Mitchel's rear. In conjunction with the move to 
Decatur, that temporary diversion allowed Mitchel to shift 
additional force to the division's right flank and advance 
on Tuscumbia with the intention of threatening Corinth, and 
in the hope of receiving support from the main army. The 
necessity for protecting key places along the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad gave the division the ability to forage 
as a deployed force.^ The division held the Memphis 
and Charleston Railroad without any support for an 
uncontested two weeks in April, but after Shiloh the 
Confederates put pressure on that part of the line from 
Tuscumbia to Decatur, which altered the Third Division's
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position.
Mitchel had a two-fold purpose when he ordered Turchin
forward to Tuscumbia. Besides proposing a turning movement,
Mitchel opened an alternate line of communications based on
1 2river transportation. Because the Tennessee River
could not be navigated by boats of deep draft above the 
Muscle Shoals, Tuscumbia became an important link between 
water and railroad communications. If the river fell below 
normal levels then transports were kept below Eastport,
approximately thirty miles downstream from
13Tuscumbia.
On the twenty-second of April, 1862, Buell responded to 
a request for supplies by Colonel Turchin, and sent two
transports loaded with 100,000 rations up river to
14Tuscumbia. These rations apparently presented a 
strong temptation to the concentrated Confederate army at 
Corinth, which was also having subsistence problems. 
Turchin's command had been threatened with encirclement at 
Tuscumbia due to the Confederate attempt to intercept the 
rations before they could be transported to 
Huntsville.^ Mitchel ordered that the stores be 
unloaded at Florence on the north side of the river, but the 
order was not r e c e i v e d . I n s t e a d ,  Turchin had 
already transported the provisions on an abandoned 
locomotive and two flat cars to Town Creek. Meanwhile 
Mitchel sent part of his reserve from Decatur to strengthen 
the force guarding the road from Decatur to the burnt bridge
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and to protect the transfer of those rations.^ At 
the destroyed bridge, the rations were loaded onto "wagons 
levied from the citizens, [carried] to the terminus of our 
railroad on the other side," then reloaded onto railroad 
cars from Huntsville and sent by rail to the commissary at 
Camp Jackson.^
Realizing that Turchin's predicament resulted from lack
of adequate manpower to cover his entire line, Mitchel
pleaded for more troops, arguing that the line occupied by
the Third Division was "one of vast importance, and a
heavier force is required for its defense and
19protection." On the 25th of April, Turchin
reported that 10,000 Confederates were advancing from 
20Memphis. Mitchel echoed that warning and relayed
his decision to Buell. "The enemy threatening to surround us
at Tuscumbia," Mitchel wrote, "we have fallen back to
Jonesborough, on the hither side of [Town Creek] . . .  as
you attach little importance to the occupying of Tuscumbia
and the south side of the river beyond Decatur I have
decided quietly to withdraw my troops to the north side of
the river, and will then destroy the [Decatur]
2 1bridge." Buell had ordered Mitchel to burn the 
bridge on the 19th of April, but Mitchel disagreed with the 
order and ignored it until he had exhausted means to obtain 
support for his forward movement from both his immediate 
commanders and from civilian leaders in Washington. On the 
27th of April, however, after repeated appeals for
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reinforcements to hold the Decatur to Tuscumbia line and
secure the Decatur Bridge in order to provide a continuous
line of communications across the Tennessee River, Mitchel
reported to Buell that "the bridge at Decatur is
2 2destroyed."
Mitchel lost his possible railroad communications with
the main army by destroying the Decatur bridge, but he was
left with no other option. The division was isolated and
had to fend for itself since Buell offered no
re-enforcements and granted no cooperation from the
regiments guarding Mitchel's line of communications, and
Mitchel was threatened by the Confederates on the Memphis
and Charleston line. As mentioned, Mitchel had kept such a
disproportionate part of his force to guard the Decatur
bridge in order to prevent it from reverting to Confederate
control. Without any other alternative, he was forced to
withdraw his command to the north bank of the Tennessee
River and protect his right flank by destroying the bridge.
He feared the effect of the abandonment of his line because
he knew the importance of his position, if ever a
contemplated move east towards Chattanooga was to take
23place. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad
provided a favorable line of operations for such an 
offensive against Chattanooga, for it permitted transfer of 
men and supplies from Halleck's army to Stevenson and supply 
by the feeder routes via the Nashville and Decatur Railroad, 
the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and the Tennessee
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River. The two railroads had gaps due to downed bridges,
but Mitchel expected that they would be closed in a few
days. Mitchel accepted the limited loss of territory south
of the river as a defensive move placing the river barrier
between his forces and the enemy, while keeping the
important Memphis and Charleston Railroad as a line of
operations for the main army and as an internal line of
communications for his division. In withdrawing, the Third
Division became more secure, but confronted the problems of
a constricted stationary force in consuming the limited
resources of the area around Huntsville and in maintaining
the logistical connection from Nashville (see map 6).
Still searching for a complete and secure line of
communications, Mitchel suggested that supplies could be
transported by steamer to Florence as had the 100,000
rations, but then transferred to wagons and hauled in two
days to Athens over roads north of the river by way of
24Rogerville and then by rail to Huntsville. He
pointed out that his "line now extends westward by rail to
Athens and . . . my communication with the main army remains
unchanged, while I am relieved from any apprehensions on my 
2 5right." Having to keep north of the river between 
Athens and Florence, Mitchel only lost the advantage of the 
railroad from Tuscumbia to Decatur. With intact railroad 
communications from Athens along the Nashville and Decatur 
Railroad, the supplies could still come into Huntsville by
train.
171
Map 6. Lines of communications and plan for Chattanooga. 
Source. Vincent J. Esposito, The West Point Atlas, 2 vols 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), l:Maps 74 and 75.
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In anticipation of the new link through Athens, Mitchel
sent the Eighteenth Ohio to secure the railroad terminus and
positioned cavalry scouts along the road north of the river
to Florence. He posted men on the river at Bainbridge and
Lambs Ferry to watch for Confederates troops or cavalry
2 6attempting to cross. In an attempt to reopen the
link to the main army, Mitchel subtly offered the support of
his division, which could have marched back along the same
roads over which he hoped to be resupplied. Remembering the
100,000 rations sent to Tuscumbia in mid-April, Buell
indicated on June 3rd, that Mitchel could again receive
supplies by that route, since the Army of the Ohio was
moving in Mitchel's direction and likewise needed 
27supplies. Most of the supplies of the Army of the
Ohio were coming by the Tennessee River, and were delivered
at Eastport and Tuscumbia.
Having his interior lines "made as perfect as
practicable" along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad
between Decatur and Stevenson, with "regular trains running,
a printed time-table; a splendid machine-shop in full
action, and all the railroad offices in complete order,"
Mitchel did not fear the enemy, either from Chattanooga or
Decatur. With his "very swift" locomotives, Mitchel had the
ability to shift men and supplies from one threatened flank
to the other after being notified of danger over his
2 8completed telegraph lines. Instead, Mitchel
worried about control of that "long railroad line, . . . the
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great distances separating [his] troops, the scarcity of
provisions and forage, . . . the immense distance to haul,
2 9and the rains and floods."
Mitchel retreated above the river to a position where
the land produced marginal subsistence crops. In a cotton
growing region an abundant supply of corn or grasses was not 
30expected. There was "little surplus of corn .
[and] planters [were] satisfied if they raise[d] corn,
forage, fodder, and hay for their own 
31consumption." The 1861 harvest had been poor,
which, combined with the retreating Confederate army
transversing the area and "levying upon the people, made the
supplies less than normal." As Judge G. W. Lane, a
pro-Union citizen of Huntsville, revealed just a few months
later, "the Confederate army passed right through the
valley, and levied contributions during the two weeks they 
3 2were there." However, under pressure from the
advancing Federal army, and attempting to concentrate at
Corinth in March and early April, the retreating
Confederates had failed to gather in all the available
forage or subsistence when they moved through the area. "In
many places . . . [were] found the greatest abundance of
corn, and sometimes hay, sometimes oats, of the crop of 
3 31861." Rather than a deficiency of forage, "the
corn crop seemed to be pretty good around the country about
Huntsville, and . . . more corn than . . . expected [was
3 Afound] in portions of Tennessee and Alabama."
Generally, the Third Division found more stored grain and 
fodder from the 1861 crop than anticipated, which supplied 
their needs because the 1862 crop would not be harvested 
until late summer.
For human consumption, little wheat had been grown in 
the area and most breadstuffs and meat products were
imported from Kentucky and Tennessee prior to the
35commencement of hostilities. Cattle were scarce
because, "the preparation of cotton required that the land
should be well pulverized, and if stock is allowed to run
upon the land in the winter and in the spring the ground
breaks up into clods." Plantation owners therefore avoided
raising more stock than required for self-sufficiency, such
3 6as working oxen and milk cows. However, during
the last ten years the farmers raised more hogs and had
decreased their dependency on outside sources for bacon.
"They used to raise cotton to buy bacon [from Kentucky and
Tennessee]," Lane noted, "but now they raise other supplies
3 7upon their plantations."
Mitchel made the decision to lessen the impact of his 
occupation upon the population by limiting requistion of 
consumable commodities from the inhabitants, but this 
practice made him dependent on his line of communications 
for provisions for his men, while subsisting on the country 
and requisitioning from the populace to supply the necessary 
forage. General Order #13a, issued by Buell on the 26th of 
February, 1862, set guidelines for the behavior of Union
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soldiers and their relationship to the citizens of the
invaded states. It forbade soldiers plundering for food and
stipulated that "if the necessities of the public service
should require the use of private property for public
3 8purposes fair compensation is to be allowed."
Mitchel reiterated the order by issuing his own General
Order #81, which forbade "all plundering or pillaging or
39depredation upon property of any kind." Mitchel
directed that supplies were to be "derived partly from the
Government headquarters at Nashville; partly by foraging
upon the country and pressing supplies," from the
populace.^  Mitchel insisted that "whenever
provisions or forage [had] been taken, and the accounts,
properly made out, [were] certified by the proper officer,
these accounts will be paid promptly by the
quartermaster. Accordingly, the inhabitants of
Huntsville did not suffer from wanton destruction committed
under Mitchel's command except in isolated cases.
Destitution was avoided, although the civilian population
complained constantly. Supplies of forage were also
procured from the inhabitants with restitution made in Union
money, but Mitchel did not "draw supplies from the country
if [he] could help it." In fact even though the forage
trains were out gathering supplies daily, the Third Division
A2did not draw all it could. Forage parties and
wagon trains did travel up to seventeen miles from 
Huntsville to gather enough feed for the division's animals
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because the cultivated land around Huntsville was oriented
A3towards the west, between Huntsville and Decatur.
Following Buell's dictate, Mitchel primarily 
requisitioned forage for his animals from the citizens.
Under advice from Judge George W. Lane, a personal 
aquaintance and Union sympathizer, Mitchel did not levy very 
heavy "contributions," but obtained "his supplies as well as 
he could from the army stores in Tennessee . . . He levied
contributions for the forage entirely." He did not
confiscate provisions from the people because "there was a
• - 11A Agreat scarcity of . . meat.
Mitchel worried about maintaining his line of 
communications because he could refrain from imposing heavy 
food levies upon the local people only so long as the line 
remained open. Swollen rivers and streams had closed the 
Shelbyville, Fayetteville, and Huntsville route, and without 
a permanent connection with the main army at Corinth or 
promise of any detached support to aid in holding the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad, the two railroads trailing 
from the division's flanks and intersecting at Nashville 
were his last two possibilities. The waters of the 
Tennessee River fell in May, which limited the access of 
boats to Eastport and forced a road trip by wagon of 
seventy-five miles from Athens to Waterloo across from 
Eastport, an unrealistic endeavor since the forage consumed 
by the draft animals would displace much of the net cargo 
and a great many wagons would have to be employed to keep a
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constant and adequate supply of provisions available. The 
Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad was not a reliable line 
of supply because the Confederates had occupied Stevenson 
and even when driven out they still applied pressure upon 
the line. In addition, the Confederates had cavalry forces 
in the Cumberland Mountains in support of their infantry 
from Bridgeport to McMinnville, and there threatened the 
Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad and destroyed numerous 
bridges which disrupted it as a line of 
communications.^ The line had to be cleared of any 
menacing guerrilla activity before it could be secured.
Therefore, the Nashville and Decatur Railroad became 
the only maintainable link with the Nashville depot. It was 
a single tracked road operating on a line 120 miles from 
Nashville to Decatur, and crossing two major rivers flowing 
east to west, the Duck and Elk, which intersected the 
railroad at Columbia and near Elkton. Some of the bridges 
on the Nashville and Decatur Railroad had been put out of 
commission when the rebels retreated toward Corinth in 
March. As a result, before Mitchel's occupation a 
forty-five mile gap in the line already existed because of 
downed bridges at Columbia and near Elkton. Because Mitchel 
did not have control of the rear echelon forces at Columbia, 
insufficient guards were posted to protect other minor 
bridges, the destruction of which further inhibited a 
continuous line of communications. Up to the middle of May, 
Buell kept tight control of the troops in Mitchel's rear
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through James Negley's command at Columbia, where two 
infantry and two cavalry regiments protected the Nashville 
and Decatur Railroad to Pulaski. Colonel Henry M. Duffield 
held Murfreesborough with the Ninth Michigan, Eighth 
Kentucky, Hewett's Artillery, and parts of the Seventh 
Pennsylvania and Fourth Kentucky cavalry. Buell held in 
reserve the Sixty-ninth Ohio and Third Minnesota at 
Nashville and promised Mitchel that four other regiments 
were being sent from Ohio and Louisville.
Buell restricted the use of those troops to the
contingency of an enemy break through at Stevenson.
Likewise, the cavalry posted between Savannah and Columbia
"should not be removed from there if it can be
avoided."^ Buell's subordinates guarding Mitchel's
rear line of communications were indecisive and naturally
looked to Buell for guidance. Asked by Mitchel to complete
telegraph communications from Decatur to Columbia and to
send a regiment to Shelbyville and one to Murfreesborough to
release his own regiment for duty at Tuscumbia and
Stevenson, Negley requested Buell to "advise [him] as to the
troops to guard the road; instruct me fully, if you 
4 8please." When Mitchel indicated to Duffield at 
Murfreesborough that "I must depend upon you to send forward 
troops immediately to hold Wartrace and Shelbyville. My 
regiment must come forward, even if I give up my line of 
supplies," Duffield sent off a dispatch to Buell to confirm 
the verbal orders that he was "to reinforce Mitchel promptly
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if attacked. No orders to relieve him. What shall be 
4 9done?" Buell was under the impression that his 
disposition of troops in Middle Tennessee was "absolutely 
necessary for its defense and to support Mitchel," but by 
directing his entire command from the Shiloh battlefield he 
became out of touch with Mitchel's command in northern 
Alabama and was not aware of the situation.^
Mitchel finally received control of the troops guarding his 
line of communications on the 7th of May, but by that time 
he had already constricted his line to Decatur, and 
destroyed the bridge.^
Because of the failure to establish any other secure
line of communications, however, Mitchel had by his first
week of occupation in April, 1862, planned on using his
wagons to bridge the railroad gap between Columbia and
Elkton. When the Third Division fell back to the north side
of the river, Mitchel posted the Eighteenth Ohio to secure
Athens and cover any movement by the Confederates across the
river south of Decatur. By maintaining control of the
Memphis and Charleston Railroad, Mitchel had communications
established to its junction with the Nashville and Decatur
Railroad at Decatur. To haul supplies and provisions
between the ends of the gap in the railroad, Mitchel
employed his division's transportation to move from Elkton
52to Columbia over the turnpike. Using a
combination of rail and wagon, Mitchel established this line 
as a very realistic and suitable alternative to the
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Shelbyville, Fayetteville, and Huntsville route until such
time as the entire Nashville and Decatur Railroad could be
put back in working order. In hopes of making the
Elkton-Columbia turnpike his makeshift line of
communications, he reminded to Negley at Columbia that a
loaded wagon train could carry about five days' rations for
10,000 men and that he requested rations be forwarded to 
53Columbia. Mitchel expected that seventy-eight 
wagons would be required and thus set in motion this 
temporary measure, but "wish[ed] it were possible to open 
the railway by rebuilding the bridges" between Columbia and 
Elk River, which "would enable me to feed my troops without 
difficulty." ^  ^
Considering that a wagon carried approximately 2,000 
pounds of supplies, including forage rations for the trip, 
and that the horses pulled the wagons about two and one half 
miles per hour, then approximately 118,600 pounds of rations 
were delivered by each wagon train from Columbia to 
Elkton.^"* Transferred to box and flat cars, the 
rations were then carried on the Nashville and Decatur 
Railroad and on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to 
Huntsville and Stevenson.^ The delay in initiating 
a wagon train relay would have been around six days, the 
time it took to get the wagons to Columbia, loaded, and 
returned to Elkton, but the Turchin expedition to Tuscumbia 
and the temporary line of communications with the main army 
by river had delivered 100,000 rations that arrived at
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Huntsville on April 24th and filled the deficiency. ^
On reaching Huntsville, Mitchel initially demanded that
the mayor persuade the local citizens to supply provisions
for the troops temporarily because the wagon train had not
5 8kept pace with the division from Shelbyville.
Then the provision train hauled rations from Shelbyville
until the rains and the terrain forced the discontinuance of
that route. The ten days' worth of rations delivered by
boat at Florence provided an interim supply, until Mitchel
started the wagon trains hauling rations between railheads
at Columbia and Elkton. Each wagon train load could deliver
roughly 37,950 full rations, good for almost four days, or
eight days on half rations. But, as the bridges were
reconstructed along the Nashville and Decatur Railroad,
first at Columbia, the distance the wagons had to haul
provisions decreased, and with the decrease less forage was
needed to feed the draft animals on the route of 
59march. The distance shrank from forty-five to 
thirty-five miles between Lynnville and Elkton and the 
number of rations delivered increased to 40,615. Once the 
Lynnville bridge closed the gap, the mules made the trip in 
two days, covering the twenty-three mile distance from 
Reynold's Station to Elkton and delivering approximately 
81,230 rations.^
However, there were times when the Third Division had 
to subsist on half rations due to failure of supplies to 
reach Columbia, or to roving bands of Confederate cavalry
182
who intercepted a ladened wagon train, but the men appeared 
to tough it out. While plundering was a punishable offense 
and officers were held accountable for their men, some 
unauthorized confiscation of provisions took place.
Other factors also alleviated the food situation, which
might have forced the army to withdraw from the region, or
might have led to wholesale pillaging. Because the
Confederates were committed to the defense of the junction
at Corinth, they were unable to release the large force that
would have been necessary to position it across the Third
Division's line of communications, which would have required
Mitchel's troops to fight on the tactical offensive to
extricate themselves from their position, for they were
totally dependent on the Nashville and Decatur Railroad for
their subsistence. The situation was also ameliorated by
the fact that at three and one-eighth pounds, the ordinary
army ration was not normally totally consumed by a "soldier
in full health," which permitted half-rations to be endured.
Most soldiers did not show evidence of "pinching hunger"
when on half-rations, even though they complained about not
getting their full share.^ The men also got along
with a sufficient supply of "green corn and a few
6 2vegetables," obtained by means of requisition.
Mitchel's subsistence problems were reduced further by 
his intact interior lines. Besides giving a strategic 
benefit in permitting movement of a regiment rapidly from 
one point to another, the Memphis and Charleston Railroad
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was a distinct advantage for each man because he could ride
6 3the distance rather than march. Since marching
troops "require more sustenance" and energy than those being 
transported, the amount of transportation for subsistence 
need be proportionately less; therefore the provisions 
hauled by wagon transport supplied more troops and 
half-rations sustained more men for longer periods. 
Engineers, foragers, men who did fatigue duty, or the like, 
were sustained on full rations because they had "hard work 
at daily labor .
Mitchel had managed the movement of the wagon train so 
successfully that he was hauling the 1861 cotton crop for 
northern cotton dealers over the gap in the Nashville and 
Decatur Railroad and shipping the bales northbound on rail. 
By charging the established government carrying charges, 
Mitchel was able to operate the extensive Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad, pay the local workers, and feed the 
division's animals by paying for instead of confiscating the 
forage received from the local farmers.^ He was also 
able to calm somewhat the antagonism of the local 
inhabitants; presumably this would help to keep his 
communications intact by minimizing local guerilla activity, 
as well as encouraging farmers to engage in commerce with 
the Yankees.
* * si­
l/ i t h o u t any cooperation from Buell or Halleck in 
joining forces for an attack on Corinth in the west, or in
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holding the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, Mitchel had 
shifted his forces to Stevenson for an advance on 
Chattanooga in the east. He had originally destroyed the 
bridge over Widden's Creek to shut off the Nashville and 
Chattanooga Railroad from the Confederates at Bridgeport, 
but he kept the route open from Huntsville to Stevenson in 
order to attack Chattanooga and to forage about the area. 
While Buell wanted the Howe Bridge destroyed, as had been 
planned earlier in the year, and Mitchel had attempted to 
destroy it with his raid in March, the bridge, still intact,
opened an avenue towards Chattanooga and provided another
, , 66opportunity to shorten the war.
After destroying the bridge over Widden's Creek, six
miles east of Stevenson, the enemy destroyed one bridge at
Stevenson and another eight miles west of Stevenson; the
Confederates had the same objective as Mitchel--each wished
to keep the other from using the Nashville and Chattanooga
Railroad. Concerned that Mitchel might be overrun at
Stevenson and lose middle Tennessee, Buell warned him that
he might have to fall back to Shelbyville if his position
was not secured. This warning had provided the pretext for
the order to destroy the Bridgeport Bridge in April.
Mitchel acknowledged Buell's order and warning, but unlike
Buell, who felt that "the railroad would hardly be a proper
line of communications for us against 
6 7Chattanooga," Mitchel considered using it to
supply and to transport a large enough force "to strike a
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6 8blow" at that city. Too late, Halleck would come
to the same conclusion for the defense of Middle Tennessee.
Throughout April, 1862, Mitchel reported that "the
bridge [over Widden's Creek] destroyed by me between
Stevenson and Bridgeport still intervenes between my troops
and the enemy. The heavy rains and high waters have thus
far prevented me from destroying the Tennessee 
6 9bridge." Told that no re-enforcements were
available to support his position on his right, Mitchel
concluded that after his troops had crossed the Tennessee
and the Decatur bridge was fired, he could devote all his
attention to the advance on Bridgeport and
Chattanooga.^  In the meantime, before Mitchel was
prepared to advance the Confederates rebuilt the bridge that
Mitchel had destroyed.  ^^ Mitchel then ordered a
small steamer to be adapted to carry a number of troops and
an artillery piece, in the hope of taking the Bridgeport
bridge. ^  Able to support the regiment of infantry
at Bellefonte and cavalry scouts at Stevenson with part of
Turchin ' s brigade, Mitchel moved on Stevenson and learned
that not more than 1,000 troops occupied Chattanooga, with
an outpost at Bridgeport consisting of a regiment of
infantry and one of cavalry. Mitchel promised that should
the rains subside and the roads became usable, he would
force the enemy to abandon Bridgeport, and then he would
7 3either hold or destroy the bridge. To reach
Stevenson required the rebuilding of two bridges, each
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approximately 300 feet long, which had been destroyed by the 
Confederates. The first, across Mud Creek, seven miles from 
Stevenson, was built as a floating bridge, upon cotton bales 
captured from the enemy. Within the afternoon of the 27th 
of April, two regiments of infantry, one company of cavalry, 
and a piece of artillery of the Third Division had passed 
the bridge. The second bridge was completed on the next
Within four days of securing his right flank, Mitchel
launched an expedition from Bridgeport toward Chattanooga
and progressed within twelve miles of the city. On the way,
the army captured supplies and a southern mail carrier, but
more important, it created panic among the soldiers and
citizens at Chattanooga. Simultaneously, another expedition
under Negley penetrated to Jasper, where it found strong
Union support. Since the garrison at Chattanooga was
undermanned and in a state of confusion, and was seen
removing property towards Atlanta, Mitchel felt that with a
larger force he could "cross the Osage at Grates' Ferry and
march against Rome [Georgia]. . . . That entire region is
now comparatively unprotected and very much 
7 5alarmed." By striking at Rome, Mitchel perhaps
could conduct a raid or even a turning movement against an 
enemy's line of communication, hoping to disrupt the Western 
and Atlantic Railroad, another strategic blow to the deep 
South.^ This was a natural strategic move that 
followed the Nashville-Chattanooga-Atlanta geographic
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corridor. Besides severing the main railroad artery into
the southeastern Confederate States, the expedition might
even have reached Atlanta while the two major Confederate
armies were occupied at Corinth and in front of Richmond.
Mitchel even expected that a "great struggle" would occur
"for the mastery of the railroad from Richmond south to
Atlanta." This could only occur if the Western and Atlantic
Railroad were cut. With the only guidance from Buell being
to relieve the Confederate threat to a small Union
contingent at the Cumberland Gap by making a diversion
towards Chattanooga, Mitchel continued to probe around
Chattanooga with his limited force. Sill's brigade had
advanced to Jasper and united with Negley's force, at which
time Mitchel gave Negley "authority to take [Chattanooga] in
case he deem[ed] it prudent."^
Relieved from the engagement around Corinth, however,
the Confederates had re-enforced the 1,000 man garrison at
Chattanooga to 10-12,000 men to stem Mitchel's advance and
to concentrate and prepare for an invasion of Kentucky and
Tennessee by General Braxton Bragg. With his meager force,
Mitchel was forced to discontinue his offensive and revert
7 8to a holding action. Awaiting the slow arrival of
Buell over the now disrupted Memphis and Charleston
Railroad, Mitchel decided that "As there is no [hope] of an
immediate advance upon Chattanooga, X will now contract my 
7 9line." Mitchel had to be content to report that
"my force is totally insufficient to do anything more than
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to guard the extensive region over which they are spread
from hostile citizens and small bands of the 
,.80enemy.
While Mitchel's advance toward Chattanooga, in the 
first week in May, was unsupported and received little 
assistance from his commanders, it could not have achieved 
more than a holding action without a complete railroad to 
provide the necessary supplies. If he had been given 
reinforcements, Mitchel could not have supplied them so far 
from their base at Nashville by way of Decatur. Unlike his 
planned move from Tuscumbia, he was now far from 
supplemental river transportation.
Mitchel's supply problem was not insurmountable when 
feeding only his own division. Even with an incomplete line 
of communications, his management was successful in 
provisioning his troops and supplying enough forage for his 
animals. Because Mitchel's force was relatively small, it 
was able to subsist by living off the land and by hauling 
supplies over the gap in the railroad. However, because his 
line of communications was not intact, he would not have 
been able to supply a much larger force, such as that 
required to capture Chattanooga. The contemplated offensive 
would have required more men and animals, not just for the 
seige of the city or for the action against Rome, but to 
guard the 400 miles of railway from
Nashville-Athens-Decatur-Huntsville-Stevenson against 
guerrilla raiders. That this line of
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communications was inadequate may be illustrated by the
attempt to supply Buell's Army of the Ohio as it moved from
Corinth to Stevenson, while trying to cut off Bragg's
invasion of Middle Tennessee from Chattanooga in June, 1862.
On the 3rd of June, 1862, Buell ordered the Nashville
depot to accumulate supplies in order to feed his army of
five divisions, approximately 40,000 troops exclusive of
Mitchel's force, as it moved across northern 
8 2Alabama. While the Army of the Ohio operated as 
part of the Department of the Mississippi, it moved very 
slowly over the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which
Mitchel had controlled from Tuscumbia to Decatur only two
8 3months earlier. Buell's mission was to conform
the movements of his army with those of the Confederates, a
84portion of which were already in Chattanooga.
Learning of the hitherto undetected Confederate move east to 
Chattanooga, Halleck insisted that "no time should be lost 
in reestablishing our connection with Mitchel. . . . The 
first thing now to be done is to open the railroad to 
Decatur .
After giving up the pursuit of the enemy south to 
Baldwin, the Army of the Ohio changed direction, and moved 
east towards Stevenson. But because it had to rebuild many 
bridges which the enemy had destroyed and to cross the 
Tennessee River by ferry, since the Decatur bridge had been 
burned down, the advance was made with great difficulty.
The Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which Mitchel had
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controlled and which had provided easy access over the 
Tennessee, now became a hinderance. Mitchel was ordered to 
ferry across locomotives and cars at Decatur to expedite 
Buell's move, but due to Muscle Shoals, ferries large enough 
to accommodate engines could not be moved above 
Florence.^
As the Army of the Ohio marched east along the Memphis
and Charleston Railroad, it received supplies from temporary
8 7depots at Eastport and Tuscumbia. On June 1st,
however, Buell was already considering how he was to supply
his army once it crossed over to the north bank. He ordered
200,000 rations and 120,000 forage rations to be accumulated
at Athens and another 50,000 rations and 25,000 of forage to
8 8meet the troops at Decatur. In order to move
those rations over the gap in the Nashville and Decatur
Railroad between Reynold's Station and Elkton, Buell
supplemented Mitchel's one hundred wagons.
In total, Buell sent over 500 baggage and supply wagons
detached from his divisions to Reynold's Station to carry 
89supplies. Immediately they were organized into
supply trains and began hauling provisions and forage. An
elaborate system was created to keep the trains shuttling
between the rail heads. In order to minimize the forage
carried on the round robin trip from Reynold's Station to
Elkton, the quartermasters established facilities for
shoeing and resting the animals and repairing the wagons at
90Reynold s Station instead of at Elkton. Just one
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days' less forage to carry on the wagons to feed the draft
animals during the layover, permitted 138 pounds more of
provisions to be carried per wagon forward to Elkton. Since
trains of 200 wagons were common, 26,400 more pounds of
cargo or 8,500 full rations, could be transported per trip,
by avoiding the lay over at Elkton. The first wagon train
of 200 wagons accompanied by two cavalry companies departed
Reynold's Station on the 20th of June and arrived in Elkton
on the same day. The distance had by that time narrowed to
91twenty-two miles. However, even with the great
number of wagons, including 100 supplied by Mitchel, the
trains could barely meet the demands of 40,000 men and
thousands of animals in providing the minimum required 
92subsistence.
On July 11th, Buell stated that "the gap of 22 miles on
the Decatur road, the one we are dependent upon for
supplies, . . . requires every wagon that can be possibly
spared to keep the troops from starving, and at that we are
living from day to day. . . .  We cannot advance beyond
Stevenson until the road is completed so as to release the
9 3wagons not absolutely required in rear." It was 
only after the gap in the Nashville and Decatur Railroad was 
bridged and the 1862 crop was harvested that Buell's army 
began to accumulate enough supplies for an advance on 
Chattanooga. As one officer recalled, "There was but a 
limited supply of forage up to the 20th of August, when the 
new crop of corn came in, when there was plenty of forage."
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And another noted that "on the resumption of communication
9 Aby rail, stores came through regularly."
With his division transportation, Mitchel had indicated
that he could supply 20,000 troops at Stevenson, but only
four days later, on the 16th of June, he believed that his
division train "will not be sufficient to do the work
required, but will suffice to feed 10,000 troops." Although
he could keep his own troops fed, he had failed to
accumulate provision and forage at Decatur or Huntsville to
feed Buell's men crossing the river at Florence and Decatur.
From the 3rd of June, the date he was ordered to begin
supplying Buell's army and while continuing to supply his
own from Nashville, to the end of the month, Mitchel had not
accumulated any stores, even when he used Buell's wagons.
That he was unable to provide adequate supply for Buell's
army proved his inability to supply the larger army he had
planned to use the previous month for his projected
95expedition to Chattanooga. The significance of an 
absence of rail communications in translating strategy into 
viable operations was demonstrated.
Photo 4. One of the reasons for the gap in Mitchel's line of 
communications, the Elk River bridge near Pulaski, 
Tennessee, which was destroyed by the Confederates and 
disrupted the flow of supplies over the Nashville and 
Decatur Railroad.
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CONCLUSION
General Ormsby Macknight Mitchel succeeded in a notable 
achievement early in the Civil War by severing the vital 
Confederate Memphis and Charleston Railroad. In April 1862 
he captured all of Alabama north of the Tennessee River and 
the rail line operating through that state from Stevenson to 
Decatur. He bisected the line at Huntsville and proceeded 
to secure his Third Division's flanks by operating the 
captured railway to Stevenson and Decatur. In a follow-up 
expedition, he had Turchin move west along the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad to Tuscumbia in an attempt to join 
forces with the combined armies of Halleck and Buell, which 
were stalemated at Corinth forty-two miles away.
In occupying northern Alabama, Mitchel sought to 
inflict more permanent damage to the Confederate east-west 
supply line than he could have done with a mere raid to 
disrupt Confederate communications. By holding the 
territory along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, he 
obtained more decisive results than Assistant Secretary of 
War, Thomas A. Scott, believed, for after the capture of 
Huntsville, Confederate forces moving by rail from Virginia 
to the Mississippi line had to come via Montgomery,
Meridian, and Mobile, then to Corinth.^ In effect,
Mitchel did more than delay the arrival of Confederate
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reinforcements at Corinth, for he initiated an 
action— perhaps a turning movement, perhaps a raid— on the 
Confederate line of communications, the Mobile and Ohio 
Railroad. Because of Mitchel's blocking action on the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad, the Confederate army was 
forced to depend on Mobile for supplies, provisions, and 
reinforcements.
Mitchel understood the vulnerability of railroads to 
disruption and the effect that cutting supply lines would 
have on an army that was concentrated. From the experience 
he gained in planning the preempted expedition to Cumberland 
Gap in October 1861, and by his practical knowledge of 
engineering and management, Mitchel realized the importance 
of the railroad as a line of communications. An army that 
had once concentrated by rail that was now denied to it, 
could be forced to live off a land not suited for a 
concentrated field army, although that same army, supplied 
by rail, would have adequate supply. This form of strategy 
discarded the direct attack on an entrenched enemy, and 
instead provoked the adversary by depriving the men and 
animals of food. A break in an enemy's line of 
communications, or even the threat of one, forced that army 
to retreat or to turn to the tactical offensive in order to 
extricate itself from its dangerous position. Mitchel knew 
that an enemy was not susceptible to indirect attack or 
threatening pressure if "he has neither front, flanks, nor 
rear; nor line of communications to cut"; however, the
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concentrated Confederate army at Corinth was in a vulnerable
2position. With a complete railroad to his rear and 
river transport as an alternate supply line, Mitchel, with 
anticipated support from the main Union army, proposed to 
cut the Mobile and Ohio Railroad near Jacinto. A united 
Federal army would have departed from Tuscumbia to threaten 
or sever the Confederate line of communications. The 
turning maneuver or raiding action had a genuine possibility 
of ending the stalemate at Corinth, forcing the enemy to 
retreat or to attack the Union lines in a tactical 
offensive.
Mitchel's effort was not appreciated by his superiors, 
whose systematic and laborious attempt to take Corinth 
occupied their total attention. If the Union commanders had 
modified their strategy to employ Mitchel's column as a 
turning movement, even a raid, the Confederates would have 
been forced to surrender their defensive strategy and go on 
the tactical offensive. The resulting assault against 
rifled muskets would have had a high cost in Confederate 
lives. But after repeated requests for reinforcements to 
support his movement were ignored, Mitchel withdrew 
Turchin's brigade to the north bank of the Tennessee and 
destroyed the Decatur bridge. Under threat of encirclement, 
Mitchel destroyed the only connection that the main army had 
with central Tennessee rather than let the bridge be 
recaptured by the Confederates.
Having the Memphis and Charleston Railroad for interior
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lines, Mitchel shifted his force of 8,700 men to Stevenson 
in an attempt to capture Bridgeport, hoping to use it as a 
crossing point over the Tennessee River to Chattanooga. In 
this move, Mitchel was encouraged by his commanders only 
because it diverted Confederate attention from Morgan's 
front around Cumberland Gap. However, the plan to turn 
Chattanooga by cutting the Winchester and Alabama Railroad 
at Rome was grandious, premature, and not likely to succeed, 
not because the strategic plan was flawed, but because 
Mitchel required more men and an intact railroad for his 
line of communications to accomplish the task. Mitchel's 
400 miles of railroad communications, stretching from 
Stevenson to Nashville, from Decatur to Nashville, and from 
Decatur to Stevenson were not complete and forced Mitchel to 
haul provisions by wagon between the gaps. When Buell 
attempted to supply the 40-50,000 men in his Army of the 
Ohio over the same broken line, it required all of the 
army's wagon transport to close the gap in its rear, leaving 
none available to support the expedition from Stevenson to 
Chattanooga. It was only after the Nashville and Decatur 
Railroad was reconstructed, and after the 1862 crop was 
harvested, that Buell's force could have gone on the 
offensive towards Chattanooga. Mitchel faced similar
conditions, but did not have the means to ensure a secure *
line of communications, while at the same time keeping 
enough men to deliver the attack on Chattanooga.
Mitchel's success was that he cut the Confederate line
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of communications, and then held his position with limited
means in order to keep the prized Memphis and Charleston
Railroad under Federal control. Halleck later realized this
importance when he ordered Buell's army to move east from
Corinth to Chattanooga in early June, 1862. Mitchel held
the Memphis and Charleston Railroad for almost three months
with an independent command, and turned over to his
superiors the opportunity employ interior lines. From
Decatur to Stevenson "the Memphis and Charleston Railroad .
. . was of incalculable advantage to the army as a means of
transportation. It was the only possible means except by
3land carriage." Since the direct link between 
Nashville and Stevenson, the Nashville and Chattanooga 
Railroad, was contested and made unusable, the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad provided the only means of hauling men 
and supplies from Nashville. The Tennessee River was 
limited, for boats could proceed no farther up river than 
Florence.
The Memphis and Charleston Railroad enabled the 
shipment of supplies from Nashville to Stevenson and gave 
the Federal army the ability to "transport by rail 18 wagons 
and their horses and 1,500 men at each trip." The running 
time from Athens to Stevenson was approximately six hours, 
compared to marching the same eighty-five miles in about six 
days. Had Mitchel's superiors realized the importance of 
his initial achievement, and provided the means to guard the 
entire line from Tuscumbia to Stevenson, then the road would
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have been intact when Halleck needed it. The move over the 
Tennessee River would have been made much more 
rapidly.^
Mitchel summarized the Third Division's endeavors in 
northern Alabama in a congratulatory communique to his men, 
dated April 16th:
So1diers,--Your march upon Bowling Green won 
the thanks and confidence of our commanding 
general. With engines and cars captured from the 
enemy, our advance guard precipitated itself upon 
Nashville. It was now made your duty to seize and 
destroy the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, the 
great military road of the enemy. With a supply 
train only sufficient to feed you at a distance of 
two days' march from your depot, you undertook the 
Herculean task of rebuilding 1,200 feet of heavy 
bridging, which, by your untiring energy, was 
accomplished in ten days. Thus, by a railway of 
your own construction, your depot of supplies was 
removed from Nashville to Shelbyville, nearly 
sixty miles in the direction of the object of your 
attack. The blow now became practicable.
Marching with a celerity such as to outstrip any 
messenger who might have attempted to announce 
your coming, you fell upon Huntsville, taking your 
enemy completely by surprise, and capturing not 
only his great military road, but all his machine 
shops, engines and rolling stock. Thus, providing 
yourselves with ample transportation, you have 
struck blow after blow with a rapidity 
unparalleled. Stevenson fell sixty miles to the 
east of Huntsville. Decatur and Tuscumbia have 
been in a like manner seized, and are now 
occupied. In three days you have extended your 
front of operations more than 120 miles, and your 
morning gun at Tuscumbia may be heard by your 
comrades on the battlefields made glorious by 
their victory before Corinth. The communication 
of these facts to headquarters has not only won 
the thanks of our commanding general, but those of 
the department of war, which I announce to you 
with proud satisfaction. Accept the thanks of our 
commander, and let your future dgeds demonstrate 
that you can surpass yourselves.
Mitchel's achievements as a commander were similarly 
recognized by the leaders in Washington on April 11, 1862,
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when they promoted him to Major-General of Volunteers "for 
gallant and meritorious service," in capturing Huntsville 
and the Memphis and Charleston Railroad without a
, T 6battle.
By capturing and using the Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad as an interior line of communications for his 
position in northern Alabama, and in his conception of a 
strategy for disrupting the Confederate lines of 
communications by turning movements, Mitchel proved himself 
an exception to the old adage that generals are always 
prepared to fight the previous war. Having been out of the 
army for a generation, he was not influenced by obsolete 
doctrine. Appreciating the significance of the railroad as 
few other generals did, Ormsby Macknight Mitchel was better 
prepared for the Civil War than some of his contemporaries 
who had remained in the army.
Footnotes to Conclusion
^Scott to Stanton, May 6, 1862, Official
Records , Series I, Vol. X, pt. 2, p. 166.
2Mitchel to Buell, June 6, 1862, ibid., p. 265.
3Innes Testimony during Buell Commission of 
Inquiry, December 24, 1862, ibid., Vol. XVI, pt. 1, p. 249.
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